

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A
COURT OF INQUIRY
CONVENED AT
TRIAL SERVICE OFFICE PACIFIC
BY ORDER OF
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TO INQUIRE INTO A COLLISION
BETWEEN USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) AND
JAPANESE M/V EHIME MARU THAT OCCURRED
OFF THE COAST OF OAHU, HAWAII
ON 9 FEBRUARY 2001
ORDERED ON 17 FEBRUARY 2001
AS AMENDED ON 22 FEBRUARY 2001;
26 FEBRUARY 2001;
1 MARCH 2001; AND
9 MARCH 2001

At Trial Service Office Pacific
Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Thursday, 15 March 2001

The court was called to order at 0800 hours.

PRES: This court is now in session. Counsel for the Court?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Let the record reflect that all members, parties, and counsel are present. Legalman Senior Chief Donna L. Sayers is absent.

PRES: Any procedural matters?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): No procedural matters, sir.

PRES: Counsel for the Parties have procedural matters?

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins): Yes, sir. If we could have marked as the next exhibit in order [handing exhibit to the court reporter] the proffer of CDR Waddle's expected testimony, actually the enclosures which are portion of the transcript. We would like to have that marked as an exhibit and appended to the record, sir. A copy of this--the original is documented as being sent to ADM Fargo this morning.

PRES: CDR Waddle's statement will be marked as Exhibit M.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, before we call any witnesses, we have two matters of evidence on behalf of Commander Pfeiffer's counsel. We would submit the following two exhibits as the next two evidentiary exhibits in order [handing exhibits to court reporter].

CR: These exhibits will be marked--Officer Assignments will be marked as Exhibit 57, and the COMSUBPAC SSN Formal Schools Completion will be 58.

(Counsel for the Court note: Although not recorded on tape, Court Exhibit 59 was also offered by counsel for LCDR Pfeiffer, party, and accepted by the court together with Court Exhibits 57 and 58.)

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, one more evidentiary matter with regard to Court Exhibit 32, which is a message on the DV embark. We would like to replace the first page with a new page with the

social security numbers redacted. That would be the next evidentiary--well actually it would be a replacement of Exhibit 32. There are no other evidentiary matters, sir. The court is prepared to call the next witness.

Curtis M. Streyle, Machinist's Mate Chief, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Chief, would you state your full name and spell your last name for the record?

A. Curtis Martin Streyle, S-T-R-E-Y-L-E.

Q. Are you currently attached to the USS GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how long have you been assigned to the GREENEVILLE?

A. Approximately 4 and a half years.

Q. What do you do on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I'm the Leading Weapons Department Chief and also the Torpedoman Chief.

Q. Can you generally describe your duties and responsibilities in both of those capacities?

A. As a Torpedoman Chief, I am in charge of the individuals of the Torpedo Division, in charge of loading weapons on and off the ship, as well as performing maintenance and maintaining the Vertical Launch and the Torpedo Launching System. As Leading Chief Petty Officer for Weapons Department, I oversee the individuals as far as personal problems and issues with personnel in Weapons Department for Sonar Division, Fire Control Division, and Torpedo Division. I also assist the COB in watchbills and qualifications of individuals on the ship.

Q. Can you describe, for the court, the underway watches that you are qualified to stand, including your most senior watchstation.

A. I am qualified to stand Chief of the Watch and my most senior watchstation is Diving Officer of the Watch.

Q. How often do you get to stand Diving Officer of the Watch?

A. I have been standing Diving Officer of the Watch continuously now for approximately 3 years on a straight basis.

Q. Were you previously qualified as Diving Officer of the Watch on any other boats?

A. I had qualifications completed up to the point of taking certification for at sea on my last boat.

Q. Do you stand Diving Officer of the Watch on the GREENEVILLE for special evolutions?

A. Usually I'm up there for angles and dangles or large rudder angles and stuff like that, but not battle stations. I am in the Torpedo Room for that.

Q. Why is it you stand Diving Officer of the Watch for special evolutions?

A. I guess--I seem to do a good job of it, you know experience wise and I pay a lot of attention to what we're doing.

Q. You consider yourself, and you are probably humble about this, you consider yourself one of the better Diving Officers of the Watch. Is that why the boat has you stand there during those sorts of evolutions?

A. I would think so.

Q. Did you stand Diving Officer of the Watch on 9 February?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What time did you assume the watch?

A. Approximately 1120 in the morning.

Q. And could you briefly describe for the members what your duties and responsibilities are as the Diving Officer of the Watch.

Q. As Diving Officer of the Watch, I oversee the Helmsman and Stern Planesman as far as reaching and maintaining ordered depth. Take the depth to--I mean take the submarine to the required depth for any casualty situations and assist the Chief of the Watch in overseeing the Control Room.

Q. I want to refer you to, up here on the wall [pointing laser at exhibit] to court Exhibit Number 6, which is a recreation of the GREENEVILLE Control Room. You've got one of these pointers up there on the witness stand. Would you take your pointer and indicate where on this Control Room diagram you stand your watch.

A. [Pointing laser at exhibit.] That is my station right there.

Q. Right there where it is indicated on this chart?

A. Diving Officer of the Watch. Yes, sir.

Q. So, you have a supervisory role over the Helmsman and the Stern Planesman, and over Chief of the Watch as well?

A. I assist the Chief of the Watch. The Chief of the Watch is in charge of the Control Room Party and personnel standing watch throughout the ship, but I'm basically a forceful backup for him as far as his job goes.

Q. Now, when you assumed the watch that morning, were there any civilians guests in the Control Room?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many were there?

A. Approximately seven or eight.

Q. Can you point out on that diagram where they were located and what they were doing?

A. [Pointing laser at exhibit.] You had some of them over in this general direction and maybe one or two over here. They were talking to the--Commander Meador at the time in regards to some of the evolutions of the ship and what the ship was doing.

Q. So you indicated there on the chart that somewhere over on the starboard side and forward and then a couple more over on the port side?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they were speaking with LCDR Meador?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was he doing?

A. He was like the tour guide for the submarine.

Q. At that time, were any of them driving the boat or performing any evolutions?

A. No, sir.

Q. I want to talk to you a little bit about the angles and dangles evolutions in the afternoon. Before the beginning of those evolutions, did you have an opportunity to hear a conversation between the CO and Petty Officer Blanding who was the Quartermaster of the Watch?

A. Before those evolutions?

Q. Right, with regard to where the ship was.

A. I can't recall what time it was. I know that there was a discussion between them in regards to the submarine's positioning, in regards to "Papa Hotel" and stuff. In regards to that?

Q. Do you recall when that discussion was?

A. I would think that was um--around 1245 or somewhere in that area.

Q. What was the nature of that discussion?

A. The position of the submarine, how far it was, "Papa Hotel", and I think it was in regards to whether or not we had present position and enough range in order to conduct the evolutions that we were going to do.

Q. Was there any issue with arriving at "Papa Hotel" late? Anything to be concerned about that you're aware of?

A. I didn't think so.

Q. Do you recall approximately what time the angles and dangles evolution commenced?

A. It was after the second sitting of chow and that was approximately 1245 or 1250.

Q. And were you stationed, at that point, where you previously indicated on this diagram?

A. As Diving Officer of the Watch, yes, sir.

Q. And at that time, where were the DV's and were the same number of DV's in the Control that you previously described?

A. The DV's----

Q. During the angles and dangles, yes, the civilian guests.

A. Oh, the civilian guests. [Pointing with laser.] They were to the rear of me in that passageway there and they were also along the side in this area here.

Q. So, they were behind you there on the port side, and as you previously described, on the starboard side and some forward starboard.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you previously said, I think, there were about seven or eight when you began angles and dangles. Was it still that number?

A. I find at that time there probably--there was more in Control.

Q. Did you observe the Executive Officer during the angles and dangles evolution?

A. No, I didn't see the Executive Officer in Control.

Q. Not during your watch at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever observe him over in the Sonar Shack area?

A. If he was, I never saw him.

Q. Was the CO in the Control Room for angles and dangles?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was he?

A. He was on the Conn with the Officer of the Deck.

Q. And where did you observe him on the Conn?

A. [Pointing laser at exhibit.] Directly around that area there.

Q. Okay, so you saw him forward.

A. Of Number 2 scope--I mean Number 1 scope, near the 1MC area.

Q. And what was he doing there on the Conn?

A. He was discussing what was going on with the submarine for the guests and he was also on the 1MC when we were going to commence angles and dangles, passing it on the 1MC what the ship will be doing.

Q. Providing information to the guests and to the crew----

A. and to the crew----

Q. As well?

A. Correct.

Q. Where was the OOD at about that time?

A. He was also on the Conn. It would have been around Number 2 scope [pointing laser at exhibit] in that general area there right after the stand.

Q. How were the--well who was driving the ship? How were the orders being passed?

A. Mr. Coen was giving me the orders in regards to what the submarine was going to be doing. The CO was prompting the

Officer of the Deck on what he wanted because I a--you know, it's one of those things where whatever--you know, the CO wants something, but you can't read his mind, so he has to get his point across somehow, so he's prompting the Officer of the Deck to do what he wanted.

Q. What sort of prompting was being provided?

A. We commenced to do a depth change between 200 feet and 650 feet, so he was informing the Officer of the Deck to do a 15 degree angle up or down to 200 feet, or down to 650 feet and vice versa all the way up to 30 degrees.

Q. Did the Officer of the Deck formally retain the Conn during this entire period?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. During this time frame of the angles and dangles evolution, did you hear any reports of contacts?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you happen to note, during this period, if the CO or the OOD ever interacted with the FTOW?

A. I'm not sure of that, sir.

Q. Did you happen to note if the OOD or CO physically went over to the starboard side of the periscope stand and took a look at it, or were even in the proximity of the FTOW's consoles?

A. I'm not sure about that either, sir.

Q. I want to move on to beyond the angles and dangles and to the high-speed large rudder angles phase and ask you a series of similar questions with regard to your observations. Your responsibilities, I would imagine, were the same during those evolutions?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And were the same number of DV's in the Control Room?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Pretty much in the same location?

A. Pretty much, yes, sir.

Q. I think you previously testified that you didn't see the XO at any point during these evolutions?

A. No, sir.

Q. I realize the CO and the OOD were probably moving around a little bit, but generally up on the periscope stand during this phase?

A. On the Conn, yes, sir.

Q. What was the CO doing during this phase?

A. Prior to this phase or during this phase he was also making some LMC announcements in regards to what the submarine was going to be doing. At this point, we were operating at 400 feet conducting the large rudder angle and course changes at that depth, so he was on the Conn and also briefing the Officer of the Deck or giving the Officer of the Deck prompting on what he wanted done.

Q. Same sort of prompting as before in terms of----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Course change and that sort of thing?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Again, the CO never formally took the Conn from the Officer of the Deck, did he?

A. No, sir.

Q. And during this phase, did you notice if the OOD or the CO interacted with the FTOW at all?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you notice if they, again, if they went over physically to the starboard side there at the Conn and in the proximity of the FTOW's consoles?

A. No, sir. The majority of my attention is paid with the Helmsman, Planesman, and the outboard station in regards to maintaining the depth for the submarine due to the changes in the-- that could occur in the depth.

Q. I want to talk to you a little bit about the preparations for coming to periscope depth. As the ship was preparing to do that, did you hear the CO give Mr. Coen any instruction with regard to coming to periscope depth?

A. I know he asked Mr. Coen or prompted Mr. Coen to get the depth--the submarine to one-five-zero feet in order to do baffle clears for periscope depth.

Q. Do you know if the CO placed any time limits on Mr. Coen to get to periscope depth?

A. I didn't hear anything in regards to that.

Q. Do you recall the ship's course and depth coming out of these high-speed large rudder angle maneuvers?

A. Not the course. We slowed to um--approximately 6 knots or that area. We were at two thirds and slowing to 6 knots when we were at one-five-zero feet.

Q. And I don't recall if I asked you this, but did you hear any reports of contacts during the high-speed large rudder angle maneuvers?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now as the ship was preparing to come to periscope depth do you recall whether the OOD conducted a watchstander's brief?

A. As far as bringing people to Control, no. There was a brief or indication to--over the 27MC to Radio and to ESM in regards to the submarine coming to periscope depth.

Q. What topics are usually discussed at this watchstander's brief particularly with regard to your watchstation?

A. During a normal periscope depth operations and where we are going to be going up to either get the broadcast and stuff like that, we would bring people to Control and discuss the aspect of what we're going to be doing with radio ESM, if we're going to be pumping sanitaries or ventilating or anything in regards to housekeeping for the submarine.

Q. Do you know why the standard brief wasn't conducted in that regard?

A. We were not going to be accomplishing any of that.

Q. Now when Mr. Coen stands watch, does he usually conduct the watchstander brief?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In your opinion, what kind of OOD is Mr. Coen?

A. Very meticulous OOD.

Q. Would that be a standard meticulousness with all the OOD's, or does he break out in someway?

A. I would think he, in regards to the other OOD's, he takes a lot more time doing what he is doing?

Q. Now Chief, as the Diving Officer of the Watch, what up angle do you like to have when you bring the boat up to periscope depth?

A. While I'm coming up or at periscope depth?

Q. Both.

A. When I'm coming up, I usually run from 5 degrees and decrease it as we're going down to periscope depth and then I mean--yeah, periscope depth I usually sit about approximately three quarters to a one up unless of course if the sea states are really rough requiring us to achieve a little bit more of an up angle.

Q. Why do you do this?

A. To--in order to keep the aft end of the submarine and the screw beneath the waves, and also to prevent any surface suction from pulling us to the surface.

Q. Now, were you able to achieve this three-quarter degree up angle at PD on the afternoon of 9 February?

A. No, I was pushing between a zero to half down in order to keep the submarine at the desired depth that we were at.

Q. Why weren't you able to achieve the three-quarter up angle?

A. The submarine was light.

Q. The submarine was light?

A. Yes.

Q. Why is that?

A. We brought on approximately 10,000 pounds of water. We were running at 6 knots and I probably needed to bring a little bit more water on, but I couldn't tell that for the amount of time that we were there. We had--we never really settled out for a long period of time.

Q. You didn't settle out long enough to bring as much water on as you needed for values to achieve your----

A. Well, first off we didn't do--we had adequate 1/3 trim at one-five-zero from the turn over that I got, but I never had a chance to do a 1/3 one-five-zero trim in regards to what we were doing. Then also, the other thing is the trace indicated that as we went to periscope depth that I needed to bring water on in regards to the submarine getting lighter. So we brought water on in order to facilitate us going to periscope depth. Once we're there, as far as shifting around, if we would have spent more time we probably would have got to the one up.

Q. If you would have spent more time--I'm sorry.

Questions by the President:

Q. Let me ask a follow-on question. Is it typical for you to--you've come to periscope depth lots of times on GREENEVILLE and other submarines. Is it typical then for you to have the three-quarter up? Did you find that unusual that you had the zero to one half down?

A. No, sir. As long as I can maintain an adequate depth, that is my job and as far as what we were doing at periscope depth, I had control of the submarine in regards to maintaining the depth. There were no major concerns as far as the ship broaching or sinking out, so I felt that I had adequate control of the submarine with the half degree down, it didn't play a major factor in regards to what we were doing.

Q. My question was, how frequently do you find yourself in that condition of having a negative trim on the ship at periscope depth? Did this frequently happen to you or is that infrequent?

A. I would say it is infrequent unless the--unless you had rough seas then in that case, you could actually go from an up angle to a down angle in a matter of a short period of time.

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Speaking of rough seas, let me ask you this? As part of that watchstander's brief that we discussed earlier, you normally get a report from Sonar on wave direction and sea state on the surface so you can calculate the proper trim?

A. Depending on when we are doing it. We usually prompt Sonar to give us the sea state and the direction of the seas.

Q. Did you get that report from Sonar?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. There was no time.

Q. Now once the ship got to periscope depth, did you observe the OOD's use of the periscope?

A. On the way up the periscope got raised at one-five-zero feet. I know the PERIVIS was on because at eight-zero feet, or

approximately that area, I looked over to PERIVIS to make sure there was no shadows as we go up. Once we were at periscope depth, no. I was paying attention to the Planesman to make sure that we were maintaining depth and calling off depth with the shallow water depth gauge.

Q. So, you were paying attention to your duties and responsibilities not to what the CO and the OOD were doing on the stand?

A. Yeah, 90 percent of my attention or 95 to 100 percent was paid directly to those that are beside me or in front of me with the SCP.

Q. Did you observe the CO's use of the periscope at all during that time?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know how long the ship spent at periscope depth?

A. I thought it was approximately 4 minutes or in that range.

Q. Is that a--in your opinion, is that a long time or a normal time?

A. I thought it was normal.

Q. Normal time?

A. If we're up there to do other things than usually we spend a lot more time.

Q. Any reports of contacts while at periscope depth?

A. Not that I heard.

Q. Now once the ship got to periscope depth did someone call out "no close contacts?"

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was that?

A. The Officer of the Deck.

Q. Officer of the Deck?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you get a report from Radio as well? Did you hear that?

A. I didn't hear that.

Q. Any reports from Sonar or the FTOW with regard to contacts?

A. I didn't hear any of that. I was paying attention to the Officer of the Deck in regards to no close contacts from the scope.

Q. Now during the OOD's initial search at periscope depth, what depth did he keep the boat at?

A. It ranged around 60 feet--61 feet for the initial search when we got up there.

Q. Okay. And did you at some point get a shallower look?

A. Yes, sir. We went up to 58 feet--directed to go to 58 feet, and we got approximately 56 and half to 57 feet during that change of depth.

Q. Who ordered that?

A. Officer of the Deck.

Q. Did you--have you--did you subsequently learn that the time at periscope depth was only about 80 seconds?

A. Subsequently learn in regards to when?

Q. How long the ship was at periscope depth.

A. I learned that just prior to this inquiry.

Q. Where'd you learn that from?

A. CAPT MacDonald.

Q. You say the CO ordered the higher look?

A. The CO prompted the Officer of the Deck to bring the ship to 58 feet. The Officer of the Deck directed us up to 58 feet.

Q. Okay. What depth gauge were you keeping--were you using at that time?

A. The shallow water depth gauge up on the right upper side of the SCP.

Q. Was it calibrated? Do you know?

A. It was in calibration and after everything was done and over with, they checked it to within 6 inches of accuracy.

Q. This was after--when the ship came back in, they checked the calibration and it was within 6 inches?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Let me ask you a few questions about the ship going emergency deep.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. First of all, who called emergency deep?

A. The Officer of the Deck.

Q. Do you recall what course the ship was on when that was called?

A. No, sir.

Q. During the emergency deep, were any reports of new contacts made from Sonar?

A. Not that I heard of.

Q. Describe the--describe the emergency deep and then the subsequent blow if you would.

A. Emergency deep was called out. It caught me by surprise. I knew we were going to be doing it, but it still caught me by surprise. I directed both of the Planesman to go full dive on the planes to achieve 5 degree down and also directed the Chief of the Watch to pass the word and also flood on water. He flooded on approximately 7,000 pounds of water. We went from 58--57 feet to a full dive like I said. The speed was ordered up and the cavitate was also ordered up at that time. The--as we went down, I was calling off depth. And with regards to going to one-five-zero feet, as we got down--started to head down the direction was given to take the ship to 400 feet in regards to setting up for the emergency blow.

Q. Okay----

A. So, we proceeded down to 400 feet. We leveled off at 400 feet and slowed to two-thirds. And at that point, we started positioning some of the civilians in positions, so that they could get some familiarity with the submarine doing the emergency blow.

Q. At what point was that?

A. Once we were at 400 feet.

Q. Okay. Were you still on the same course that you had gone down on?

A. During the emergency deep, the rudder was amid ship, so either we were there or we were close to it.

Q. Do you recall if the ship changed course while the emergency deep evolution was going on?

A. I thought that we changed course to the right.

Q. Okay, and with regard to that course change, when did the civilian engage in the evolution? At what point was he--before the course change or after?

A. Civilians as far as where?

Q. Sitting the Helm?

A. I don't recall a civilian being on the Helm at all.

Q. Oh, what do you recall about what the civilians were doing?

A. A civilian was put in positioning--position with the Chief of the Watch to operate the emergency blow switches above the BCP and one was also getting in position with our auxiliary diving alarm in order to initiate the alarm--I mean the diving alarm during the emergency blow.

Q. Would you have been in a position to see if there was a civilian in the chair at the Helm?

A. Yes.

Q. And you didn't notice that that occurred?

A. No.

Q. With regard to the civilian operating the actuators was--did that--did the crew have positive control over that civilian at all times?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you remain on watch as the Diving Officer of the Watch after the collision?

A. Approximately a short period after the collision occurred the scopes were raised and we started checking--started finding out what happened and making reports. I informed the Chief of the Watch that I needed to have a relief, so that I could go assist with the rescue and assistance. And at that time, it was probably about 5 minutes or so later that Senior Chief Crist relieved me as Diving Officer of the Watch, so I could go and perform those actions.

Q. What role did you have in the rescue and assistance? Do you have some special training in that regard or some special duties?

A. Well, as a Torpedoman, a large percentage of our time--the majority of our time on the submarine--if we do things similar to that or diving operations with SEALs and stuff, it's at the escape trunks. So in this case, here I was the assistant man in

charge during the rescue and assistance. So I would have been-- and that's where I was at, the forward escape hatch--the forward escape trunk to assist with that evolution. It's to get eight people topside and assisting with the rescue.

Q. Just a couple of more questions for you, Chief. Do you know what the AVSDU is?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Okay, do you know if it was in service that day or out of commission?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You did not know it was out of commission?

A. No, sir.

Q. Would you normally know that as a Diving Officer of the Watch, if there was something--a piece of gear out of commission?

A. Not--not in regards to that one. It depends on what if it regards to--if it affects what I do as Diving Officer of the Watch or Chief of the Watch or something major like that. This here would be the Officer of the Deck or Fire Control and Sonar.

Q. Is there some sort of an "out of commission" logbook or something that's maintained?

A. Yes, we have an "out of commission" logbook.

Q. Okay----

A. And usually a major piece of equipment like that is turned over to, depending on if it's relative of the submarine, it's turned over in Control during--prior--right prior to the initial dive, in regards to the Officer of the Deck and the CO and everybody else in regards to the ship during its initial dive.

Q. Who would make an entry into that "out of commission" logbook, if anybody, with regard to the AVSDU.

A. Usually the LPO that is in charge of the equipment would make the initial entry or the Department Head.

Q. Thank you, Chief.

A. Yes, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): I have no further questions, sir.

PRES: RADM Stone?

Questions by a member (RADM Stone):

MBR (RADM STONE): Good morning, Chief.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Q. I take it with your experience that you've seen a lot of Commanding Officers and OOD Conning Officers in your career.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And being able to see those various relationships that exist, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, I'm interested in getting your reflections--your opinion on the 9th of February as we go into the Control Room, particularly during the phase where GREENEVILLE was proceeding to periscope depth and operating at periscope depth and then doing the emergency deep, during that time frame in particular. What I'd like to do is give you three categories that I've observed in the Fleet, and in your answer, you certainly don't need to stay within those categories if in your experience you think there's a better way of describing what you've observed, and the three categories that I've observed and that I would give you to consider, one is what we kind of call command negation. This is where the Commanding Officer lets the OOD, the Conning Officer, drive the ship and the Captain won't say much unless he sees something that concerns him and he basically stands back and lets the OOD Conn--drive it.

The second category would be sort of a coaching, mentoring CO where the OOD is driving it and the Captain may offer a, "Hey you may want to slow down now. You may want to come left," but the OOD basically is driving the show and the Captain is just sort of mentoring or coaching.

Another category in the Fleet--this third category, might be the CO really directing it and the OOD, Conning Officer, parroting the Commanding Officer's orders. In other words, the CO may say let's come to zero-nine-zero and the Conning Officer goes, "Coming to zero-nine-zero". It's sort of a directive approach.

Those are three categories you might see in the Fleet and you've probably seen all three in your career. But, on the 9th of February, during the time frame that--the outline that I'm

interested in, could you give me a feel for which one of those three categories you felt the directions and orders fell under? If there's another category that you think best describes it, please share it with the court.

A. Well, to be truthful in regards to everything that goes on, when we do large rudder angles or angles and dangles in a submarine and setting up for emergency blow, the Captain is usually in Control--in the Control Room also prompting the Officer of the Deck on what he needs to be doing, and this was no different than any other time that we've done angles and dangles in the past in regards to what was going on.

The Captain was in Control to make sure that things were going the way he wanted them done and to make sure that the safety was being maintained on the submarine. He's pretty up front about that and he's usually there to make sure that things like that happen. In regards to the 9th, it was no different, he was in Control. He was directing stuff to the Officer of the Deck on what he wanted to happen in regards to depth and angle changes and like that. It's one of those things where people can't read his mind and he just didn't come up--come out and paraphrase everything so that the Officer of the Deck could do it. He's--he puts it out there for the Officer of the Deck to react to.

Q. Okay, so during that time frame that you just described, that would fit for not only the angles and dangles, but also for the period of time proceeding to periscope depth, at periscope depth, as well as the emergency deep? All that time frame?

A. Yes, sir.

MBR (RADM STONE): Okay, thank you, that's all I have.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Good morning, Chief.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Q. I just wanted to go back over some of the things you said to get a little more clarification.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Again, I just want to get your feel. You were certainly a prime member of the Control team at the time. First, I would like to start with watchbills. I believe you said, and you can clarify this, that you help with the watchbills--help the COB?

A. Usually what we do in that case is the COB works on watchbills and then he takes the inputs from the various Chiefs and LPOs, as well as passing it through the Department Head to make sure that everything looks pretty good in regards to making sure that we have the right personnel onboard and stuff like that, and in position.

Q. So, it'd be fair to say that it's a collaborative effort, it's pretty well thought out on the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yeah, It's not one person or two people that can actually put the watchbill together. The watchbill is generated--it takes inputs from quite a few people in order to make the thing work.

Q. Would it be unusual to have someone who is not qualified on a watch position stand a watch without--under instruction?

A. Would it be unusual--we're talking in regards to Sonar?

Q. Just in general.

A. Well, usually in other watchstations like TMOW, Helmsman, Planesman, or something like that, if we have a particular person there usually you see it annotated as UI, under instruction. As far as the watchbill for Sonar, as long as I've been on there, we've never had a UI indication for Sonar.

PRES: Okay. Can----

Questions by the President:

Q. Can you tell me why? I mean it's annotated in other places, why is it not annotated for Sonar?

A. In Sonar, it's usually set up where there's numerous individuals in the Sonar Shack that are providing over instructions for that and those guys are learning, just like with the people that are driving the submarine. We don't usually annotate a UI there. We put them in the position of the Messenger where--that's where they stand their watch at because they're not actually doing much. But whenever--sometime during the watch, we'll put them in a position to drive the submarine with somebody supervising directly behind them.

Q. What you're--what I take from that, Chief, is when you put someone in UI in the spot they have direct supervision on that watchstation by someone who is qualified on that watchstation.

A. Yes, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. The watchbill for the 9th of February that we've been provided and have been using it as we go through our testimony here and we've found--so far there's been a number of disconnects. People standing watch where they're not indicated standing watch with no real approval to do that. Can you shed any light on how that might have happened on this given day based on what you just said?

A. I'm not sure what you're asking in regards to that.

Q. Well, for instance, there are certain people that were indicated to be standing watch on your section that weren't actually the people standing those watches. Petty Officer Feddler was one of the individuals that we're probably talking about.

A. He's my Helmsman for that position. Usually he has a lot more experience in doing the angles and dangles, so in that case, he relieved the individual that I usually--would have had according with that watchbill on that position. Depending on some of the evolutions that we're doing, we'll set individuals in position to make sure that it goes smoother and that it works out well.

Questions by the President:

Q. Chief, can you clear something up for me though? The angles and dangles were in the POD right?

A. I know that--I'm not sure if they were in the POD. I can't remember that day----

Q. Alright----

A. As far as the POD goes, I know that we knew we were going to be doing angles and dangles and large rudder angles whenever I came on watch and that emergency blow was going to be done too.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. Okay. So you put a more qualified guy--they're all qualified, but you put a more qualified guy because you wanted to go smoother for the DVs?

A. Exactly.

Q. Alright. Do you recall who your Messenger was that afternoon on the 9th?

A. I can't recall off the top of my head who it was.

Q. On the watchbill--and I'm just trying to get your read on this, it says Brown. I assume that's FT3 Brown?

A. FT3 Brown?

Q. Right.

A. I don't think he was a Messenger at that time.

Q. Okay. Chief, you've mentioned your qualifications. Are you qualified Contact Coordinator?

A. No, sir.

Q. Would you take position as the Diving Officer on a normal watch relief? Can you describe for me what you do and what your routine is to get your situational awareness up?

A. Usually what I do is I come to Control, review the CO's Night Orders, take a look at the charts as far as where we're operating; find out from the Chief of the Watch what's going on as far as evolutions on the submarine; and then take a turnover from the Diving Officer of the Watch in regards to the status of the submarine, overall trim and stuff, and any evolutions that's going on that might affect the integrity of the submarine. And at that point, I'll get the turnover completed and then I get permission from the Officer of the Deck to relieve the watch.

Q. Okay. Does it--on GREENEVILLE does the Chief of the Watch keep an "out of commission" list?

A. He has the log there that reflects material conditions for various things. Sometimes we'll get people calling in to put inputs into it or have the log sent to them to update that. And we also have another log that actually indicates various pieces of equipment prior to us getting underway and stuff like that as far as "out of commission".

Q. Is that "out of commission" list of equipment posted somewhere in the Control Room?

A. No, sir.

Q. I'd like to talk just a little about angles and dangles.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You talked about that you are the most proficient Diving Officer. You tend to be the----

A. Well, I consider that I have a lot of experience doing it because I've been doing it for quite a few years onboard the submarine and usually I'm in Control 90 percent of the time that we seem to be doing it.

Q. How often do you do angles and dangles on GREENEVILLE?

A. One of those things that we like to do whenever we go out to sea within the first 24 or 48 hours is do large angles and dangles to ensure that the submarine is stowed for sea and that everybody understands that at anytime during the period that we're out, that we may have to take those angles and dangles in regards to conditions of whatever may be going on with the submarine.

Q. Do you rotate your--do you use it as a training evolution and rotate people in various spots?

A. Yes, we have.

Q. On this given day, the sense I've gotten is that the ship was running late, behind where you thought you'd be as far as in the program for the DVs. Do you have any idea why you were running late?

A. I didn't think the submarine was running late. So--I mean if it was, it was just a matter of lunch and stuff running longer than it should have been.

Q. Okay. When you took over, you said you were told you had a good one-third trim at 150 feet?

A. We had a--he was explaining to me that they had a one-five-zero trim, one-third at one-five-zero feet whenever I relieved the watch from the time that he dove the submarine until the point that I was turning over.

Q. And where did--where were you--at what depth were you at when you took over?

A. At the time I took over, we were at 650 feet.

Q. Okay. After the angles and dangles, you came up to make preparations for the periscope depth?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And CDR Harrison talked about the opportunity to trim--recheck your trim at 150 feet?

A. Usually you slow to one-third and steady on course for a period of time in order to get an adequate one-third, one-five-zero trim.

Q. But, that is not required though?

A. No, it is not required.

Q. But, why do we do it?

A. Why do we do it? Usually to make sure the submarine is trimmed up. The submarine normally operates at one-five-zero feet. If we have a casualty or something like--or we are going to be doing large--I mean spending large periods of time at one-five-zero feet, so we trim out for that depth and that is where we usually set up at. Similar to this, is we come to one-five-zero feet prior to going to PD and then usually after we come down from PD prior to proceeding to other depths.

Q. Is it unusual not to get the opportunity to allow the Dive Officer or allow you to trim up?

A. Unusual in this situation? No. Unusual where we were doing large periods of times, housekeeping evolutions and stuff like that, yes.

Q. When you came up to periscope depth, you said you were using the shallow water depth gauge?

A. Depth gauge, yes.

Q. What other indications are available for you to use?

A. You have the digital depth gauge that we usually use at 150 feet and below, but we don't use that going to PD or at PD.

Q. What kind of error was it registering, even though you weren't using it to control the ship?

A. The digital depth gauge usually reads anywhere from 4 1/2 to 5 feet or within that range deeper than the shallow water depth gauge.

Q. But, is it a pretty consistent error known by Dive Officers?

A. Each one of them--you have one on the inboard and outboard the ICP and each one of them is pretty close to that or within 6 inches or so of that.

Q. You certainly have had a lot of experience going to periscope depth and based on being a Monday morning quarterback you did a pretty fine job of getting the ship at its depth

considering the set of perimeters handed to you. This periscope depth evolution you testified was about 4 minutes in duration--your recollection?

A. That is what I thought it was.

Q. Well, that is okay, but how does that--can you give me a sense, is that--even on a short come up and look type thing, did this seem rather short to you? I mean, in your experience? I'm not asking you to pass judgment on how long it has to be, but just--all the times you've gone to PD was it fairly short in duration?

A. Well, as Dive and Helms and Planesman, I know we always look forward to short periods at PD, especially if it is rough. Usually to come up, look around, check things out 4 to 5 minutes is what we look at unless of course we know that there are contacts and stuff up there, then we'll spend more time at that depth checking it out.

Q. Were you in the process of balancing--re-trimming the ship while you are up there at periscope depth?

A. The only thing that I didn't do was shift water with the trim pump because there was not a whole lot of time to do that, but yeah, we continued to bring a little bit of water on to try to trim it out.

Q. How were you bringing water into the ship?

A. Through the Depth Control System.

Q. Fast flood or----

A. Well, it could be fast flood, it's up to the Chief of the Watch what he is doing. If I tell him I need it on now he will open the valve up and quickly flood it on. But in this case here, I had control of the submarine and there was no reason to take extreme measures in order to fast flood any water on and keep it down.

Q. When it comes to the emergency deep, you testified you were surprised, but you knew it was going to happen. How did you know you were going to do emergency deep?

A. Usually prior to doing an emergency blow, we do an emergency deep in order to get the submarine down to depth quickly--as quick as possible in order to set up and do the emergency blow,

so we have a minimum amount of time from periscope depth to whatever depth we get to blow.

Q. So, you just anticipated the fact of what you were doing that day and thought you were going to----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In your exper--you've been on GREENEVILLE an awful long time. The last year or so, how often do you do emergency blow for training?

A. Oh, emergency blow?

Q. Yeah.

A. I'm not sure how many times we've done it. We've done it--I've done it--been on the boat a couple of times while we've done it and this is probably at least my fourth time as far as being onboard the boat where I've been in Control for it.

Q. So, you have certainly been involved in the evolution in the past?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In your recollection, the way it was conducted on the 9th where you came up fairly rapidly, did a quick look at periscope depth, and returned quickly with emergency deep, and then followed by the blow, was that standard operating execution of this evolution?

A. I don't think we've done anything that would've hampered anything out of the ordinary for standard operating procedures. Time wise we may have been going quickly, but there was no contacts as far as I knew of, so as far as the amount of time that we were up there doing it, I didn't see any problems with it.

Q. Are you normally--do you remember--again, if you don't know the answer that is perfectly okay, but do you--you came up, I believe you said, at ordered 58 feet then you came up to 57 or 56?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you used to, in your past evolutions on GREENEVILLE, coming up higher to get a better look?

A. I'm not sure on that. If--the only thing I could say that if the sea state would have dictated the fact that we would have

came shallower we probably would have. Most of the time, the only time that we come to 55 feet or shallower than 58 feet would be if we are going to ventilate the submarine where we would have to have the snorkel mast out of the water.

Q. So, you're not--on GREENEVILLE it is not common practice to come up and get a high look?

A. If there is something out there that needs to be seen from far away or if we suspect that there is something out there, we will usually come up further, yes.

Q. Okay. Now you get ready to do this evolution and you are at 400 feet and the order is given, you know, emergency blow the ship to the surface or whatever. Say you are halfway up or even start into this and the decision was made to terminate--you didn't want to surface, what could you do as the Diving Officer?

A. For the emergency blow?

Q. If anything?

A. There is nothing that we could do to stop the submarine from coming up. Once we conducted the blow and air is into the ballast tanks--we could have ordered speed and tried to push the angle down, but we are still coming to the surface.

Q. Could you order the vents open? Would that help at all?

A. I've never heard of that happening and even if the vents did come open, some air would get out, we'd still go to the surface. There's not enough time for that air to escape and then the hazard that I would see is the fact that the vents are open, we are on the surface, and then we are going to sink directly out after that.

Q. So the picture you are describing and I'm certainly not disagreeing with you, is once you initiate the blow it is irretrievable?

A. Yes, sir.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Sir, that is all I have.

Questions by the President:

Q. Chief you mentioned, maybe three or four or five times that you didn't feel like you--you didn't say--you said, "Because of the time we did this, because of the time this happened this way." Did--in your words--what my question is by that, did you feel rushed or you just felt like things were going correctly?

A. I felt things were going quickly, but I never felt rushed.

Q. Are you aware of any restrictions as to depth and speed to keep your DV embarked and the unclassified regime? I mean, are there speed restrictions or depth restrictions for submarines when you have DV embarked?

A. I'm not aware of any, sir.

Q. You are not aware of any? Okay. GREENEVILLE is a good boat?

A. Yes, sir. Best I've been on for a long time.

PRES: Thank you, very much. Counsel for CDR Waddle?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young):

Q. Chief Streyle, good morning. I'd like to take you back to the beginning of the day. Around 1120, do you recall reviewing the emergency blow procedures with the Officer of the Deck and the Chief of the Watch?

A. Me and the Chief of the Watch reviewed them when we came on and then when Mr. Coen came on, we also discussed it and he got the book out and we went over it.

Q. Alright, so 2 hours before you actually conducted the procedure you all reviewed it together?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. You also stated that the CO was informing the crew and the guests via the 1MC?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And prior to going to 150 feet, the CO had stated over the 1MC that this is what we are going to do. Do you recall that?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. So in your opinion, you had plenty of time and the other crew who were listening to the 1MC would have known well ahead of time what the CO and the OOD were going to do with the ship?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. RADM Stone asked you a question about the relationship--the three different types of relationships between COs and OODs and the last relationship you talked about was the one where the CO is pretty directive with the OOD. And you indicated that you thought the CO was prompting the OOD with regard to some of the maneuvers that you were conducting that day, right?

A. Yeah, he was basically prompting the Officer of the Deck on things that he wanted. It is the situation where it would be similar in the Torpedo Room if I wanted something carried out, they can't read my mind, so I have to either give directions or some kind of indications on what I expect to be done.

Q. Chief, do you agree that would be a normal thing for the CO to do on--and that he has even done on your past boats under these circumstances in order to maintain safety?

A. It depends on the CO and in this case here, CDR Waddle usually when we are doing angles and dangles he is in Control. He likes to be there. He likes to make sure that things are going smoothly and that everything is being taken care of as far as making sure the ship is safe and stuff like that.

Q. And considering the fact that LT Coen was the OOD, it would be especially appropriate for the CO to be doing that?

A. I wouldn't say especially appropriate, but I mean in this case here--I don't know how long Mr. Coen has been a qualified Officer of the Deck, but it is not like he has been Officer of the Deck qualified for a couple of years and so he was there overlooking him, making sure everything was being taken care of.

Q. You stated that typically you would do a periscope depth brief if the sub was going to come up to periscope depth for a longer length of time in order to do some type of evolution, housekeeping or sanitary?

A. Right.

Q. So in your opinion, it was not that unusual not to have the brief considering you were just going up and you were going back down again?

A. There's been situations where the brief has been done over the 27MC, similar to this case here. We were going through the paces where we were stepping through one thing going to the next, so as far as what was happening that day, I don't consider it unusual and we continued on.

Q. Chief, when you were talking about the up angle of the ship you said if the sea state was really rough you would need more of an up angle, do you feel the sea state that day required you to have more of a up angle?

A. No, we had control of the ship like I said.

Q. So, you felt comfortable going to periscope depth?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Do you know if the ship got a good 1/3 trim after you did the initial dive that morning?

A. The word was given to me that they had a satisfactory 1/3 trim when I turned over in regards to the time that we did the initial dive. Some things can change as we go along whether we are making water or if they've pumped anything off and then usually trim is adjusted as they do that. So, the word I got is we had--we were close to a good 1/3 trim.

Q. So it sounds like you were keeping good watch to watch compensation that day?

A. We weren't out for that long, so yes, I would say.

Q. Do you feel that the ship had a good trim throughout the whole time that you were the Dive Officer of the Watch?

A. I thought so. A lot of times though the speed has effect on it so, you know, the speed can hide the trim of the ship, but we didn't have too many problems at all with what we were doing.

Q. Alright. Chief, using the--when you were using the shallow water depth gauge--I just want to make sure that I'm clear on this. Do you recall the CO ordering, or the OOD/CO ordering 58 feet or do you recall him saying come up a few feet? Do you recall which words he used?

A. Officer of the Deck or the CO?

Q. The CO when he asked for the higher look, the shallower look?

A. He prompted the Officer of the Deck 58 feet.

Q. And you said that in your opinion, based on what you know about the depth gauges, that you could have come up to as shallow as 56.5 feet?

A. In regards to what we actually got to? Yes, the shallow water depth gauge reads off in approximately 2 feet increments looking at it and you have the two markings and we were right in between the two markings for 56 and 58 feet.

Q. And you believe that that was plenty of scope to do a good look?

A. Yes.

Q. Chief, you've also stated that you did not--you think things went quickly, but you did not feel rushed, right?

A. No, ma'am. I didn't feel rushed.

Q. You didn't feel at anytime that the CO was pushing the envelope that day did you?

A. No, ma'am.

Q. In fact, what you were doing was pretty much along the same line of things that you had done before?

A. We've done things like this before, yes, ma'am.

Q. And one question regarding the watchbill, Chief. If you needed to swap some watches to support, say division training or drill monitors or tactical evolutions, such as a strike, do you change the watchbill to support that or is it--is the watchbill more of guide?

A. The watchbill is a guide, but if--like if we have to do training and stuff it is not unusual for people to be changed out in the middle of a watch for somebody to go to training and you don't change the watchbill specifically for that. Tactical strikes and stuff like that? Usually we have a watchbill specific for that.

Q. The command climate onboard the GREENEVILLE. Can you tell us about that?

A. As far as command climate goes, I thought it was the best boat I've ever been on and I thought everybody felt really good in regards to the submarine itself. There was no major problems and the crew seemed to really enjoy where we were at. Not like they always enjoyed going to sea, but that is not out of the usual for a submarine.

Q. And you've been onboard since April 1997?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And you agree that you felt comfortable to freely talk to the CO if there was any type of problem?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And you observed the CO and the XO's relationship?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And, in your opinion, do you feel the XO would also feel just as free to talk to the CO if there was a problem?

A. Yeah, I don't--I wouldn't see that he wouldn't go to the CO and talk with the CO. Now, whether he talked to him directly,

you know, with the crew around and stuff like, usually they went and talked, you know, probably in a stateroom or aside or something like that.

Q. But, if there was a safety of ship issue that needed to be brought to the CO's attention, you don't feel that the XO would hesitate to bring that to his attention, do you?

A. I'm not sure. I mean, --I'm not sure on that.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Thank you, nothing further, sir.

PRES: Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer's party?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Yes, sir.

Questions by counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone):

Q. Chief Streyle, I want to--first with regards to the brief that you said about the--the Captain's brief, in terms of the emergency blow. Now, I have your notes here, from what it appears that you said, it said that the Captain did not specifically say that you would be doing an emergency deep prior to the emergency blow, but rather he'd just be taking a look, going down, and then doing the blow. Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. I don't remember any--anything in regards to the emergency deep as far as it being briefed. We do know, like I said though, that when we were going to do an emergency blow, we'd do the emergency deep in order to get down on depth quickly, and to keep the time period from PD and the time when we commence the emergency blow to as small as possible.

Q. And--and you do that so in case there is something up there, the contact picture won't necessarily change from the time that you're at periscope depth, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You just said something right there at the end of CDR Waddle's counsel's questions about, you're not sure if the XO would say anything. What is your opinion of the Executive Officer?

A. I think he's an excellent Executive Officer. As far as how him and the CO intercommunicate between each other, I can't guess on how that was. I know they had a good working relationship as far--as well as his relationship in regards to the crew.

Q. But that's nothing out of the ordinary, for communications between the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer to be away from the crew, correct?

A. No, sir. I've seen other Executive Officers that were hesitant about talking to the CO, and stuff like that, but not in this case, that I know of.

Q. It's not in this case?

A. No, sir.

Q. And based on your opinions and understanding of the XO, if there was an issue with regards to safety of the ship at any time, I mean, you'd think the XO would step in and say something though, don't you?

A. I would think so.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Chief, I think that's all the questions that I have. Thank you very much.

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party, (LT Fulton): Thank you, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party, (LT Fulton): Good morning, Chief.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Questions by counsel for LTJG Coen, party, (LT Fulton):

Q. I want to ask a couple questions about the periscope search.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. First of all, do you recall who was on the Number 2 periscope as the ship was approaching 60 feet?

A. Mr. Coen. He was on the scope at 150, on the way up. Like I said, I looked back at 80 feet and--to check the PERIVIS, and that's when I saw him on the scope, but from the time we were PD on, I don't know who was on the scope, I just assumed that Mr. Coen was there, and then that the CO took a look around.

Q. Would it be safe to say though, that your attention was focused ahead of you, more on control?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You weren't necessarily paying a lot of attention to when the CO got on the scope or who was on the scope at any particular given time?

A. No, sir, just the initial breaking of the scope and making sure that we had no close contacts, that's particularly when I pay attention, whose voice is coming directly to me in regards to that.

Q. When the CO, or the Officer of the Deck, or somebody in Control calls emergency deep when you're at periscope depth, is it the per--is it typically the person who's on the periscope that calls emergency deep?

A. Typically, yes.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party, (LT Fulton): Thank you, sir.

PRES: Counsel?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Nothing further, sir. Chief, thank you for your testimony. Before you go, let me give you the following warning. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, a party, or counsel. You will not allow any witness in this case to talk to you about the testimony that you have just given or testimony that you may give in the future. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempt to talk to you about your testimony you should make those circumstances known to me. Thank you.

PRES: Chief, you did a fine job supporting the court.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

[The witness was withdrew from the courtroom.]

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, at this time the court calls MM1 Harris.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Good morning, MM1.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Corey L. Harris, Machinist's Mate First Class, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Petty Officer Harris, would you state your full name for the record and would you spell your last name for us?

A. Yes. My full name is Corey Lee Harris. Spelling of the last name is H-A-R-R-I-S.

Q. Thank you. Are you currently assigned to the USS GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What do you do on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I'm the Leading Torpedoman of the Torpedo Division.

Q. You're the LPO in the Torpedo Division?

A. Yes, sir, the LPO.

Q. In that capacity, generally speaking, what are your duties and responsibilities as the LPO in Torpedo Division?

A. It's to ensure safe handling of all weapons, the maintenance and proper functioning of the Torpedo Launch System and the Vertical Launch Weapons System, as well as various small arms and other associated equipment, sir.

Q. Sounds like quite a job.

A. I like it, sir.

Q. What underway watches are you qualified to stand, including your most senior watchstation?

A. I'm qualified to stand Torpedoman of the Watch and Chief of the Watch.

Q. Okay. Would you tell the court a little bit about the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of the Watch?

A. Yes, sir. Assuming the watch, I'm responsible to the Officer of the Deck and the Diving Officer of the Watch for the implementation of the Plan of the Day, make sure things are carried out with the watchstations. I'm responsible for supervising rotation and reliefs for the Helmsman and Planesman. I'm responsible to the Diving Officer for properly trimming out

the submarine, and to the Officer of the Deck for raising various masts and antennas, as he directs.

Q. Thank you. How long have you been qualified as Chief of the Watch?

A. A couple of months now, 2 months or so.

Q. Onboard the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you ever previously qualified as Chief of the Watch on any other boats?

A. No, sir, it's my first time qualifying.

Q. Congratulations.

A. Thank you, sir.

Q. I want to talk to you a little bit about the events on February the 9th.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. Did you have Chief of the Watch on that day?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And do you recall, approximately, what time you assumed the watch as Chief of the Watch?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What time----

A. I assumed that time 1131, sir.

Q. 1131. And I think you previously indicated that you supervise two personnel while you're the Chief of the Watch, the Helmsman and the Stern Planesman----

A. I actually----

Q. What's your relationship with them?

A. My relationship with them is to make sure that they relieve on time and make sure that they get relieved on time.

Q. Generally speaking, what gear or equipment is associated with your watch duties as Chief of the Watch?

A. Okay, I have the Ballast Control Panel or BCP. I have the ship's alarms, I have the raising and lowering of the mast and antennas, and I operate--and I line up the system--or the ventilation system on the submarine, to ventilate; and things of that nature.

Q. Thank you. I want to have you take a look up here at the wall at Court Exhibit 6, which is a recreation of the GREENEVILLE's Control Room. Would you tell the court members, as the Chief of the Watch, where you stand your watch and where this equipment is that you just described for us?

A. Okay. That would be the upper----

Q. Excuse me, you've got one of these [referring to laser pointer], I'm sorry.

A. I do have one of these. Okay, I sit right there [pointing laser at exhibit], which is the Chief of the Watch's Chair, and I monitor the Ballast Control Panel, which is right here [pointing laser at exhibit] and those alarms and associated equipment are right here [pointing laser at exhibit].

Q. Thank you, so you're near here [pointing laser at exhibit]

A. Right here [pointing laser at exhibit].

Q. You've indicated on the diagram right where it says, Chief of the Watch, that's where you sit; and your equipment there is indicated in that purple color where it says BCP?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, was the equipment that you described--that you're responsible for and operate, was that equipment properly functioning on the 9th of February?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Was there anything of significance that was OOC or out of commission that day?

A. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Q. Now, let me ask you this, what was occurring during the earlier portion of your watch, between the time you assumed the watch and about 1300 or so? What particular events were going on?

A. Okay. Throughout the ship, we were shooting water slugs, and we were doing a few angles and dangles.

Q. Okay. Were there--were there any civilian guests in the Control Room during that time frame?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, and what were they doing?

A. In the beginning they were standing, observing, and later on in the watch they were--they were taking turns sitting in the chair to drive the submarine, and observing as well.

Q. How many--at this time frame that we're discussing, which is the earlier portion of the watch, how many civilians, do you remember, being in the Control Room, approximately?

A. Somewhere between 8 and 12, possibly more. I didn't take a count.

Q. Okay. Do you, generally speaking, could you--using your laser pointer, could you indicate where you recall seeing some or all those civilians?

A. Yes, sir. There were about three [pointing to Exhibit 6] standing behind the Planesman and the Dive--in between myself and the Diving Officer, and they were concentrated along this area, right here [pointing to Exhibit 6].

Q. Okay. So you're indicating then along the forward end of the Control Room over to the port side and then sort of centerline as well?

A. Yes, sir, and some were starboard as well.

Q. Thank you. Now at some point after this period we've just discussed, did the ship commence some angles and dangles evolutions?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. I want to ask you a few questions about those evolutions.

A. Alright, sir.

Q. Do you recall approximately what time the angles and dangles evolutions began?

A. Sometime during lunch, the latter part of the lunch hour.

Q. Okay. And were you stationed in the location that you've previously indicated?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And during the angles and dangles evolutions, were there civilian guests in the Control Room at that point as well?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you recall approximately where in Control at that point?

A. The same number----

Q. The same number?

A. As before, yes, sir.

Q. And that was about 8 to 12?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they in the locations that you've just described?

A. Yes, sir. As I look at your diagram, it's a little wider than I thought. They came over, the civilians, were as far over as the CEP plot here [pointing laser at exhibit]. So, it's a little wider range here [pointing laser at exhibit].

Q. Did you notice that--if any of the civilians were over on the starboard side in the proximity of the FTOW or not?

A. No, sir, I don't know that.

Q. Did you happen to notice during--again we're talking about the angles and dangles evolution, before the ship got into the high-speed rudder angles.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. Did you happen to notice if the Executive Officer was in the Control Room at this point?

A. No, sir, I did not see the Executive Officer.

Q. Was the Commanding Officer in Control at this point?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was the Commanding Officer?

A. On the Conn, sir.

Q. Okay. What was he----

A. [Pointing laser at exhibit] That would be this area right here. He was explaining what was going on, explaining the angles and dangles, explaining what we were going to do next, and what was happening.

Q. So, explaining by using an announcing system, or just using his voice?

A. At first he was just using his voice because we were using-- we were just doing minor course changes, and when we got into the later ones, he still used his voice.

Q. Okay. Did you notice that the CO was interacting with the Officer of the Deck at all?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Describe those interactions, if you would.

A. They were discussing course changes, depth changes, things of that nature.

Q. Okay. And they were discussing plans for course changes?

A. No, I--when we were changing courses, they were talking about the changing of courses. I don't know what the exact conversation was about, other than the part that I heard, which was course changes and depth changes.

Q. Who was providing the orders to the Control?

A. At this point and time it was the Officer of the Deck.

Q. Okay. You said, "at this point and time," did that change at some point and time?

A. And, you say we were talking about the?

Q. The angles and dangles.

A. The small angles and dangles, before we changed high-speed. Yes, at this time is--was the Officer of the Deck providing the course changes.

Q. Okay. We're going to talk about the high-speed large rudder angles in a few moments, but did that change at that point?

A. Yes, sir----

Q. Someone else giving the orders?

A. Not giving the orders, the Captain was conveying to the Officer of the Deck and the Officer of the Deck was conveying--was giving the orders to the Diving Officer.

Q. Okay, and that was once the ship started on the large rudder angles?

A. Yes, sir----

Q. High-speed maneuvers? Now, still back in this angles and dangles time frame, did you happen to note any reports of contacts?

A. I did hear Sonar announce three contacts.

Q. Did you remember approximately when that was?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you happen to recall any other contact numbers?

A. No, sir----

Q. That they mentioned? Did you recall any of the locations that they reported the contacts being in?

A. No, sir.

Q. Just recall three contacts?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you notice during this time frame of angles and dangles whether the CO or the OOD was interacting with the FTOW?

A. I did not observe that, sir.

Q. Did you notice whether the CO or OOD physically positioned themselves over the starboard side of the Control Room in the proximity of the FTOW?

A. The Officer of the Deck was all over the Conn, but I can't say that he was interacting; I just know that he was all over the Conn.

Q. Okay, I'm going to ask you very similar questions with regard now to the high-speed large rudder angle.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. Was that the next evolution after the angles and dangles?

A. Yes, sir, I believe so.

Q. Okay, were there any change in the status of the civilian guests in the Control Room during and between those two evolutions?

A. They were directed to kind of hold on because we were going to go faster and take more steep angles, so they moved to positions of bracing themselves on chairs and rails and things like that.

Q. Okay, did any leave or join the crew in the Control Room?

A. I believe a couple more came in.

Q. During the a----

A. Before we started.

Q. Other than moving around to hold on to something, was the distribution about the same as it was during the angles and dangles?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And during this time frame, did you happen to see the Executive Officer in the Control Room?

A. No, sir, I never saw the Executive Officer in the Control Room.

Q. Did you ever see him over maybe in Sonar poking his head out of the curtain or anything?

A. I never saw the Executive Officer in the Control from the time I took the watch until after the incident.

Q. Okay, and as you testified a few moments ago, the CO was still there in Control, and in addition providing the course information to the OOD, was he still communicating with the guests?

A. Yes, he was explaining what we were doing, to the guests, yes, sir.

Q. And during this time frame, were there any new contacts reported or any updates to existing contacts that you recall?

A. I didn't hear that information, sir.

Q. And during this time frame again, when you were doing the large rudder angles, high-speed rudder angles, do you recall the CO or the OOD conferring with the FTOW?

A. I don't recall that, sir.

Q. Do you recall them positioning themselves in the starboard end of Control to be in proximity to the FTOW?

A. Again, sir, I do not recall that.

Q. I want to ask you some questions now about the coming to periscope depth.

A. Coming to periscope depth, you said?

Q. Yes.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. Now, at some point was there an order or an announcement that the ship was going to proceed to periscope depth?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, where did that order or announcement come from?

A. I believe that came from the Officer of the Deck.

Q. What is that standard announcement or order?

A. Make preparations to come to periscope depth.

Q. Okay, and you heard that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, did--after that point is normally a brief associated with that, with coming to periscope depth?

A. Actually the brief would be held before that.

Q. Before that announcement?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, was that brief held?

A. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Q. As the Chief of the Watch, are you normally a part of that brief?

A. Yes, normally we would make plans and we'll make plans to do things whether it be to pump sanitariums, ventilate the ship, transmit messages, or something.

Q. So, any specific evolutions that the ship is planning----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You'd be briefed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In particular to your watchstation, what sorts of those evolutions or any other evolutions might be briefed, as the Chief of the Watch?

A. Ventilating, pumping sanitariums, shooting the TDU or shooting trash. I would have to be notified or be briefed on what was going to happen, on all events.

Q. Okay, so the ship wasn't planning any of those evolutions you've just described?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is it your opinion that there be no need for that brief as a result of that?

A. That is my opinion, there would be no need for that brief.

Q. Okay, during this time frame, what was the CO doing, as we were preparing for periscope depth?

A. When coming to periscope depth, he was explaining to the guests the reason for coming to periscope depth. The reason for baffle clearing and why we--just, basically why we have to come to periscope depth and why we had to clear our baffles.

Q. What was he telling them, if you recall?

A. He was telling them we needed to clear our baffles to make sure that, that nothing is there to make sure we're safe and to make sure that we don't hit anything.

Q. Did he impress upon the guests the importance of the baffle clear----

A. Yes, he did.

Q. During evolutions?

A. Made that very clear.

Q. How did he do that?

A. He was telling the guests, you know, I have to do this to protect myself and we don't do anything wrong, we don't hit anything. I can't remember his exact words, but that's my interpretation of his words.

Q. Okay, do you recall what course the submarine was on as you emerged from these rudder angles and high-speed maneuvers?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recall the baffle clear, what course the ship maneuvered to for a baffle clear?

A. No, sir.

Q. Would you normally be aware of the course changes, the direction the ship's going in as the Chief of the Watch?

A. Not the Chief of the Watch, no, sir.

Q. During this time frame, were there any reports of new contacts?

A. I didn't hear any, sir.

Q. Okay. Any reports that you heard of, existing contacts, changes in bearing rates, or anything alike?

A. No, sir, I didn't hear any of that.

Q. Now as the--what are you doing during this time frame as the ship is ascending to periscope depth, what particular duties do you have?

A. Right now depending on the attitude of the submarine, I'm either bringing on water or pumping water off to make the ship either lighter or heavier. I am basically taking orders from the Diving Officer to get the ship in what we call "a sat trim" or make sure we get to periscope depth.

Q. Okay. What's "a sat trim?"

A. That's a condition of the ship where it is buoyant so you can use minimum or no planes activity.

Q. Is there--is there a certain angle that you and the Diving Officer of the Watch want to be on when you come up to periscope depth?

A. We want to be at a--well we're coming up, we want to maintain as close to a zero bubble as possible, or neutral buoyancy.

Q. Okay, and what about at periscope depth, what do you want to maintain?

A. Try to hold the ship, whatever it takes, to hold the ship at the water depth.

Q. Okay. Did--were you able to maintain the--the "sat trim" or the appropriate trim you wanted on this occasion?

A. Well I don't--I don't think it was perfect, but we were holding depth.

Q. What was not perfect about it?

A. Well, I'm not qualified Diving Officer, so I can't say what was perfect to the Diving Officer.

Q. Okay----

A. But my opinion is that we were holding okay, so the trim was okay.

Q. The trim was okay?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, I understand you are not yet qualified Diving Officer, what, in your opinion, thus far was wrong with it or not perfect about it?

A. Well there was--there was heavy seas, so we were rocking a little bit.

Q. There were heavy seas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. During that--during that brief that we spoke about earlier, the proceeding to periscope depth, is there normally some sort of a brief from Sonar with regard to the sea state?

A. They'll--they'll give a direction of seas and an estimated sea state.

Q. Okay. Did you get that information from Sonar?

A. I didn't hear it, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you know if the Dive got that information?

A. I don't know, sir.

Q. Okay. Would that information normally assist you in maintaining the trim of the ship, having that information in advance?

A. Possibly. You're able to compensate a little more.

Q. Do you recall--well let me ask you this, did--while at periscope depth, did you have an opportunity to observe the OOD's use of the periscope?

A. At periscope depth, yes, sir.

Q. Okay, and what were your observations?

A. I just glanced back, just looking at him I saw him make a turn--a turn, and I had directed my attention back to the BCP, and when I turned back around I saw him finishing up, to me, which was the second turn. I don't know what he did during the time I looked away.

Q. Okay. So you observed what appeared to be----

A. What appeared to be----

Q. At least two evolutions?

A. At least two turns, yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Did you have an opportunity to observe the Commanding Officer and his use of the periscope?

A. Yes, sir. I observed the Captain using the periscope, I only observed the Commanding Officer making one sweep.

Q. One complete revolution?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Was--I know you don't stand OOD and you probably don't have a whole lot of experience with the periscope, but based on your understanding of the required sweeps, was--what was the--did the OOD do it quickly, slowly, appropriately, in your opinion?

A. In my opinion he did it appropriately, yes, sir.

Q. Okay. What about the CO's use of the scope?

A. CO did it appropriately as well.

Q. Okay. After the CO did that one complete revolution, did you observe the CO's use of the scope in addition to that?

A. The only other time I observed it is when--when I heard him pass the word emergency deep, and I looked over and he was on the scope at that time.

Q. Did--what depth did the ship initially come to at periscope depth?

A. 60 feet.

Q. Okay. What depth equipment were you using to measure that? What depth gauge?

A. I didn't measure it, I just heard the order to come to 60 feet.

Q. Okay----

A. And that we had reached an ord--a depth of 60 feet.

Q. Who gave that order?

A. Mr. Coen, the Officer of the Deck.

Q. Was there another order thereafter to come to a shallower depth?

A. Yes, sir. I heard "Dive, make your depth five-eight feet."

Q. Okay. Is that Mr. Coen as well?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you observe the CO's use of the periscope when the--when the depth was raised a couple of feet?

A. My opinion, he had to be up there because he was the last one on the periscope, so my assumption is that, yes, the Captain's on the periscope at 58 feet.

Q. Did you hear anyone call out, "no close contacts?"

A. I seem to remember hearing that in the beginning.

Q. Okay. From--from who?

A. Mr. Coen, the Officer of the Deck.

Q. Okay. Did you hear anything from radio with regard to contacts?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Now at periscope depth, do you recall the CO or the OOD interacting with the FTOW at all?

A. I don't recall, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you recall how long the ship was at periscope depth, approximately?

A. Approximately between 3 to 5 minutes, maybe a little longer.

Q. 3 to 5 minutes, maybe a little longer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That seem about right to you, given the circumstances?

A. Well we don't--I don't know of a set time to be at periscope depth, as long as you--you get up to periscope depth and you do what you have to do.

Q. Well you weren't doing any of those evolutions----

A. I know, so it wasn't--we didn't have to be up there that long, in my opinion.

Q. Okay. Now at some point did the ship go emergency deep?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who ordered that?

A. The Captain, sir.

Q. Okay. Describe what the ship did as--after that order.

A. At emergency deep, the order's given, pass the word on the LMC, the Officer of the Deck, or whoever has the scope at the time, lowers that scope, I ensure all masts and antennas are lowered, and I fast flood water until we get to a depth of 80

feet, and I stop flooding, flooding water, and we come down, sir.

Q. Okay.

A. To a depth of 150 feet.

Q. One-five-zero, is that where you went to, 150?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Did you go any deeper than that?

A. Yes, sir, after we reached 150.

Q. Okay. Who ordered the deeper depth?

A. I'm not sure, sir.

Q. Okay. What was the depth that was ordered?

A. 400 feet, sir.

Q. Okay. Do--did you achieve that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And what happened once you got down to 400 feet?

A. We hung out at 400 feet for a little while and we were making preparations to emergency blow.

Q. Okay. What happened next?

A. Shortly after that I was given the order to emergency blow and main balance tanks.

Q. Okay. Were there a course change when you were down at 400 feet?

A. I don't remember a course change, sir.

Q. Okay. Were there any new--after the order for emergency deep, were there any new contacts reported?

A. I didn't hear any, sir.

Q. Any updates on any existing contacts?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Okay. Were there civilians participating in this evolution?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, and where were they participating?

A. One civilian was positioned at the Helmsman, with the qualified watchstander right next to him with his hand on the helm.

Q. Okay.

A. One civilian was situated--was standing right behind me at the Chief of the Watch station with his hands on the emergency blow actuating switches, with my hands intertwined with his, and there was one right behind me at the secondary diving alarm.

Q. Okay, so--so as indicated on the Control Room schematic there?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. When--let me ask you this, a moment ago I think you said that you don't recall if there was a course change once you got down there?

A. Yes, sir, I don't recall.

Q. Is that something as the Chief of the Watch you'd normally be paying attention to or----

A. No, I'm not normally paying attention to course changes or sonar contacts----

Q. Okay.

A. Or things like that. I just happen to hear them in this case.

Q. Do--do you recall when the civilian sat in the Helmsman chair, at what point that was during the emergency deep?

A. They were not there at the emergency deep.

Q. Okay.

A. They were not there 150, when we were at 400 feet, that's when I noticed the civilian at the helm, prior to emergency blowing.

Q. Okay, and your observations were that the on watch Helmsman was right there with the civilian?

A. Yes, sir, right there with him with his hand on the wheel.

Q. With a hand on the wheel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Did you remain on watch after the collision occurred?

A. Yes, sir, temporarily, sir.

Q. Temporarily? What were your responsibilities while you remained on watch?

A. My responsibilities were to sound the collision alarm and get damage control efforts started and get personnel on station, and to assist the Diving Officer and the Officer of the Deck.

Q. Okay. Moving backup for just a second, the civilian that was working the actuators, who was supervising that civilian?

A. Me, sir.

Q. You were. Was there anything unusual about the operation of the actuators during the--during that time frame?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. You were in close proximity?

A. Couldn't have been closer, sir.

Q. Okay. So had anything gone wrong, or been unusual, you were in position to take station?

A. Yes, sir. My hands were on his and actually on the valve.

Q. Okay. After you completed your duties as the Chief of the Watch, you were relieved at some point?

A. I wanted to be a part of the damage control efforts and I was a little shaken up, so I called down for a relief for myself.

Q. Okay.

A. And a relief for the Dive, and we got relieved.

Q. Alright. What--what role did you play in the damage control efforts?

A. Just breaking, helping, breaking out gear, and try and find someone who spoke Japanese, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Terrific, thank you. Sir, that's all I have.

PRES: RADM Stone?

MBR (RADM STONE): Sir. Good morning, Petty Officer Harris.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Stone):

Q. I'm going to be asking you a few questions about the watchbill.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. If you could focus on that a little bit for me here. When did you first see the watchbill for 9 February?

A. I think I saw it the day before, I'm not sure though.

Q. The day before maybe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall whether it was a signed version or an unsigned version, and would that matter to you, if it was signed or unsigned?

A. No, sir, I did not notice if it was signed or unsigned.

Q. Would it matter if it was an unsigned version or a signed version, based on your experience on GREENEVILLE, does that matter?

A. It does matter. Normally they are signed.

Q. Okay. Why do you think the Navy has a watchbill, what's the purpose of a watchbill on a Navy ship or submarine?

A. To ensure that the qualified watchstanders understand who--there responsibilities and where they will be standing watch at a given time, sir.

Q. Why do you think we have, onboard GREENEVILLE, the XO reviewing and the CO approving the watchbill, why is it at that level?

A. So they can make sure the right people are on the right watches, they're qualified, and we have enough people to man the watches.

Q. Okay. Do you think the watchbill is viewed as a guide onboard GREENEVILLE, or is it a directive on GREENEVILLE?

A. Prior to the signing of the watchbill, the department chiefs, they give their inputs, okay, and with those inputs, the Chief of the Boat promulgates the watchbill, based on the department chiefs and after all those--after all those things are put together, then the watchbill comes out. So it's not a directive, it's a--I guess you have to say it is a directive. You will stand this watch at this time, if you're qualified, and if you're able.

Q. Okay, that's how I understand it as well. That's why we have XO's review it and CO's put their formal signature on it---
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And it becomes a directive because they're in a position to ensure we have qualified people, as you stated, on the watch.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so obviously because you're--they're in the business of making sure people are married up, strengths and weaknesses of watchstanders.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Why do you think it's important to be fully qualified to stand a watch, or do you?
A. I do think it's important to be fully qualified.

Q. And why?
A. So you can have--so you know what you're doing, basically, and you're able to stand a watch.

Q. Do you know of any exceptions, based on your experience on GREENEVILLE, where you don't necessarily have to be fully qualified to stand a watch?
A. Well you do have an Under Instruction, but you're not fully qualified, you are being trained--being trained to stand that watch eventually, so that's an exception that a name will be on a watchbill that's not fully qualified, but it will be indicated as Under Instruction.
Q. Okay. And is there a requirement then, if they're under instruction, to have fully qualified, continuous monitoring of that individual?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Once the watchbill is promulgated, like we have here on 9 February, and signed and approved by the individuals that you're familiar with onboard GREENEVILLE, if the boat gets underway and you were to take a snapshot in time, say 4 or 5 hours after the boat's underway, and there's numerous mismatches where you go to that watchstation and the person that's on the watchbill isn't physically there, would that be of concern to you?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why?

A. Well if they're not there, that means the watch is not getting stood, or the person who is on watch, is not going to get relieved, so that will be a problem.

Q. So different people standing the watch in the positions there, indicated on your standard GREENEVILLE watchbill, would that be the norm on GREENEVILLE, you've been there for awhile, would you be surprised if after 4 or 5 hours of underway, there are numerous, different people standing the watch?

A. That doesn't happen on GREENEVILLE, sir.

Q. And why do you think it doesn't, why would that not happen on GREENEVILLE?

A. Because of the management, the COB and the XO and the Commanding Officer, they know who's getting underway, they match the men up with their watches, we have a approved leave and school plan so we know who's not going to be onboard, who's going to be onboard, and they write the watchbill for who's going to be onboard, and before we get under way we have a sailing list, so if this person is not there, we'll know about it.

Q. So that would be--would that, in your opinion, be a bad thing, if you walked around the boat and found different people standing the watches that the directive states?

A. I'm not sure I understand your question, sir.

Q. If you walked around GREENEVILLE with a copy of the watchbill in your hand and at the times designated on the watchbill, and you found that the names weren't matching the people that were standing the watch in a number of areas, would that be a bad thing?

A. No, sir, not if the person who is standing the watch is qualified, sir.

Q. Okay. And that's the key thing, in your mind, is that person needs to be fully qualified?

A. Yes, sir.

MBR (RADM STONE): Okay, thank you.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Good morning, Petty Officer Harris.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. I'd like to follow-up with a couple of questions for you. First, when you go to assume the watch, pre-watch evolution type things, what do you do to get yourself ready to assume this very important watch, as Chief of the Watch?

A. Me personally, I go get a drink of water. When I get up there, I get a turn over from the off going watchstander, and he tells me the conditions of the submarine and what to expect, what I'm going to be doing on this watch, I also read the Night Orders to find out if the Commanding Officer has tasked us to do any additional things, and basically what's going on, the status of the equipment, who's on watch right now, things of that nature, sir.

Q. Do you review the ships status as far as equipment?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I noticed in your statement you didn't know that the AVSDU, the sonar repeater up on the Conn was out of commission?

A. No, sir, I did not know.

Q. Can you shed some light on that, how--how that happened?

A. Shed light on the fact that I didn't know?

Q. Yeah.

A. I didn't know, sir.

Q. Is that typically one of the things you do cover though during your relief?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you keep posted anywhere near the BCP, a list of equipment out of commission?

A. Well we have an Out of Commission Log, sir, and this day I didn't review it.

Q. Alright, and where's that log kept underway?

A. Right here in this book locker [pointing laser at exhibit].

Q. Can you explain where that is for the court?

A. Right behind my chair as Chief of the Watch, located in that book locker, sir.

Q. So I--I mean, I think of your job as sort of--you're sort of the town hall kind of guy, right? That's where all the--all the action on the ship is centered where you're sitting---

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As far as communications and what is going on internally of the ship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You stated that you're pretty much kind of an overseer, or at least involved with the junior watchstanders in the Control Room?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you tell me who the Messenger was during that afternoon of the 9th?

A. I believe it was Seaman Stevenson, sir.

Q. Stevenson? Who were your Helmsman, Planesman?

A. Petty Officer Feddeler and Seaman Ramirez, sir.

Q. We talked a little bit about compensation of the ship, to keep it in neutral trim as best you can?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When you took over on the 9th, you were--I'm sure--told that you had a good trim?

A. No, sir, I wasn't told that I had a good trim, that would be the Diving Officer's turn over.

Q. In your experience as Chief of the Watch, how often do you--does the Diving Officer compensate his trim?

A. Well we do a watch to watch and if we go to periscope depth, we'll try to get a sat 1/3 trim, at that time as well.

Q. What is a sat 1/3 trim?

A. That's going at 1/3 bell, and you're minimizing your use of planes, trying to get as close to a zero bubble as possible with minimum use of your planes.

Q. Is there any particular depth to do this at?

A. 150 feet, I do believe, sir.

Q. Okay. During the afternoon of the 9th, you took the watch I think I said--I think you said about 1130?

A. Yes, sir, 1131, sir.

Q. Can you think back how many times you--you were compensating--well let me ask you this way, were you making a--was the evaporator running, were you bringing water onboard?

A. No, sir, not to my knowledge, sir.

Q. So there wasn't--again, I'll ask it so I don't lead you here, were you having to compensate the ship's trim?

A. No, not compensate it in that capacity, no, sir.

Q. As the ship's ready to go to periscope depth, and you hear the order, you know, "Diving Officer make your depth 60 feet," can you explain to me where--what you were doing right at that point?

A. Right at that point, once we have to get ready to go up to 60 feet, I'm energizing and testing depth control, to be able to bring water onto the submarine, or take it off, and I'm just listening to the Diving Officer's orders to either pump or blow water.

Q. Where are your hands?

A. My hands are on top of the controls, on top of the BCP.

Q. And what are you ready to do?

A. I'm ready to, if--when depth control is energized, I'm ready to open a valve, TD-241, to bring water onto the submarine, or take it off.

Q. What are you focused on with your eyes, anything in particular?

A. Tank levels.

Q. So it's fair to say, you're pretty much focused in on exactly what you're going to do if you have--receive the order to emergency deep?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you looking at the--well let me ask you again this way, is there a PERIVIS repeater somewhere near you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you show me where that is?

A. There's a small PERIVIS, right about here [pointing laser at exhibit] above these lockers, a small one, and there's one over here [pointing laser at exhibit] near the fire control, that I can see.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): For the record, that was just aft and outboard of the book locker----

WIT: Yes, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Port side and then another one on the starboard side as well?

WIT: Yes, sir, sorry I didn't clarify that.

Q. So on your way to periscope depth, are you looking at--are you looking at these--any of these PERIVIS displays?

A. I glance at times, because I like to look at the waves, sir.

Q. And did you do that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did you see when the scope broke the surface?

A. Water and clouds, sir.

Q. Can you describe, maybe visibility?

A. No, sir. The PERIVIS that I looked at was kind of far away so I couldn't really--I saw clouds, I can't guess on the visibility, sir.

Q. Was the scope taking hits, taking water over the head window?

A. I saw some water.

Q. When--you testified, I believe, you did hear the "no close contacts?"

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now what do you do? You got your hands on the controls to quickly bring water into the ship, exactly what happens then when you hear, "no close contacts?"

A. We hear "no close contacts," for me, I'm not really paying attention to it, I just--you--you hear it, I'm still listening to the dive, because the dive still has to keep the boat at periscope depth, so I'm still standing by to bring water on or take water off as necessary.

Q. But--but psychologically, you know at least you made it to periscope depth safely?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. During the evolution we're concentrating on, on the 9th, were you--were you ballasting the ship once you got to periscope depth?

A. Yes, sir, I was moving water, taking water on and bringing off.

Q. Where were you putting it?

A. Aux Tank Number 4, sir.

Q. So you were basically----

A. Ingesting.

Q. Bringing water on because the ship was light overall?

A. Yes, sir, or just light.

Q. While at periscope depth, did you raise any other mast or antenna, do you recall?

A. No, sir, not that I recall.

Q. Did the scope fairing go up with Number 2 scope?

A. Yes, sir, it did.

Q. And why are you paying attention to the fact that the scope fairings go up with the periscope?

A. To make sure so I could report--if it didn't go up I can report that to the Officer of the Deck, and indicate that we have a problem.

Q. When emergency deep was announced by the Commanding Officer, will you explain to me what you did at your watchstation?

A. At my watchstation upon hearing emergency deep, I started ingesting water. I did a quick sweep to make sure I had a straight board, no hull openings, and that all mast and antennas indicated down or faired.

Q. Once you got down deeper, did you ever--did you get a chance to reballast the ship prior to the emergency blow?

A. No, sir, there was no reason, sir.

Q. Did you make any attempts to reballast the ship?

A. No, sir.

Q. In your testimony, you mentioned you've done this evolution a couple times.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Emergency blow, that is.

A. I didn't testify to that today, sir, but yes, I have done it a couple of times.

Q. And that's a couple times on GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The sequence that was done on the 9th of February, was that pretty much the way you do this evolution?

A. Yes, sir, with the exception of the ending, sir.

Q. Of what, the ending?

A. The ending, sir.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): That's all I have, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q. Petty Officer Harris, what do you have, 12, 13 years in the Navy right now?

A. Fourteen, sir.

Q. Fourteen. Is GREENEVILLE your third or fourth boat?

A. Yes, sir, third.

Q. Third boat. GREENEVILLE takes a lot of pride in conducting it's operations?

A. Yes, sir, we do.

Q. GREENEVILLE's a good boat?

A. The best, sir.

PRES: Counsel for CDR Waddle?

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Yes, sir.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Good morning.

WIT: Good morning, ma'am.

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young):

Q. A couple questions for you. When you are standing your watchstation as Chief of the Watch, you're facing outboard, right toward the panels in front of you?

A. Yes. Yes, ma'am, I'm facing kind of--yes you could say caddy corner and I'm looking outboard.

Q. Alright, so your attention is focused on what is not going on behind you, but on the panels in front of you?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Fair to say that the AVSDU is not a piece of equipment that is pertinent to your watchstation?

A. That is accurate, ma'am.

Q. Alright. To your knowledge, would it be wrong for crew members to swap watchstations as long as they're qualified, in order to support training or drills, or even the DV escorts?

A. It's not wrong, ma'am, we sometimes do that, we have to, that's why we have the watchbill and the manning, so we can remain flexible.

Q. And as long as the supervisor approves, there's no problem?

A. That's accurate, ma'am.

Q. Alright, Petty Officer Harris, I want to ask you about the command climate. You've been onboard GREENEVILLE since July of 1999?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Can you tell us what the CO's, or the GREENEVILLE's motto is?

A. Safety, efficiency, backup.

Q. Now, Petty Officer Harris, so are those just words, or do you all really live by that?

A. We have to, ma'am.

Q. Why is that?

A. We have to live by those words because if you don't things happen and we don't like things to happen, we have to ensure that we're safe. We have to make sure we're efficient, and if you don't know something, you can rest assured that somebody's backing you up to make sure you don't make mistakes, ma'am.

Q. And where did you first hear those words?

A. When I met the Captain on my first day onboard, ma'am.

Q. And how many times would you say you've heard those words since you've been onboard since July 1999?

A. Almost daily, every time he talks.

Q. And do you hear them not just from the CO, but from other crew members?

A. Everybody. If you don't know those words, you're not on GREENEVILLE, ma'am.

Q. Alright. Petty Officer Harris, can you tell us about this particular Commanding Officer, what are your feelings?

A. The best, ma'am, outstanding, great personality. The best Commanding Officer I've ever worked for.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Thank you, nothing further.

PRES: Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Good morning, MM1.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Questions by LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone):

Q. You stated that you qualified as Chief of the Watch on the GREENEVILLE, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you explain a little bit about how that process works.

A. Okay, sir. First you get your qual card, you have to be qualified submarines, have to be a First Class Petty Officer, you get a waiver for Second Class, you go through and you--you go to all the qualified Chief of the Watches or Dives, to get your theoretical knowledge factors on different systems and equipment throughout the boat, after you get all that done, you have to take a test, after the test you have to go see the Executive Officer for your final interviews.

Q. And when you go to this final interview, is it just a rubber stamp, so now you're basically the Chief of the Watch, or what happens?

A. You're kidding me, sir. No, sir. No, sir. You spend a lot of time with the XO. You get to see his Stateroom a lot.

Q. And what's going on during these interviews?

A. You're getting grilled on systems, on knowledge factors, and everything else he wants to test you on.

Q. So what level of standards would the XO be setting for that watch?

A. Very high. He expects the best from you.

Q. When the emergency deep was called, you were startled, weren't you?

A. Not really startled, I'm prepared for anything at my watchstation. It did shock me a little bit, but we've done that before, and I know my actions, so I carried out the actions.

Q. And when you go to emergency deep, that's a busy time for your watchstation?

A. Not really, sir, I'm bringing on water making sure of certain things, so it's not really busy.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Thank you.

WIT: Alright, sir.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): That's all the questions I have, sir.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Thank you, sir.

Questions by counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert):

Q. Petty Officer Harris, I'm just going to focus on LTJG Coen. Now you've stood watch with him while he's been the Officer of the Deck underway?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So you've had a chance to observe how he conducts himself when he's the OOD?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you tell us, how does he stand that watch?

A. Stands his watch very meticulously. He makes sure everything is done by the book, makes sure all his "I's" are dotted, his "T's" are crossed and makes sure that nobody makes any mistakes.

Q. Does this come out even with the watchstanders during the time he's the OOD?

A. At all times, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Thank you. I don't have any more questions, sir.

PRES: Any redirect?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): No, sir. Thank you for your testimony, Petty Officer Harris. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, a party, or counsel. You will not allow any witness in this case to talk to you about the testimony that you have just given or testimony that you may give in the future. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempt to talk to you about your testimony you should make those circumstances known to me. Thank you.

PRES: Petty Officer Harris, you did a fine job.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

PRES: This court will be in recess until 1015.

The court recessed at 0956 hours, 15 March 2001.

The court opened at 1015, 15 March 2001.

PRES: The court is now in session, Counsel?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Let the record reflect that all members, parties and counsel are again present.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, the court calls SK3 Feddeler.

William E. Feddeler, Jr., Storekeeper Third Class, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and was examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rate, organization and present duty station.

A. William Earl Feddeler, Jr., last name F-E-D-D-E-L-E-R.

Q. Thank you. Petty Officer Feddeler, are you currently assigned to the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you been onboard the GREENEVILLE?

A. A little over 3 years, sir.

Q. And what do you do on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I'm a Storekeeper.

Q. What division? Supply Department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What underway watchstations are you qualified to stand at this point?

A. Helms, Planes, and Lookout.

Q. How long have you been qualified in Helms?

A. A little over 2 and a half years, sir.

Q. Is the GREENEVILLE your first boat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I want to talk to you about the events on February the 9th.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. And ask you a few question about that day. And what I want to do is direct your attention from--well, first of all, did you have watch as Helms on that day? Did you have the Helm Watch?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you take that watch?

A. I don't remember exactly, it was around 1:00.

Q. Around 1:00? So, you had the afternoon watch then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Alright, I want to talk to you about the events from the time you took the watch, until the time of the collision.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. Can you generally describe for the members what your responsibilities and your duties are as you stand the helm watch?

A. I take orders from the Officer of the Deck, to steer course, and I take the orders from the Dive to maintain depth.

Q. And what--I going to direct your attention up here to the wall, there's a diagram there of the control room in the GREENEVILLE. [Pointing laser at exhibit] Can you--you've got one of these laser pointers there, can you point on that diagram where you sit your watch?

A. Yes, sir. [Pointing laser at exhibit].

Q. Right there where it says the Helmsman?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, terrific. When you took the watch at 1300--and again I'm going to ask you a series of questions that are going to involve the time period from 1300 until the time of the collision.

A. Aye, sir.

Q. Were there guests in the Control Room?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Approximately how many?

A. I'd say about 10, sir.

Q. Do you remember generally where they were?

A. They were behind the Dive, sir. In this area [pointing laser at exhibit].

Q. Most were all of the 10 that you're talking about?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any at or around your watchstation?

A. No, sir, they kept them out of the way over to the side.

Q. Do you recall if the Commanding Officer was in Control at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And where was he?

A. I believe he was on the Conn, sir.

Q. Were you paying attention at all to what the Commanding Officer was doing?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know if the Executive Officer was in Control at the time?

A. No, sir?

Q. Did the Executive Officer ever come into Control during the time that you had the watch before the collision?

A. Not that I remember, sir.

Q. Okay, did you hear any information passed with regard to contact information during that entire period?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now, at--I want to talk to you about the civilian guests. At some point on your watchstation did a civilian guest join you and take the helm?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when was that?

A. After we came down from the periscope--periscope depth.

Q. Okay, so you were at periscope depth and then the ship did a dive?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at what point in the dive did the civilian sit down in your chair?

A. After we got to 400 feet and we finished a baffie clear. We didn't do--we turned to north and after the turn---

Q. Okay, so you went down to 400 feet and you turned back to north?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When during that time frame did the civilian take seat in your chair?

A. I looked at the gauge and we were passing knots, about zero three zero to the left.

Q. Okay, so the ship was in the turn?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. Okay, was there any problem with handing over the seat and the steering wheel to the civilian?

A. No, sir.

Q. And did you remain with the civilian the entire time until the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So, you were in close proximity able to take the controls if need be?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And after the collision occurred did you take your seat again?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Sir, I have nothing else for this witness.

MBR (RADM STONE): Good Morning.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Stone):

Q. You were onboard over 3 years now, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I was just looking through your summary, of your initial interview, and you've done lots of dependents and VIP cruises while you've been onboard?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there anything different about this one that stuck out in your mind in terms of how you operated and did business?

A. No, sir, it felt the same.

Q. Do you have set procedures in place when you're going to set someone down in the helm? In other words, you've done this enough, is it passed on by word of mouth or is there some document or how do you know what guidance to follow when you sit someone down in the Helmsman position for the demonstration?

A. Usually the Officer of the Deck or somebody will ask me to stand up and allow them to sit down and I'll explain to him the indications on the panel.

Q. And everything just seemed--you did everything the way you normally have in the past?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There wasn't anything different this time?

A. No, sir, not at all.

Q. Okay, thank you.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Good Morning.

WIT: Good Morning, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. I just have a couple quick questions. When you normally relieve the helm of another Helmsman, is it typical to relieve--change out positions in the middle of a turn?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did that surprise you? Reading your statement I can see----

A. Yes, sir, it did a little----

Q. That you didn't anticipate that being done. That someone was going to come in and you were going to have him as under instruction?

A. No, sir.

Q. Can you describe for the court--the individual sat down, the civilian?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you obviously were in control of what he was doing. How you did that, with your--you know where your hands were? What you were doing to ensure that the Officer of the Deck's words were carried out?

A. Yes, sir. Usually I'll just stand up to the side to where I'm still holding the helm and the visitor can step up around behind and sit in the seat and put his seat belt on. And once he's sitting down then I can crouch down beside him and explain to him the panel and explain to him what we're doing to carry out the Officer of the Deck's orders.

Q. Now his hands are on the helm?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And where are your hands?

A. Over his hands making sure he follows through with all the orders from the Officer of the Deck.

Q. You talked about if you--you've done this a couple times before?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If one of these untrained civilians isn't doing what you need him to do, what do you do?

A. I'll grab the stick right away, sir, and--the helm, and I'll guide him in the right way.

Q. So you're clearly in control?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, thanks.

A. Yes, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q. Is it Petty Officer Feddeler? Is that how you say it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If you have the 12 to 1800 watch, when are you normally relieved from the 12? The 1200 watch?

A. 1130, sir.

Q. 1130? So why did you relieve at 1:00?

A. I wasn't supposed to have watch that day. I was called up to do angles and dangles.

Q. Okay, the GREENEVILLE'S a good ship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Alright, thank you.

PRES: Counsel for CDR Waddle?

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (CDR Herold): Good morning, SK3, how are you doing?

WIT: Good morning, ma'am.

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (CDR Herold):

Q. I've just got a couple of questions for you and they're related to the item that Admiral Nathman finished up with, the command climate. Can you tell me what the--a few of the three tenets of the ship's safety, efficiency, backup?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Are you familiar with those?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell me a little bit about that, how that works on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I think they all work together. Safety first of course, because we don't want anybody to get hurt, and efficiency, we're constantly reviewing our books to make sure we all have our procedures down, and backup has always been out in the open. If you see anybody even hesitate with any of the procedures and you know them well yourself, there's never a problem to stand up and backup your shipmate.

Q. Do you feel pretty comfortable as a pretty seasoned Helmsman to backup the OOD if he ever needed it?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Okay, and as a Lookout, did you ever have any occasion to backup the CO?

A. No, ma'am.

Q. Don't remember anything?

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Great, thank you.

A. Yes, ma'am.

PRES: Counselor for LCDR Pfeifer?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): No questions.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for Mr. Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No questions, sir.

PRES: Counsel?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Mr. Feddeler, thank you for your testimony. Before you go, let me give you a witness warning. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, a party, or counsel. You will not allow any witness in this case to talk to you about the testimony that you have just given or testimony that you may give in the future. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempt to talk to you about your testimony you should make those circumstances known to me. Thank you.

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Petty Officer Feddeler, you did a fine job.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, the court calls SN Ramirez.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you, good morning.

WIT: Good morning.

Jose M. Ramirez, Yeoman Seaman, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Have a seat, if you would? State your full name, rate, organization and present duty station.

A. Jose Manuel Ramirez, R-A-M-I-R-E-Z.

Q. Thank you. Are you currently assigned to the USS GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, I am, sir.

Q. How long have you been assigned to the GREENEVILLE?

A. It's been about a year and a month now.

Q. You are a YNSN?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What do you do on the GREENEVILLE?

A. Well it consists--I just took over PLR basically. I take care of people's pay problems or correspondence, or stuff like that basically.

Q. Pay's important.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you--are you qualified in any underway watchstations?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What watchstations are you qualified in?

A. I'm qualified Lookout and Helms and Planes, sir.

Q. Helms, Planes and Lookout?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you been qualified on the Planes Watch?

A. I'm thinking about 6 months.

Q. Okay, how about the Helm Watch?

A. It's the same actually, sir.

Q. Is this your first boat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Congratulations on getting your Dolphins.

A. Thank you, sir.

Q. I want to ask you some questions about February the 9th, and what I want to do is first ask you at what point did you assume the watch as the Planes.

A. I assumed the watch at noon, sir.

Q. At noon?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And did you remain on that watch until the time of the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Can you generally describe for the court members what your duties are when you've got that watch--what it is that you do?

A. As the Planesman you're supposed to during high-speed operations you basically control depth for the ship by controlling the bubble. And during just normal operations I control the bubble to keep the boat--help the Helmsman keep depth.

Q. Okay. And take a look at this diagram up here on the wall that's--that we've labeled Exhibit Number 6 [pointing to Exhibit 6]. Can you tell the court members where it is you stand this watch? You've got one of these little laser pointers up there so if you'd point to where you sit.

[Witness did as directed.]

Q. Okay. Right there where it says "Planesman"?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Perfect. Now I want to ask you a series of questions that pertain to the time that you had the watch up until the time of

the collision. Were there--when you took the watch were there any visitors in the Control Room?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. At some point after you had the watch did visitors come into the Control Room?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you remember approximately when that was?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you remember approximately how many came in?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it a lot, a couple, or----

A. I'd say it was a decent group, sir.

Q. Okay. And do you have any idea where they were?

A. They stood at the entry right in Control, sir.

Q. Okay. Were any of them close to--very close to your watchstation?

A. Not until after we blew, sir--er, before.

Q. Okay. Was the CO in Control at this time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what was the CO doing? If you know?

A. No, I don't know, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you know where he was in the Control Room?

A. I believe he was on the Conn.

Q. Okay. Do you--did you ever see the Executive Officer during the time you had the watch?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now you mentioned a moment ago that the civilians weren't close to your watchstation until some point later on. What point did--what point was that?

A. Right before the blow. I think one of them sounded the diving alarm and the other one was by the Chief of the Watch station, I think.

Q. Okay. So one sounded the diving alarm by the Chief of the Watch station?

A. [Nodded affirmatively.]

Q. Okay. Do you know what any others were doing?

A. Well, one of them was under instructions for the Helm.

Q. Oh, for the Helm? That's seated right next to you?

A. Second--yes. Right beside the Dive.

Q. Okay. And that would have been the person that took Petty Officer Feddeler's seat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And that was during the dive you said, just before the blow?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. At any point during the time that you had the watch did you hear any announcements of contacts from Sonar or the FTOW?

A. No, sir.

Q. Okay. Did it--were you expecting someone to take the watch at the Helm next to you or did that surprise you?

A. No. It didn't really surprise me, sir.

Q. Did--prior to the collision did anything unusual with that visitor sitting in Petty Officer Feddeler's chair?

A. No, sir.

Q. Petty Officer Feddeler was always right there next to the visitor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Thank you.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, that's all I have.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins): No questions, sir.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): I have no questions, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No questions, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): SN Ramirez, thank you for your testimony. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, a party, or counsel. You will not allow any witness in this case to talk

to you about the testimony that you have just given or testimony that you may give in the future. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempt to talk to you about your testimony you should make those circumstances known to me. Thank you.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

PRES: Ramirez, you did a fine job.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, at this time, the court calls Senior Chief Smith.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Good morning, Senior Chief.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Tony H. Smith, Electrician's Mate Senior Chief, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Senior Chief, would you please state your full name and would you spell your last name?

A. Tony Harvard Smith. S-M-I-T-H.

Q. Thanks, Senior Chief. Senior Chief, are you currently attached to the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you been with the GREENEVILLE?

A. Approximately 2 years, 8 months.

Q. And what's your job on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I'm the Nav Ops Department LCPO, and the Communications Chief.

Q. How long have you had those jobs?

A. I've been the Nav Ops Department LCPO the entire time and depending upon whose--if I have another Chief I may or may not be the Comm LPO then.

Q. Okay. Can you please just generally describe your duties and responsibilities as the Comms LCPO.

A. I'm responsible for all the communications equipment onboard, for the training and anything else that goes on with Comms and all the Comms personnel.

Q. Okay. You also--you qualified Radio Supe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. What does that job involve?

A. Supervises watchstander--the Radioman of the Watch. So as if it's an intense comms environment, depending upon what we're doing in the battle group something like that, than you have an extra guy in there to kind of keep an eye on things. To assist and to make sure things are going right.

Q. I want to talk to you a bit about February the 9th.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall where you were when the collision occurred?

A. I was in the Chief's Quarters, sir.

Q. And where did you go after the ship experienced the collision?

A. Straight to Radio, sir.

Q. Which--why did you go straight to Radio?

A. I was--the minute I felt the shudder I knew what had happened and knew where my place was. To get to Radio to start generating the OPREP 3.

Q. Okay. And if you would take us through what your immediate actions were when you got up to Radio in terms of the OPREP 3.

A. The minute I got there I checked the circuit line up to make sure we had SATHICOM up. As soon as I got the antenna in the air, got permission--well, actually I got permission from CAPT Brandhuber to start the OPREP 3. I contacted SUBPAC and let them know I had immediate precedence traffic.

Q. Was CAPT Brandhuber in Radio?

A. Yes, he was in Radio at that time, sir.

Q. Was he there when you got there?

A. I don't remember, sir.

Q. But you discussed the voice report--OPREP 3 with CAPT Brandhuber?

A. Instead of--normally I would run out to get permission from the OOD to transmit, but the Captain was there and he just--he told me to start.

Q. How long did it take you to get voice report going?

A. About 4 to 5 minutes is the time we got--we were pretty close to being on schedule--pretty close to being time lined for that.

Q. How long do you have to do that?

A. 5 minutes, sir.

Q. It sounds like you did pretty well then.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What--what information was immediately provided to SUBPAC?

A. I reported that we had had a collision and I think I told them fishing vessel. About that time somebody brought me in the position that we were at and gave me the name that they had read off the side of the vessel and it was something school--fishing school--something like that. I passed that to SUBPAC as well as the ship's posit.

Q. Okay. Do you remember who gave you that?

A. The Navigator brought it in on a little sheet of paper.

Q. Okay. Now after the initial voice report do you do a hard copy of that OPREP 3?

A. Yes, sir. At that time Petty Officer Hawn, who was in Radio, had started bringing up the computer and I kind of pushed him out of the way after the voice report and started working on that.

Q. Okay. Was the Chief of Staff involved in that with you as well?

A. Yes, sir. He--after I got it typed originally he took a quick look at it, recommended one change, we made the one change, and sent it out to the Navigator and I believe to the Captain. They took a quick cut on it and then brought it back in and we brought SSIXS up at that time, dropped one of the other circuits I had to so I could transmit.

Q. Okay. Did you continue providing information on the Satellite Comm?

A. Yes, sir, almost continuously for the next 8 to 10 to 12 hours.

Q. I may have just missed it, what else were you doing with the communication systems at that point?

A. I brought up all the search and rescue freqs that I could think that would be reasonable to bring up. I brought up the SAR freq. I expected to have aircraft overhead fairly soon so I brought that freq up. I also brought up the life boat--international life boat and also one other freq, the 5 Meg--and I'm not--without getting out my Comms plan I couldn't tell you what it was for.

Q. Okay. Did you--was there a bridge to bridge associated with the Number 2 periscope?

A. Uh-huh. The bridge to bridge was patched to Number 2 scope at the time.

Q. Okay. You were able to accomplish that?

A. Yes, sir. With the communications suite we have we can use only one antenna at one time and then patch the scope to something else.

Q. When the Coast Guard got into the area were you able to hear--overhear those communications on the open mike?

A. Yes, sir. At times we were hearing things over the bridge to bridge radio and then SUBPAC was relaying the same information a moment or two later on the SATHICOM to us. So, I thought we had pretty good comms bridge to bridge.

Q. Could you hear the CO and the ENG communicating with the Coast Guard on the handheld?

A. I remember the engineer communicating. I don't remember the Captain being on--actually I remember the engineer because he was up there as OOD for so long.

Q. It sounds like you got communications up quickly and efficiently.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At some point--do you recall when the Coast Guard got on the scene?

A. I don't remember the exact time, but I remember SUBPAC coming to us and telling us that the Coast Guard had taken over as the search and rescue coordinator at that time. I don't remember the exact time. It's in my Comm plan, I believe--I mean, not my Comm plan, my log.

Q. Okay. So you recall getting the official word from SUBPAC--
--

A. Yes, sir, from SUBPAC that the Coast Guard had taken over as On Scene Coordinator for search and rescue.

Q. Okay. But the ship remained on station----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Thereafter.

A. Yes, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you.

MBR (RADM STONE): Mr. President, I have no questions.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): No questions, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q. Chief, you were in the Chief's Quarters--did you say you were in Chief's Quarters----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When the collision occurred?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there a collision alarm ever sounded on the ship?

A. No, sir, I don't believe so.

Q. After a collision is it typical for submarines to do any type of watertight integrity checks to change the material condition of the submarine after a collision or in preparation for a collision?

A. Is it typical, sir----

PRES: It's okay. Alright.

Counsel for CDR Waddle?

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (CDR Herold): Yes, sir.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (CDR Herold):

Q. Senior Chief?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Hi, Senior. I just wanted to ask you a couple of questions about command climate. When we talked we discussed this a little bit.

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. The first thing I want to start off with actually is Petty Officer Seacrest. Do you remember the comments you made to me about Petty Officer Seacrest being the best FT onboard?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Do you remember that you mentioned that if you had a problem that you thought--your impression of him was that he would work at it until he could get it solved?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Now tell me a little bit about the command climate onboard GREENEVILLE under CDR Waddle and LCDR Pfeifer.

A. Command climate was good. I mean--the crew was generally happy. They--we didn't have any great problems. I've been on ships where it was terrible before so I know the far end of the spectrum. Command climate was pretty good. Chief's Quarters got along. The Wardroom seemed to get along. The crew all got along.

Q. And how was the CO as far as--as far as backup goes? Was he pretty willing to give out and also take backup?

A. Compared to other COs I've had. I've had--like I said the very far end of the spectrum where you couldn't tell the guy anything. And then I've had--he was middle of the road. He had--he use to stress safety, backup, and efficiency to us. But he was pretty middle of the road as far as that was concerned--as far as I was aware.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (CDR Herold): I have no further questions.

PRES: Okay. Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): No questions, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No questions, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you for your testimony, Senior Chief. Let me give you the following witness warning. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone

other than a member of the court, parties thereto, or counsel. You will not allow any witnesses in this case to talk to you about the testimony that you've just given or which you may give in the future. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempt to talk to you about your testimony, you should make these circumstances known to me as Counsel for the Court.

WIT: Yes, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, the court calls LCDR Meador.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Good morning, LCDR Meador.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Tyrone L. Meador, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q. Would you please state your full name and would you spell your last name?

A. Tyrone Lewis Meador. Last name spelled M-E-A-D-O-R.

Q. Are you currently assigned to the GREENEVILLE?

A. No, sir. I'm currently assigned to CINCPACFLT.

Q. Okay. And what are you doing at CINCPACFLT?

A. I'm on the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board.

Q. Were you recently attached to the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir. I transferred February 22nd.

Q. How long were you onboard the GREENEVILLE before you transferred?

A. Approximately 39 months.

Q. Okay. What'd you do on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I was the Engineer Officer on the GREENEVILLE.

Q. Were you the ENG for the entire tour?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would you please, just briefly, describe your previous duty assignments prior to the GREENEVILLE.

A. Prior to the GREENEVILLE as a junior officer I was on 2 submarines. I was on a 640 Class ballistic missile submarine the WILL ROGERS and I served a variety of JO duties there. I split toured from there to the USS MIAMI. I made one deployment on the MIAMI. For shore duty following that I was an instructor at Nuclear Power School in Orlando, Florida. And then I came to the GREENEVILLE as the Engineer Officer.

Q. How long have you been qualified in submarines?

A. I've been qualified in submarines approximately 10 years.

Q. I'd like to talk to you about February the 9th.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have any duties in the morning of February the 9th?

A. For the day of February 9th I was assigned as a--essentially a VIP tour guide for the day. I did not have watchstanding duties. I supervised the reactor plant startup at approximately 2 a.m. that morning and then starting first thing when the visitors started to arrive I was one of two escorts assigned to show them through the ship.

Q. So you were involved in briefing the visitors when they arrived?

A. I was not directly assigned a section of the standard brief we go through. I was there and available to answer any questions that they had. But we gave them essentially a routine brief that we do for all visitors including the Corpsman, the Executive Officer, the ship's PAO, we went through essentially the basics, safety brief, radiation areas, etc.

Q. Okay. Can you just get into that just a little bit as to what sort of things occur during those briefs by the various parties?

A. They--the Corpsman has to brief essentially the radiation areas of the ship and the areas that the visitors should not go into. The XO, I don't recall which areas he briefed, but he'll introduce himself and talk a little. And then the PAO went through a standard slide show that we have set up for the

visitors talking a little bit about the GREENEVILLE and some of the ship's history.

Q. Okay. And as far as you know that brief actually occurred--the standard brief?

A. Yes, sir. I was in Crew's Mess and the brief occurred. I was kind of conducting a side bar discussion so I wasn't paying attention to a lot of it but it did happen.

Q. So during the maneuvering watch your duties were with the DVs?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Did you have all of them or did you have a group of them?

A. There was--we split them basically into two groups of eight. I was assigned one. LT Pritchett was assigned the other although he had a maneuvering watchstation where as I didn't. So we escorted them--for the underway we escorted them topside. We had them put on the ALIUP life preservers. They went topside for the first part of the underway until we got around Hospital Point and then we brought them down after that. So--after the Maneuvering Watch was secured that's when LT Pritchett also assisted. And then from there we split up the groups into the two groups of eight and started showing them through the ship. Prior to that we were coordinating--we'd send a couple of people at a time up to the Bridge and we were trying to coordinate that as well as the people topside.

Q. What'd you do with your group once you split up into groups of eight?

A. Standard ship tour. We went through the 9-man berthing area, went down into the Machinery Room, the Torpedo Room, up into the Sonar Room, through Control. I showed them the periscope. We talked about how the ship operates. Looked at the ship control functions. We just did a--a pretty routine tour for about an hour.

Q. Okay. Did you have lunch with the DVs?

A. I had lunch with a group of eight. It was--from the ship it was myself, the Executive Officer--we were with the second seating of lunch. And so, yes, sir, I did.

Q. What time did that conclude?

A. Right about 1300. It was just a little bit before because I know--one thing I told my group we'd do is observe shooting water slugs. And during my initial tour we were still rigging

the ship for dive so we weren't able to shoot the tubes at that point. So I told them right after lunch we'd go down and see the torpedo tubes and shoot some water slugs. And in fact that's what we did.

Q. Okay. So--just after 1300 you had an opportunity to do that with them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Now after you did--you shot the water slugs what'd you do with your group?

A. I went up to the Control Room because I knew--I knew based on the POD we had an Emergency Blow scheduled per the POD for about 1330 so I knew we'd be starting the angles and some of the more interesting evolutions in the Control Room so I took my group up to the Control Room.

Q. Do you recall approximately what time you got your group there?

A. It--close to 1315. I don't recall the exact time.

Q. So it took about 15 minutes to do the water slug evolution with them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Got it. And you said you brought your group of eight in?

A. Yes.

Q. Was LT Pritchett's group--were they already there when you got there?

A. Yes, the other group was already there.

Q. Now did you remain with your group in the Control Room during that time?

A. I stayed in the after part of Control Room for a few minutes and then the Captain asked me to go check for stowage in the Engine Room. So I went back and LT Pritchett also went too. And we went back and checked the areas he told us to check and then after that I went to my stateroom.

Q. How long do you recall remaining in the Control Room before you departed to do the----

A. Less than 5 minutes.

Q. Okay. Was the CO there when you brought your group in?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was the XO in Control as well?

A. Yes, he was. Yes, he was.

Q. Okay. Do you recall where they were?

A. The XO was--he was right near where I was. I was all the way in the aft part of the Control Room between the two plotters and the XO was just forward of the primary plotter.

Q. Up on the--up on the--the periscope stand?

A. Right. Yes, sir. Where the--where the--right by where the chair is there in front of what it says--it says "Navigation Plotter Table".

Q. Alright. Where--and then you went to your stateroom?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. Okay. Is that where you were at the time of the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In your stateroom. Okay. What did you do when the ship experienced a collision?

A. The--the unusual nature of the ship surfacing following the emergency blow--the shudder we felt alerted myself--and I was in the stateroom with a Damage Control Assistant and both he and I left to investigate what had happened. The initial--we didn't have any initial idea what had actually happened. So I didn't know whether it was a system failure, high-pressure air rupture, we weren't sure. But it was obvious that something had gone wrong. So I went to--I came into Control via the aft door to see what was happening. And that's the point when I saw that the Captain was looking out the Number 2 scope and he was just turning it over to the Chief of Staff and they were both looking aft. And then I could tell something had gone very wrong.

Q. Did you get a chance to see the PERIVIS and see what they were looking at?

A. No, sir. I actually went to the scope and when the Chief of Staff basically relinquished the scope--I--I took the Number 2 periscope to observe what he had been looking at.

Q. What did you see?

A. I seen the EHIME MARU was--at first--at first we knew we hit something, but we didn't know whether she was sinking and--I

started seeing her slowly sink and I was basically reading off the name of the ship. Somebody asked for the name of the ship and so I was reading off the name of the ship what I saw. I didn't see the stern that had the EHIME MARU, I saw the port side that read Uwajima Fishery High School and I reading that off to--I don't recall who was taking that information, but that was what I was doing.

Q. What did you do after you completed looking through the periscope?

A. The Captain had said man the bridge--He didn't say it to me directly, but I already had a harness staged for going to the bridge later so I went and grabbed the harness and Petty Officer Darby had already opened the bridge access trunk lower hatch and so he was ready to go. So, I put on the harness manned the bridge.

Q. What's the bridge suitcase?

A. The bridge suitcase is the device we use to communicate from the bridge as amplified announcing circuits and also has attachments for the sound powered--sound powered phone connections. It has the gyro repeater Engine Order Telegraph repeater provides the Officer of the Deck on the Bridge--provides him with communication capabilities with the rest of the ship.

Q. Did you bring that with you manned the bridge?

A. Yes, sir. I brought the bridge suitcase. Petty Officer Darby had sound powered phones and that's what we took up there with us.

Q. How long would you say it took between you felt the collision and the time you were up on the bridge with the bridge suit case?

A. It seemed like about 10 minutes it--it--everything happened in rapid succession. It didn't--I wasn't on the periscope very long and I went straight from the periscope to putting on a harness and as I said I had that already staged. So, I was ready to go. I felt the ship was on the surface and holding. Ordinarily after an emergency blow, we'd go through our normal surfacing procedure which could take over 30 minutes by the time you go through the preparation phases and then placing a low-pressure blow on the Main Ballast Tanks. But in this case based on how I seen the ship holding through the periscope, how long I knew the emergency blow had gone on and the urgency of assisting in the search and rescue. I went to the bridge at that point.

Q. Okay, so not withstanding the potential dangers of going through that surfacing procedure, your concern was with the search and rescue of----

A. Yes, sir. The one thing right after the--I looked through Number 2 periscope, I believe the Captain was looking through Number 1 periscope at that point and I know the Chief of Staff had said, "Captain you need to initiate search and rescue procedures now." We were kind of all motivated in that direction and things were moving pretty fast.

Q. Did--when you got up there to the bridge did the ship swimmers or divers arrive----

A. Yes, sir. What happened was myself, Petty Officer Darby got to the bridge. He had a life ring with him in addition to the phones. Right away the Jacob's ladder made it up to the bridge, so he and I rigged that over the portside of the sail and within minutes the Captain was on the Bridge. He had a bridge-to-bridge radio. He was contacting the Coast Guard to report the accident. Master Chief Swanson and Petty Officer Rivas, two of the ship's divers came to the bridge at that point in time also.

Q. The were standing by ready to go in to the water?

A. Yes, sir. We had very quickly--we had the divers up on the bridge ready to go. I was receiving reports from the forward escape trunk that their making preparations to open that, which was draining the upper hatch cavity, but I told them we were still taking water over the upper hatch cavity. I conducted a watch relief up on the bridge as soon I installed the suit case and tested the LMC. I relieved Mr. Coen of the deck and the Captain of the Conn up on the bridge and then from there we were--we were in the process of lowering the outboard to provide rescue to any personnel we saw in the water.

Q. I think you said that the Captain was already on the phone with the Coast Guard talking to the Coast Guard?

A. He was using the bridge radio. I really wasn't paying attention what he was saying as far as the exact words, but I knew he was providing the information on the collision to the Coast Guard. At one point we called down and asked the Navigator to provide us the latitude and longitude, because we had to report the collision location. But other than that I was focused on getting the outboard down and getting over near the rafts were and also we were maintaining a lookout for any personnel in the water.

Q. When you got up on the bridge with the--what was the status of the EHIME MARU?

A. She'd gone under. When I left the periscope that the ship was still--still on the surface and I could tell though that--the bow was starting to rise out of the water and the stern was starting to sink. I hadn't seen any life rafts at that point and I only see one person on deck, on the starboard side of the ship away from me. I was surprised when I got to the bridge--I was taken aback by there was just an intense diesel--diesel smell when I first got to the bridge and that was from the diesel fuel in the water obviously and also I was surprised to see so many life rafts--up there, because as I said when I just left the scope a few minutes before there had been none and to see so many life rafts kind of surprised me.

Q. How many did you see?

A. Petty Officer Darby counted. He said eight. I never counted actual number of people myself. I never counted the life rafts I only heard of reports of it. I was more focused on getting over--driving the ship over to where we could provide assistance.

Q. Did you see anyone in the water?

A. No, Sir? I never saw anyone in the water even when I was on the periscope. I did not see personnel in the water as I said there was one person I saw on the starboard side of the ship, but I didn't see anybody in the water.

Q. You and the Captain were prepared to put divers in the water if need be if you saw anyone?

A. Oh, yes sir. We discussed it--we discussed that specific thing. We could send them down. We chose not to because there was nothing that they could have done at that point to assist. Personnel were already in the rafts and at that point we were looking for anybody who could have been injured in the rafts. I had the scope operator trying to look at the raft to see there was anybody that injured. We assessed that there was nobody that we could tell from that distance was injured.

We were looking to provide any assistance we could, but the problem was that the ship was heaving so much in the water, to have one of the rafts approach was dangerous. We tried to approach the first raft with two people in that was off the port bow. As we got close to it the waves started surging into the raft and actually filling up the raft as we approached and our concern was the raft could come down--it could end up on the

deck and then flip over and what kind of rescue would that have been?

Q. So, in your view it would have been more dangerous to approach the rafts than to stand off?

A. We tried to approach at least two of the rafts and every time we got close we--it proved impossible to try and safely--safely get a--to establish a lee. That's one thing we were trying to do with the ship was position it so that there would be a lee, but based on the seas they weren't coming from one direction in particular. We were not able to establish a lee that would provide safe--a safe means to bring personnel onboard and as said there is no body that was in the water.

Soon after manning the bridge we knew that the Coast Guard helicopter was 14 minutes away and then the first ship would be about 45 minutes away. So, based on that the prudent thing to do was to wait for the Coast Guard to assist in the rescue.

We were trying to determine if all the survivors were accounted and tried to communicate with the rafts, but we weren't having success with that either.

Q. Why was that?

A. Just the background noise was extremely loud and they couldn't hear us. I don't know whether or not that the survivors spoke English that we were closest to, but the noise out there that day we couldn't shout down to anybody where they could hear us.

Questions by the President:

Q. What was the background noise?

A. Just the seas against the ship, yes, sir.

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Were you able to--you said you were trying to look with the periscope at rafts or into the rafts?

A. We had both periscopes manned. The Contact Coordinator had been directed to maintain a close geo-plot position of all the rafts. One thing--despite the fact that seas were coming from no particular direction. There wasn't a lot disbursing of the debris of the rafts. Everything seemed to stay in a fairly tight area. Even for several hours later as the Coast Guard assisted in the rescue.

Q. Can you describe those seas?

A. 4 to 6 foot swells. It was as chop like I said from no particular direction. That's about it.

Q. Would you have been able to open forward hatch?

A. Not--we could have opened but we would have taken a significant amount of water down it. It was a balance and if we had to bring personnel onboard the preferred method would have been up the ladder up the side of the sail. Although we were set up. We established--we had a containment set up around the forward escape trunk and that containment can direct water down to the bilge area instead of the all over the equipment that's immediately around the forward escape trunk.

The containment was being set up and we would have been able to open the hatch had it been necessary, but not for an extended period of time, because as I said there were--every minute or so there were at least a foot of water going over the forward escape trunk as the waves went over it. The ship seemed to be sitting really low. We maintained a continuous low pressure and we still couldn't freeboard to free up the forward escape trunk.

Q. You didn't get any indication when you were looking into those rafts--somebody was trying to get your attention or any indication that someone was injured.

A. No, sir. The survivors we saw in the raft were essentially--there were one group of three rafts all together and they seemed to be communicating. The two survivors in the raft off our bow were mostly looking at us with concern, because as I said every time the submarine got near, the water would wash into their raft. And that is the raft that I ordered--prior to that had been using the outboard to maneuver the ship and we approached that one and that is when I ordered the back full bell to back down from that raft, because of my concern for that.

During that time we received a report from maneuvering that the shaft was experiencing a vibration. I continued to remain on the back full bell for a period after that just because it was one of those balance things, mechanical problem versus these people who if they get sucked in through the bell area, you know, a potential loss of life there so we remained on the bow until we established--or remained on the bell until we established stern way.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Okay. Let me ask you to slow down a little bit to assist the translators if you would.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Q. You said that you got some shaft vibration, but nonetheless you stayed on the back full bell. Was there a possibility of damage to the shaft of the submarine as a result of----

A. That was the report I received on the bridge that maneuvering had indication that there had been damage caused--a vibration of the shaft, yes.

Q. But you stayed on it anyway out of concern for safety for the individuals that were in the boats?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would there--given the sea state that you observed, would it have been dangerous for one of the swimmers or divers to try and get down the Jacobs ladder and into the water?

A. It would have been very dangerous for our divers who are in very good physical condition and they are trained for this, it would have been extremely dangerous and if not life threatening to try and bring somebody who wasn't as experienced as they are to try and bring them back to the submarine via that route. I think our divers, based on their training and as I said their physical condition, could have made it into the water if they had to. But where they would have gone at that point--you know, it would have been very hard for them to bring--come back to the ship.

Questions by the President:

Q. Let me ask you a follow-on question.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Does the Jacobs ladder go down to the hull and then down to the water level or does it stop at the hull?

A. Yes, sir. It goes down to basically where the sail meets the hull. It does not continue down into the water. We have a separate ladder for that that we could rig in the event we need it, but it was not rigged in this case.

Q. Have you recently climbed a Jacobs ladder?

A. No, sir.

Q. When was the last time you climbed a Jacobs ladder?

A. In 1993 I climbed on one when we were going through Suez Canal.

Q. Would you agree it takes a certain amount of balance and hand strength to go up a Jacobs ladder?

A. Oh yes, sir. And on that day the ladder--the ship was rolling enough that the ladder would swing away from the hull and slam back against the hull. It was very choppy as I said.

Questions by a court member (RADM Stone):

Q. How long, if you recall, until the Coast Guard helicopter got on scene?

A. They initially reported an ETA of 14 minutes and that is about what it seemed.

Q. And what were your observations of what they did when they got there?

A. They just flew circles around the accident scene.

Q. Did they drop divers in the water or anything?

A. Not that I observed, no, sir.

Q. How far were the rafts from the GREENEVILLE?

A. The furthest ones were probably 200 yards, 300 yards maybe.

Q. So if you did put a swimmer in the water--if you could get a swimmer down the Jacobs ladder and into the water, he would have to have swim that distance just to get to the rafts?

A. To get to the furthest rafts, yes, sir. We had--there was one raft that was probably 50 yards off the port bow, so considerably closer. And then there was a raft astern of his with another person in it just a little bit further than that, yes, sir.

Q. When did the first Coast Guard vessel arrive on the scene?

A. Like I said, their ETA was about 45 minutes and that is probably what it was.

Q. You were still up on the bridge?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So what were your observations of what they did?

A. The Coast Guard initially had a rigid hull inflatable boat arrive and that boat started passing from raft to raft. It didn't initially take on any of the survivors. It seemed to be checking with the different rafts with people in it. And so once again our--as we were trying to do all along, we wanted to find out if all personnel had been accounted for from the ship.

So we were trying to establish communication with the Coast Guard to try to find that information out.

Q. Was the Skipper still with you on the bridge?

A. Yes, sir. He was the one that was trying to find that out?

Q. Approximately how long did it take the Coast Guard to get all the survivors onboard?

A. Probably about an hour because they--it wasn't until the 42 foot Coast Guard boat arrived before they really began to take people onboard. As I said, the seas were extremely rough. At one point the Coast Guard asked us to stand off because of how the seas were interacting with our hull and interfering with their ability to transfer personnel between their two boats at that point and time.

Q. After the Coast Guard got everybody onboard what was the role of the GREENEVILLE from that point on?

A. We were still circling the area looking for any other survivors as we had done the whole time. We remained in the area throughout the night continuing the search. At one point in the evening a formal search had been established and the turn over I got, because I was the mid-watch OOD as well as that we had been asked to stay on the outskirts of that formal search although we were still able to search the area using night-vision goggles on the bridge and also we have the image intensifier on the periscope too that helps.

Q. So you remained diligently searching throughout the night, then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When do you feel you actually secured the search efforts?

A. I don't feel we ever secured the search. We proceeded into port. At some point I guess you could say we stopped the search, but I don't think there was ever a conscious decision of that's it, this is over, we are not going to find anybody, stop looking type thing. I think everybody continued to search.

MBR (RADM STONE): Thank you, sir, that is all I have.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): LCDR Meador, good morning.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. You mentioned you were a tour guide in the afternoon of the 9th?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When I was looking through the watchbill of the 9th of February, it has your name down as the OOD in the afternoon and there is a line through it and has LTJG Coen's name there. And down where it has LTJG Coen being left behind on the beach, his name is crossed out. Can you tell me a little bit about that? Who changed it and why?

A. There was consideration being made to having me drive the ship coming into port, because I was so close to being transferred, kind of the last chance to drive on the surface. And also since the Chief of Staff was onboard, giving him the opportunity to observe my ship driving. So there were a few watchbill changes being made, but as far as what the final resolution was, we hadn't decided who was actually going to drive the ship into port that day.

Q. Why would that necessitate the change to have you deleted as the OOD and LTJG Coen's name penciled in there? I'm not quite sure I understand why that change would be made. Was that to facilitate you conning the ship in or what?

A. I don't recall the specific change that you are talking about, sir. But I know from the initial brief in the morning that the XO had wanted myself and LT Pritchett to be the tour guides, if you will. And so watchbill changes may have been made following the navigators initial write of the watchbill. But I don't recall specifically when those changes were made.

Q. Did you ever see the 9 February watchbill or were you just verbally told?

A. I saw the 9 February watchbill, but I don't recall what information it had with respect to final changes.

Q. Okay. Are you a more experienced OOD than LTJG Coen in your opinion?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Based on your seniority and experience is your relationship different with the Commanding Officer than LTJG Coen's relationship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you describe in what way?

A. I think very typical of how training occurs. The senior watchstanders, the department heads especially, will receive less day to day guidance or watch to watch guidance from the Captain. He knows based on our experience that we require less supervision and that's one or--whether you're a propulsion watchstander or whether you're an Officer of the Deck, it's kind of the same situation, and based on my experience level, I receive less direct guidance on a watch to watch basis.

Q. You mentioned the Propulsion Plant. When I go through the 9 February watchbill and I look at who's in writing in some of the control stations, and then I go to that period in time, on the 9th of February there are a number of people that aren't in that position of the watchbill. There is a lot of change there from 9 February. Down in your propulsion plant as the Engineer, would I find much the same thing? Is that the standard in which you operated your plant?

A. No, sir. We have less just because the situation in the Engine Room is less dynamic than the situation forward. Personnel--and if some of the forward watchstations get called away to do different things--you know something as simple as opening up the ship's store for visitors onboard might require the one person who is on watch at that point in time to be relieved. There is many conditions which would require changing the watchbill forward. It happens a lot less frequently aft just because it is less dynamic or we have a fully structured and mundane situation in the Engine Room.

Q. Is that driven by the safety requirements of nuclear power plants that you would be more hesitant to do that than you would in some of the other stations if you could give us a perspective.

A. I know it--it--it's specified in more places with respect to the Propulsion Plant. However, as I said I think just based on the fact that the Engine Room and the engineering watchstanders were much less involved with what was going on that day is the most likely reason that watchbill would receive less changes.

Q. I only have one more question for you and that is, in the area of this safety, efficiency, backup aboard GREENEVILLE--was that philosophy meant for 365 days a year or what was your perspective on that? Was that to be executed events every day of the year with safety efficiency backup or just on more evolved evolutions? What was the philosophy?

A. There were no bounds specified. That was the Captain's three tenets from the first day he got onboard, or the first time he talked to the crew I guess it was then that he put that out, but there were no bounds. It wasn't--we're doing something complex so this day these three tenants apply, tomorrow we're doing something simple so they don't apply. It wasn't--it----wasn't

Q. Do you think it's a 365 day requirement?

A. Yes, sir. I think it's a good philosophy.

Q. Why is it this required for 365 days a year? What happens if it's not done 365 days a year?

A. Because if you take a simple evolution and you think--you treat it like it's a simple evolution things can go wrong and it can be something as simple as loading potable water, but you could damage equipment and hurt people during what is perceived as a simple evolution without applying some of those basic principles.

PRES: I agree. Thank you.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. Just one follow-up question on watchbills. Certainly you do watchbill changes for the Propulsion Plant. Can you describe how that is done?

A. The Engineering Department Manual requires watchbill changes to be approved by myself, the Engineering Officer, and we have local instructions all the Engineering Officer of the Watch or the Engineering Duty Officer to make an initial change to the watchbill and he can contact me and inform me of that change if I'm not immediately available.

Q. And how do you signify that you approved the change?

A. Changes are lined out and initialed by the Engineering Officer.

Q. But if I walked into you plant and the names would match the posted watchbill?

A. Yes, sir. They would.

Q. I want to start back earlier in the day for reactor start up. What time did you have your folks come in to do the reactor start up?

A. The brief for the reactor start up was at 0200 and commence the procedure at 0230.

Q. Did you have a number of trainees trying to get [inaudible] or was this sort of a----

A. I'm sure--I don't recall specifically which ones, but I know we had at least one knew Engineering Officer of the Watch person who was in qualification as Engineering Officer of the Watch. There is hardly a startup goes by that we don't involve trainees I mean it's the nature of the business.

Q. Were you physically onboard during the startup?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that your common practice?

A. Yes, sir. I have never missed a startup in 39 months.

Q. Obviously your relief was in town?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was he with you?

A. He was there for the startup. He had to participate in training--ship training up at the training center later that day so we left him inport.

Q. Now during the Maneuvering Watch, I believe you stated you were up in the crew's mess?

A. I was in the crew's mess for the Maneuvering Watch. I went topside with the visitors as well.

Q. On a typical Maneuvering Watch, what station do you----

A. Typically, I'll be the Propulsion Plant Supervisor in the engineering spaces.

Q. Who was doing that?

A. I believe it was LT Mahoney. It was either LT Mahoney or LTJG Coen. I don't recall which one. Those would be the two. The procedures specify the Main Propulsion Assistant should normally do that. However, we implement a philosophy that that person should also be qualified as Engineer. Since LTJG Coen is not yet Engineer qualified we would often default to--in my absence default to one of the Engineer qualified officers and the only one we had at that time was LT Mahoney.

Q. You had buy in on who that was I assume.

A. Yes, sir. I was aware of it at the time, but I don't recall now.

Q. During the conduct of this DV cruise that we're on, previous testimony the ship operated at test depth. Do you know any reason why that was done?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is that typical of what your experience in general is?

A. I know the intention was to--I don't know why that was done specifically.

Q. You were saying you had some intention--there was some intention.

A. Not specifically. I don't know why that was done. No, sir. It was part of taking--showing what the submarine force can do I guess would be the intention of why we did anything that day was to show the capabilities of the submarine force.

Q. Do you know what the SORM says about unclassified submarine operating depths and speeds?

A. I know the current policy on what are considered unclassified depths and speeds. Yes, sir.

Q. And what are those?

A. That's--we're capable of going deeper than eight hundred feet and we're capable of doing speeds in excess of twenty five knots. I don't believe that guidance is in the SSORM as far as--I think that changed in--I know it changed, but I don't believe the SORM is caught up with that.

Q. Okay. When drills are conducted on the ship in the propulsion plant, can you tell me how that is done as far as who is privy?

A. Yes, sir. The Commanding Officer authorizes all drills. He--in an effort to conduct drills safely we have pre-made guides that have various safety monitor intervention points. The group of safety monitors get together and conduct a drill brief prior to the drill in which we review the procedures we expect the watchstanders to follow. We review the safety monitor intervention points and the Captain and the Executive Officer attend that brief, and then the Captain approved the conduct of the drill.

Q. What about a drill that is outside the propulsion plant but it affects the Operations Officer side? Do you have any involvement in that or any notification?

A. I'm not sure specifically--when you say affects propulsion plant--I mean a drill that changes the ordered bell would affect the propulsion plant, but I would not typically be involved with that. If it affects propulsion plant equipment I would be very involved with that.

Q. The Chief of Staff, your father in law, testified that one of the reasons he got underway was a chance to--as you have already alluded to, to see you operate the GREENEVILLE. Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. Based on--it was kind of--my time onboard was obviously winding down. I transferred at my scheduled transfer date of February 22nd, so it was kind of a last opportunity for him to see me before I left.

Q. Did you spend any time with him?

A. That sidebar discussion in the morning I referred to while the indoctrination brief was being held, I was conducting with him. Yes, sir.

Q. During his testimony he testified something to the effect that one of the reasons that he got underway besides the chance to sail with you, was just to see the performance of GREENEVILLE and your Skipper. He said one of the thoughts he had in his head was that GREENEVILLE was a lot of show but not much go. I don't know exactly what he meant by that. I was wondering a--did you ever have any discussions about GREENEVILLE and the command climate with your father-in-law?

A. Not command climate. We talked about big picture operational type you know--we're doing this next week or--I didn't spend a lot of time discussing detail--I would call it gossip, that is essentially what it would be. Day to day operations--we didn't discuss those type issues.

Q. So you pretty much kept it inside the lifelines?

A. Oh definitely, yes, sir.

Q. When you observed the sinking of the EHIME MARU, what was your estimate of how long it took to sink?

A. As I said when I manned the bridge--or when I left the periscope, the ship was still on the surface, but in the amount of time I was on the scope which I don't estimate more than a about a minute, I saw her drop by at least four or six feet aft,

and I started to seeing they had--they were like fishing balls with net around them on the aft deck and I started to see that material float off the aft deck, so I could definitely tell--I could definitely tell she was sinking. The initial observation was she is not sinking, and within 20 to 30 seconds, she was.

Q. Congratulations on completion of your tour and good luck.

A. Thank you, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q. The ship--is there any guidance in ship's bills or in Captain's standing orders on collision as far as changing material condition of the boat?

A. With respect to out of commission or with respect to if something fails, sir? I don't understand the question, sir.

Q. No, changing of the wat--I have a collision did you change the water tight integrity or did you change the material integrity of the boat?

A. The bill would--essentially you are going through a flooding general emergency type bill, which would for us we have some water tight or some doors in the engine room that we shut and then you--in any situation like that where you are in a general emergency type condition you would take action to place the ship in a safer condition although we just don't--unlike surface ships that have extensive bulkheads and doors and---

Q. Well, you have some of them I assume?

A. We have a few and the----

Q. Was that called away?

A. I don't recall, sir.

Q. You are the Engineering Officer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Wouldn't you have a lot of interest in that?

A. The--right from the point of collision on it was--it was pretty apparent that GREENEVILLE had really suffered very little damage and our concern was with survivors and providing for the search and rescue efforts there. The quick inspection of the ship showed that we had suffered very little damage initially so that was not what our concern was.

Q. You mentioned you had a shafting problem on your backing bell?

A. Yes, sir that we didn't observe until--when I first arrived in the Control Room after the collision the ship was at all stop and a bell was not ordered until--that was the first bell that was ordered following the collision.

Q. Have you done DV escorts before?

A. Yes, sir. We've done numerous escorts both--we do it both for distinguished visitors, but most importantly we do it for midshipmen----

Q. Well, let's talk about DVs.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you take the DVs in the engineering space?

A. Yes, sir. When Tipper Gore was onboard she received special permission to go in the engineering spaces.

Q. These DVs on the 9th of February didn't go in the engineering spaces?

A. No, sir.

Q. What kind of memorabilia do the DVs get when they typically leave GREENEVILLE?

A. Ball caps, they like I--we open the ships store and they get whatever. We provide them--in this case with 100-year centennial packets. They were provided those. Typically the Captain will personalize a letter for them, sir.

Q. Do you guys ever give away styrofoam cups?

A. We had--we had staged some styrofoam cups that they had written. We staged those in the forward escape trunk area so that they'd be subjected to the ships depth change and they'd have memorabilia like that.

Q. So you knew the ship was going to go--those things were staged in the ship specifically to be crushed by the----

A. Yes, sir. Anytime you submerge the ship it is going to crush it. It changes based on the depth obviously.

Q. Is that the reason why you went to test depth?

A. I don't know specifically. I wasn't involved in----

Q. As the Engineer of the boat you were aware of the restrictions on depth and speed for classification of the visit?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you mention that to anybody?

A. The--no, sir. It was not--there's certain things that happen when people ride a submarine that you can't--that are classified if you are bringing people on inport, but you can't hide them from them because they are necessary to view those things as part of submarine operations and for the same reason that half of the Ships Control Panel is covered when we are inport rigged for visitors, it is not going to be covered at sea.

Q. Okay, well does the depth panel or the panel where it exhibits depth on it, does it have a big red line on it that says test depth on it?

A. No, sir.

Q. So the crew--the DVs would not know it was test depth unless someone told them that?

A. Yes, sir.

PRES: Okay, thank you.

Counsel for CDR Waddle?

Counsel for CDR Waddle (LCDR Young): Nothing from us, sir.

PRES: Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Thank you, sir.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Good morning, sir.

WIT: Good morning, sir.

Questions by counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone):

Q. Behind the CO and XO you are the third most senior officer onboard, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you describe what you saw as relationship between the CO and XO?

A. I thought GREENEVILLE was the best submarine I've been on. I thought we had a great reputation on the waterfront and I

think the CO and the XO compliment each other very well as--as a solid team that lead the ship.

Q. In your view did they have different leadership styles?

A. They had different leadership styles, yes.

Q. Can you try to give us kind of a feel for what their leadership styles were?

A. The Captain is very--is very personable and he's capable of--he's good at reaching out to new people and meeting people and really, really selling the submarine, and the XO is kind of the hard working guy that sits behind the scenes and makes it work--work supporting him from there, so that is why I think it worked real well.

Q. Would it be fair to say that the XO's style was a little bit more conservative?

A. I don't--what do you mean by conservative. I mean, would--is he less outgoing? Yes, he's less outgoing so he is more conservative in that way.

Q. I was thinking more in--when we are talking about operational environments and making decisions operationally.

A. No. I don't--I don't--I can't say that he's more conservative. I think he's got a different experience base than the Captain and so for certain situations he may suggest one way based on his experience where the Captain may, based on his experience, want to do it a different way.

Q. Based on your observations is there any doubt in your mind that the XO sensed that there was something unsafe on the ship that he would speak up and tell the CO that?

A. If the XO felt that the ship was being operated in an unsafe manner, he would--he would talk to the Captain and remedy the situation.

Q. When we are talking about the non-operational aspects of the ship, things like admin and training, in your opinion how did the XO do on those kinds of things?

A. He was--he had very high standards and that was his business and so he ran those programs.

Counsel for the LCDR Pfeifer party: No further questions.
Thank you.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LT Shanahan): Thank you, sir.

Questions by counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LT Shanahan):

Q. LCDR Meador, I want to ask you some questions about the experience of LT Coen as an Officer of the Deck.

Now LT Coen qualified as an Officer of the Deck, I believe, in June of 2000. Does that sound about right?

A. Sounds about right.

Q. And it is my understanding that the ship then was underway after he qualified for about another month?

A. Right, about--we had a lot of non-operational time through July where we were inport a lot and then we went into a Selected Restricted Availability through the rest of the year, so maybe a month----

Q. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut you off there, but in July when you didn't have--when you were not underway was that when the boat was up in California?

A. We were in California. We were doing a--we did a visit over the 4th of July to Santa Barbara and then we conducted midshipman training operations out of San Diego in the later part of July.

Q. Okay and then the boat went into the SRA in the fall, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And then it got underway again for a significant period in January for a few weeks. Is that right?

A. Right.

Q. What I would like to ask you is, based upon your experience as a submarine officer, the--if you could compare the type of underway evolutions or operations that he experienced as an Officer of the Deck as opposed to what he would get when he was on let's say a WESTPAC. If you could compare the difficulty of those and how that would impact his experience.

A. I think--I don't think you really get a good solid experience base until you've done a deployment like a WESTPAC. You can do a lot of local operations, but you really don't get a sense for the submarine force and really being able to differentiate what is important versus what is really important until you get on a deployment and operate the ship from the type of environments that we do.

Q. And for LT Coen that would have come up this coming summer?
A. Yes.

Counsel for LT Coen party: Thank you. I don't have any further questions.

PRES: I have one follow-on question.

WIT: Yes, sir.

EXAMINATION BY THE COURT

Questions by the President:

Q. What is the name of the material condition that you call away to set a higher watertight integrity?

A. If--following a collision or following a collision alarm you would rig for flooding and general emergency and that's----

Q. And that includes enclosing some more watertight----

A. Rigging for flooding does, yes, sir.

PRES: Okay. Alright.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): LCDR Meador, thank you for your testimony. Let me give you the following witness warning. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, parties thereto, or counsel. Do not allow any witness in this case talk to about the testimony that you have just given or testimony that you may give in the future in this case. If anyone other than counsel, the parties thereto, attempts to talk to you about your testimony you should report those circumstances to me as the counsel who originally called you for the court.

WIT: Yes, sir.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

PRES: This court will be in recess until 1300.

The court recessed at 1141 hours, 15 March 2001.

The court opened at 1301 hours, 15 March 2001.

PRES: The court is now in session. Counsel for the Court.

CC: Let the record reflect that all members, parties and counsel are again present. Mr. President, the court has one procedural matter. I wanted to bring to the attention of all of the parties and counsel that all of the members of the court have had an opportunity to thoroughly review, after court yesterday, the Exhibit 56, which is the summary from Master Chief Anderson at Naval Submarine Training Center Pacific. It was provided by Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer. The court wanted to note that the--within the exhibit there are summaries of statements, interviews, that were made to Master Chief Anderson by various member of the GREENEVILLE sonar team. Those summaries appear to be inconsistent with some of the testimony that was provided by those witnesses in yesterday's session. The court wanted me to point that out to the counsel and to the parties and that they will consider these interviews statements together with the interview statements that were provided in the Preliminary Inquiry, as well as the sworn testimony that we heard from the sonar team yesterday. Sir, that is all we have.

PRES: Okay. Counsel for the Parties, procedural matters?

Counsel for the CDR Waddle party (Mr. Gittins): Sir, I would just note my objection to the consideration of unsworn statements over sworn testimony given in court.

PRES: Counsel for the Court?

CC: Sir, the rules provide that the court can consider the unsworn statements together with the sworn testimony of witnesses.

PRES: Well, to specifically answer your question what I saw in that particular enclosure was a debrief or hot wash up of Sonarman to an ACINT, I believe that is the correct description, that a Master and Senior Chief who'd be very knowledgeable of sonar techniques and I saw it as a review and I think this is information we ought to consider.

Counsel for the LCDR Pfeifer party (LCDR Stone): Nothing, sir.

Counsel for the LTJG Coen party (LCDR Filbert): No objections, sir.

PRES: Counsel?

CC: Sir, at this time the court calls CAPT Jim Angert, U.S. Coast Guard to the stand.

James Angert, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. Captain, I note that you brought some notes with you to assist you in your testimony today?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Would you please make those available after your testimony for the court?

A. I certainly will.

Q. Captain, will you please state your full name and spell your last name for the record?

A. Yes, I will. Captain James Angert. That is spelled A-N-G-E-R-T.

Q. And what is your rank?

A. Captain, U.S. Coast Guard.

Q. And are you stationed here in Honolulu, Hawaii?

A. Yes, I am. I am the Chief of the Search and Rescue Branch for the 14th Coast Guard District stationed in Honolulu and I work in the Federal Building.

Q. How long have you been stationed there, sir?

A. That will be 3 years this summer.

Q. Can you describe your duties and responsibilities?

A. Yes. As chief of the search and rescue branch, one of my responsibilities is managing RCC Honolulu, which is the Search and Rescue Coordination Center for the central Pacific Ocean. It actually encompasses 12.2 square nautical miles, a fairly large area.

Q. On the 9th of February of 2001, was the Coast Guard notified of a collision that occurred between a U.S. submarine and a Japanese motor vessel?

A. That is correct. Yes, we were.

Q. Was the submarine identified as the USS GREENEVILLE?

A. That is correct.

Q. The Japanese motor vessel the EHIME MARU?

A. That is correct.

Q. How were you first notified of the collision?

A. The Coast Guard was first notified. That was Coast Guard Group Honolulu, located on Sand Island. And they received a call on channel 16 FM and that was from COMSUBPAC announcing that there had been a collision, one of their submarines with a commercial vessel.

Q. Do you know what time on the afternoon of the 9th the Coast Guard was notified?

A. 13:55.

Q. Sir, are you aware of the time the collision occurred?

A. Only what I read as speculation in the newspapers.

Q. And how was it that COMSUBPAC first notified the Coast Guard? How did they do that? Did they call you up on the telephone? Did they notify you by message?

A. As I said it was on a radio call on channel 16 VHF FM, which the Coast Guard continuously monitors.

Q. What did the Coast Guard do in response?

A. Certainly took the information, immediately diverted a Coast Guard helicopter that happened to be airborne at the time on a whale sanctuary patrol over by Kahoolawe told the Coast Guard that there had been a collision, people in the water and asked them to divert to that position.

Q. Do you know how long it took them to get to the scene of the collision?

A. I listened to the radio transmission. Initially the helicopter estimated it would take them 26 minutes to get on scene. They were notified approximately 13:56 and they actually arrived on scene at 14:27, so they were fairly close in their estimate.

Q. Can you describe what they found when they arrived on the scene?

A. They--certainly--GREENEVILLE was amongst several life rafts. At that point all the people were out of the water, there was nobody left swimming. Some of the rafts were tied together. At that point, the Coast Guard had also dispatched two small boats that were minutes away from the scene as well.

Q. When you say small boats, do you know what time that they arrived on scene?

A. Yes, sir, I do. Immediately after diverting the helicopter, Coast Guard Group Honolulu notified Station Honolulu, which is also on Sand Island to send their 21 foot Zodiac and a 41 foot utility boat. Both of those vessels got underway approximately 1358 and the Zodiac, being the faster boat, arrived on scene at 1431, followed by the 41 footer at 1444, so right after the helicopter arrived on scene.

Q. Which of the boats actually rescued the people from the rafts?

A. The people were actually transferred ashore onboard the 41 footer. But the Zodiac is a bit more maneuverable and I think they were involved in checking out the rafts and seeing if everyone was all right.

Q. Do you know where USS GREENEVILLE was at this time?

A. I think they certainly remained on scene. I know at one point I heard an account that they were trying to create a lee to make it a little bit easier ride for the life rafts. I think at one point they were so close to the life rafts that some of the Coast Guard small boat asked them to even back off a little bit because they were having a bit of trouble checking out the rafts.

Q. Was the Coast Guard able to establish communications with the GREENEVILLE?

A. The Coast Guard small boats on scene did talk to the GREENEVILLE on channel 22 FM.

Q. Do you know what time--approximately what time in the afternoon that was?

A. I don't know the exact time that was.

Q. Do you know if it was when they actually got out--the Coast Guard units were out on the scene? Was that the first time that comms were established with GREENEVILLE?

A. I would say that's a fair statement, yes, sir.

Q. Did it surprise you that you weren't able to establish communications before that time with GREENEVILLE?

A. I suppose looking back on it now the--we heard about the collision from COMSUBPAC. Obviously the GREENEVILLE had notified them by some means of communication. I know that the GREENEVILLE did have the capability to talk on FM because they did talk to the Coast Guard boats, so they certainly would have

had the opportunity to call directly to the Coast Guard and ask for assistance.

Q. Do you know if they tried to do that?

A. I don't know if they tried to do that.

Q. Once the Coast Guard established communications with GREENEVILLE on the scene, what information was passed back and forth between the units? Do you know that sir?

A. I don't know the entire extent of the conversations. I know at one point the Coast Guard EMTs on scene were concerned. I think they put one of the survivors on oxygen and they were afraid that the transit ashore would take so long that they might run out of oxygen. I understand the GREENEVILLE offered that they had oxygen canisters that they could transfer to the Coast Guard small boat if that necessary.

Q. So when you said EMP, do you mean emergency medical personnel?

A. EMT, yes, sir.

Q. EMT?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would you describe the wind and the sea state that afternoon?

A. I could tell you what was reported in our situation report for that first day. Weather was reported as seas 3 to 4 feet, with the winds zero-four-five at 10 knots, visibility 6 miles, air temperature 78 degrees Fahrenheit, with a water temperature of 77 degrees Fahrenheit.

Q. Can you describe the color of the sky?

A. My window has a nice view looking in that direction and it was a bit of an overcast day. I certainly recall that myself.

Q. Would you characterize it as kind of a white haze on the horizon?

A. I'm not sure that I would say that, overcast I think would be---

Q. Overcast?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Alright, sir. Did any of your units observe any GREENEVILLE sailors out on the deck of the submarine?

A. Talking to the coxswains from the small boat I certainly got the indication that they saw many people up in the tower, in the sail area, of the submarine.

Q. On the Bridge?

A. Yes, sir. I've never heard that anyone came out on deck.

Q. Do you think that was because of the sea state at the time?

A. The initial report to the Coast Guard indicated that the rough sea conditions may preclude the GREENEVILLE assisting.

Q. Now as the search and rescue effort progressed, did any other Coast Guard or Navy units arrive on the scene?

A. Oh, absolutely. I'll speak for the Coast Guard first. We notified our--we keep two patrol boats on ready status. One of them is always in at least a Bravo Two status ready to be launched in 2 hours and the second one is always in a Bravo Twelve status. It just so happens on that day that the Bravo Two boat, was the Coast Guard Cutter KISKA, which is stationed over on the Big Island. We made notification of the Cutter KISKA to get underway to assist and we also called the Coast Guard Cutter KITTEWAKE, which was the ship on Bravo Twelve status in Kauai. Coast Guard Cutter ASITIGUE was in a Charlie status, maintenance status here on Sand Island. We did call down there and ask if it was possible for them to get underway and they said that yes it was. And they got underway fairly rapidly with the minimum crew to go out and assist on scene.

Q. Do you know what time the--well I'm assuming that the Coast Guard eventually took over the search and rescue efforts and became the SAR coordinator?

A. Yes, sir. As soon as we were notified of the event we assumed that status. I wasn't aware that there was a transfer that actually took place.

Q. Okay. Do you know, sir, if USS GREENEVILLE remained out overnight to assist in the SAR efforts?

A. Yes, sir. They certainly did.

Q. How long did the Coast Guard search and rescue effort go on for?

A. [Looking at notes.] A total of 22 days, actually it worked out to be 102 separate searches over those 22 days, covering 32,000 square nautical miles.

Q. Captain, I would like for you to give the court your assessment of the timeliness of the notification you received

from the Navy. From the time of the initial collision, which I know you said that you've read about, but if I told you it was 1343 on the afternoon on the 9th of February? Given what you've just testified to in terms of when the Coast Guard was notified, how timely is that as compared to other notifications that you've received in your office?

A. Well certainly the Coast Guard would like to know about events like this as soon as possible. Unfortunately in this situation perhaps it would not have altered the outcome, but it would seem to me that there was an opportunity to have called directly to the Coast Guard. We monitor distress channels, both channel 16 and 2182. It would have been possible for the GREENEVILLE, I think, to have called on the radio to the Coast Guard directly rather than to COMSUBPAC and then COMSUBPAC eventually got ahold of the Coast Guard.

Q. Of course you are testifying you are not aware that they--or you are not aware that they didn't try to do that, correct? They may have tried to do that for all you know?

A. That is correct. If they did, it was not picked up on any of our sites. All three high sites picked up the call from COMSUBPAC.

Q. How effective would you assess the combined SAR effort of the Navy and the Coast Guard was?

A. I would say very, very effective. Being so close to Honolulu we had, in fact, probably more assets responding that we could reasonably assign effective search areas to.

Q. How effective would you assess the communications between the Navy and the Coast Guard units? Particularly the GREENEVILLE once they established communications with Coast Guard units on the scene?

A. I would say overall the communications were very good yes, sir.

CC: Sir, that is all I have.

PRES: Okay. RADM Stone?

Questions by a court member (RADM Stone):

Q. Good afternoon, Captain. Why do you think GREENEVILLE was ordered to stay overnight on the 9th of February? Why do you think that was done?

A. I don't know. I can say that I was in the Coast Guard RCC when the call came in from COMSUBPAC asking us if the

GREENEVILLE could go home. We said, yes, we had plenty of assets on scene that they were released if they wished to go home.

Q. Those were U.S. Coast Guard assets that you had on scene? Is that what you were referring to?

A. We had Coast Guard and Navy at that point as well, both the SALVOR and the LAKE ERIE were on scene at that point.

Q. We had received earlier testimony that talked about how GREENEVILLE was left there to ensure Navy presence on the scene and then to enhance the overall Navy assets that were on the scene, in other words, the more pair of eyes, the more assets. The greater probability perhaps of spotting anyone that may have been able to have been found?

A. I'd say that is possible. As I said, they did ask if the GREENEVILLE could go home. We did release them. We got a call a few minutes later that the GREENEVILLE would stay out overnight.

Q. Were there any particular, as you think back over the SAR effort, any--the top three lessons learned that you might want to offer the court that you take away from this as far as the search and rescue effort?

A. As I said for us, from the search and rescue standpoint, it created a--it was very close to shore. We had a lot of assets, we knew exactly where the collision occurred with great certainty as far as time and location. It is unfortunate that there were no survivors other than those that made it the rafts, but certainly if there were I feel confident that we would have found them that first afternoon.

MBR (RADM STONE): Thank you very much. That is all I have, sir.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): I have no questions.

PRES: Counsel, thank you very much. Counsel for CDR Waddle?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins):

Q. Sir, you are an aviator?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have any background in the requirements for ships regarding water-tight compartments for U.S. registered vessels?

A. Gosh, I wouldn't be an expert to testify in that, sir.

Q. Yes, sir. I understand. You indicated that you had a view out of your office window of the ocean?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That looks out away from land, correct?

A. Yes, sir, south from Honolulu.

Q. South from Honolulu? And to your knowledge to your knowledge the accident was out south of Honolulu, out in the direction you would be generally looking, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You indicated that there was some--there was some difficulty initially making contact with GREENEVILLE. Were you aware that the CO of GREENEVILLE attempted to call the Coast Guard on channel 16 and was directed to stay off channel 16 that an emergency was in progress?

A. I was not aware of that.

Q. What is a sea state 2? What does that mean to you?

A. Again, I could not comment. I know the sea state rougher conditions, but I couldn't give you the parameters of sea state 2.

Counsel for CDR Waddle party (Mr. Gittins): That is all I have, sir.

PRES: Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer party (LCDR Stone): Sir, we have no questions.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No questions, sir.

PRES: Counsel?

CC: Captain, we appreciate your testimony today. I do need to give you a witness warning. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, the parties, or counsel. You will not allow any

witness to talk to you about the testimony he has given or which he intends to give. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempts to talk to you about your testimony, would you please make those circumstances known to me please.

WIT: Yes, sir.

CC: Thank you, sir. We appreciate your testimony again and you are excused.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

CC: Sir, at this time we call the Chief of the Boat.

Douglas L. Coffman, Machinist's Mate Master Chief, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. Master Chief, would you begin by stating your full name and spell your last name for the record?

A. Douglas Lloyd Coffman, C-O-F-F-M-A-N.

Q. And what is your rate?

A. MMCM.

Q. Master Chief, how long have you been on active duty in the U.S. Navy?

A. 19 years.

Q. How long have you been qualified in submarines?

A. Since 1979.

Q. What is your current duty station?

A. USS GREENEVILLE.

Q. You are currently Chief of the Boat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you been Chief of the Boat?

A. One year.

Q. What are the duties and responsibilities of the COB onboard a U.S. Submarine?

A. As the senior enlisted advisor to the Captain of the enlisted people onboard, work with the XO and the Captain in the administration and running the ship.

Q. Any other duties?

A. Too many to name.

Q. Well go ahead and try. We would like to get a flavor of what a COB does.

A. Keep the ship clean; health and welfare of the crew; keeping the chiefs quarters together and working together, that is a big job there, those boys, good boys, but spirited men; preparing for inspections one right after another.

Q. Okay. Master Chief, I would like to turn your attention to the 9th of February and I would like to focus you first on the civilian guests that you had onboard on the 9th? Did you meet these civilian guests on the pier before GREENEVILLE got underway that morning?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was with you?

A. On the pier?

Q. On the pier?

A. I believe the XO was up there. The Captain--we've done so many the Captain is normally there. I don't remember if he was up there that morning or not to be honest with you.

Q. Anybody else other than the XO?

A. Not to my recollection, sir.

Q. So you and the XO were out on the pier to greet the DVs as they came aboard?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When they came aboard, where did you take them?

A. Crews mess.

Q. What did you do in the crews mess with them?

A. Gave them a quick brief on how to use the heads, what to do and not to do on the ship, where to go if something were to happen and then we gave them a quick little brief of GREENEVILLE history. The PAO gave that.

Q. So, it is fair to say you gave them a safety brief?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They given a medical brief?

A. The corpsman comes in and does that. I don't believe I was there for that, but the corpsman comes in and tells them about the radiation areas and so on and so forth.

Q. I want to take you back just a little bit to the time on the pier. Was the Chief of Staff of SUBPAC also out on the pier with the civilians?

A. He wasn't there when they arrived. He arrived a little bit after they got there, maybe 5 or 10 minutes after that to the best of my memory.

Q. Did you and the XO greet the Chief of Staff?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. And what did you talk about on the pier?

A. Just what we were going to do for the day, basically you know go out and do a VIP cruise and nothing specific. I used to work for him so we discussed some things--sea story type stuff.

Q. Did you or the XO hand him a welcome aboard package? Do you recall?

A. Couldn't tell you, sir. Usually the yeoman passes those out.

Q. Did the DVs get a welcome aboard package?

A. I know they had one because they were all gathered up and put in one spot after we took them to crews mess so they didn't have to carry around all day. When they actually received them I don't know.

Q. After these series of morning briefings that the civilian received on the mess decks, did you have any escort duties with the civilian guests that day?

A. I pretty much floated back and forth between each little group. No specific group did I stay with the whole day.

Q. Is it fair to say that your focus that day was escorting the DVs around and helping out with the civilian guests onboard GREENEVILLE?

A. My duties?

Q. Part of your duties?

A. No, sir. My duties were I was just making sure things were going well on the ship. I was not an escort escorting them around. I had lunch with, I can't remember the man's name, his name was John; his first name. And that was about the most time I had spent with any one person.

Q. Did you give the Chief of Staff at SUBPAC a tour of GREENEVILLE that morning?

A. We walked around the forward part of the ship. We had about a 10 or 15 minute talk in the CO's stateroom. Then I took him down to the Chief's Quarters and he went and visited with the Chiefs onboard.

Q. Can you tell us what you talked about with the Chief of Staff in the CO's stateroom?

A. Just how the crew was doing, that's always one of his questions. How's the crew doing? How's things going? How's the ship doing? Just your basic Chief of Staff type questions wanting to know how things are going. He's very much a people person. So he asks a lot of those questions like that.

Q. You may have said this already but how long did that meeting last for?

A. I would say about 10 or 15 minutes maybe.

Q. What did you do after that? You said you had lunch. After lunch, what did you do?

A. I'm not sure exactly what I did after lunch. I talked to CAPT Brandhuber. And after that, milled about making sure we were stowed for sea because I knew we were going to do angles and dangles.

Q. Did you visit the Control Room at all that afternoon?

A. Probably two or three times during the day, at least, just to make sure the civilians were okay and nothing was amiss in Control.

Q. I would assume, though, just for brief periods of time?

A. Brief periods of time.

Q. Sonar? Did you go into Sonar?

A. Walked through once that I can remember. Maybe more just because I was checking the stowage.

Q. Master Chief, where were you when the collision occurred?

A. Crew's Mess.

Q. And what did you do when you first learned that the ship had collided with the EHIME MARU?

A. Well, to be honest with you, when it first happened I didn't know when had happened. Somebody on the LMC said, COB, come to Control. I went to Control. I went and talked to the Diving Officer. I said, what's going on. It sounded like the worse case of bow plane slapping the water that you ever heard. And I asked him if that's what he thought had happened. And then somebody said, who it was I have no idea, I think we hit something. And after that--the next thing I remember is going aft because there was failure of the primary shaft seals. They said it kicked on the secondary shaft seals. And myself and CAPT Brandhuber when back to shaft alley.

Q. I'd kind of like to refocus your attention, COB, and talk about command climate onboard GREENEVILLE. I'm sure as the Chief of the Boat, that's one of the areas you keep pretty close tabs on?

A. That's what they pay me to do, yes, sir.

Q. How do you define command climate as the Chief of the Boat.

A. On the GREENEVILLE or just in general?

Q. In general. What are the kinds of things that you're always keeping tabs on? As you just stated, it's one of the principal things that you do. What are the things you look for and assess to determine command climate?

A. Well daily we walk through the boat. You can just tell each guy--I mean it takes you month or two to figure each guy out, how he works. But I mean in 2 months time, some sooner and some a little more, you can tell by just looking at them or talking to them for 5 minutes if they're doing okay, if they're not doing okay. The big thing is we implement and support what comes down from SUBPAC.

We try to keep as many people on GREENEVILLE and in the Navy as we can. We try to implement the plans that they set for us to do and the crew responds well. We maximize liberty and maximize

training. We take care of our guys very well. And for that reason, we don't have--like a lot of people always wondered why squadron wasn't down on the ship all the time. Well, and this comes from the horse's mouth and those people. You don't have to go down to some place that's not broke. There are plenty of other ships out there that need their help. And they didn't visit the GREENEVILLE because they knew we were doing okay. We weren't sending people to squadron. We weren't losing people. The guys were happy campers. If we lost a guy it was for some medical reason.

Q. Master Chief, we've certainly heard a lot of testimony over the last couple of weeks about the great command climate that existed on GREENEVILLE. What do you attribute that to?

A. A number of things; the officers, the chiefs, and the LPOs. I just think we're doing things right. Like I say, we try to do the best we can for the guys. And the guys are always--to focus. It's not, you know, the Chief's going on liberty, the officer's going on liberty. It's getting the guys, getting their jobs done. Getting the best support we can out of the IMF, the shipyard. So those guys come down and do their jobs so our guys can focus on the multitude of maintenance they have to do so they can have time off. That's what makes a Sailor happy. And, you know, we do the best we can. But, you know, people still have to work a lot.

Q. Master Chief, you mentioned that the officers played a large part in the positive command climate on GREENEVILLE. What role did the Captain, CDR Waddle, play in GREENEVILLE's command climate?

A. He's a leader. He's the guy that made it all happen. Everything that he did that I saw was for the guys. I mean, it was never--there was always the story, well Scott Waddle does everything for political gain. It was even a joke on the boat. I think if you were to talk to one of those crew members, they would tell you that what was done for the guys on the boat was because--CO, the XO, and I guided things along where the crew got a lot of good deals because they worked hard.

They did whatever was asked. The VIP cruise was part of their job. It wasn't like; if it was going to war, it was going to war. If it was VIP cruise, it was doing a VIP cruise. It wasn't like, my God, we got to go do a VIP cruise. It was like that was part of the job and they went and did it.

Q. Master Chief, you said one of your principal duties as Chief of the Boat is the advice and the relationship you have with the

Commanding Officer, CDR Waddle. Could you describe that personal relationship that the two of you had to the court?

A. Well I had the benefit of being the COB and having the Captain's ear any time I want it. I never felt that I didn't have it. If I had something I thought that needed to be addressed, I'd walk in and do it. The way the GREENEVILLE worked is, me and the XO worked together. And we came up with a decision because every once in while we would have a hair brained idea. And before we went and bounced it off the Captain, we came up with a good plan to go to the Captain with.

Not, you know, something that was off base. You know, something that we shouldn't do. Or one of us had a better idea, that's when we went in and proposed it to the Captain. It wasn't me doing everything, the XO doing everything, the Captain doing everything. It was a team effort there altogether.

Q. You'd say the Captain was very approachable?

A. The most approachable Captain I've ever worked for. Again, I had the luxury of doing that and you would have to ask the rest of the Chiefs but I believe they would tell you that they could go and talk to him, or the XO, any time they wanted because that's just the way we worked.

Q. You mentioned the XO in there and I'd like you to focus a little bit on your relationship with the XO as well. I take it that you generally have the same comments about the XO that you just expressed about the Commanding Officer?

A. The XO was the planner on paper and I was the executor. The XO was the guy that could plan a fine day; a 0800 to 1600 day and then I would execute it. He's just a better planner. I'm not that great of a planner but I can execute things quite well.

Q. Speaking of planning and executing, I wanted to focus on the watchbill on the 9th of February. Are you responsible, the COB, for the enlisted watchbill on GREENEVILLE?

A. I write the enlisted watchbill, yes.

Q. And how do you put that together?

A. I get inputs from the Chiefs, Department Chiefs and then I put those names to paper. And if I have to move somebody that they had specific in a spot so I got enough for Helmsman, Planesman, mess cooking duties; I move those people where I need to and go back and tell them, this is what I did.

Q. So the input comes then from the various divisional or departmental Chiefs?

A. Yes.

Q. So you simply collate that and put it together in a watchbill form?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you check their input?

A. Spotcheck, I don't check every person.

Q. How do you spot check their input?

A. I check the proficiency binder, the qual binder, made sure they're qualified. Make sure that that's where the guy supposed to be.

CC: [Speaking to LCDR Harrison.] Show Master Chief Coffman Exhibit 41, which is the watchbill on the 9th of February?

[LCDR Harrison did as directed.]

PRES: Master Chief, how are you doing?

WIT: Good, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q. I'd like to look at the watchbill for the 9th, I'd like to look at Section 2, the 12-18 watch.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That would have covered the period of the collision at 1343. I'd like to go down the watches with you a little bit. The Diving Officer of the Watch was Chief Streyle, is that how you say it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The Chief of the Watch was Petty Officer Harris?

A. Yes.

Q. The Helm was Petty Officer Feddeler?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and it shows Bauer in that particular watch position?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, the Lee Helmsman was Ramirez, and it shows Petty Officer Feddeler in that position?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. The Messenger shows Brown, I can't remember the name that was in the testimony, but it--we've been able to ascertain that it wasn't Brown as a Messenger?

A. That's true.

Q. Do you know who it was?

A. Not off the top of my head, sir.

Q. Okay. The Quartermaster of the Watch was Petty Officer Blanding, it shows Petty Officer Kurns on the watchbill?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The Fire Control Technician of the Watch shows Petty Officer Seacrest, it----

A. I believe it was----

Q. Was Petty Officer Seacrest--but it shows----

A. Benkovic.

Q. Benkovic?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. ESM was Petty Officer Carter--it shows Petty Officer Carter.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Radio Operator was Petty Officer Hensley.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It shows Petty Officer Hensley. Sonar Supe was Petty Officer McGiboney?

A. Yes.

Q. But it shows Petty Officer Holmes.

A. Yes.

Q. Sonar Operator, that's Broadband, as I've come to learn was Petty Officer Anderson.

A. I believe was on watch.

Q. Shows Petty Officer Anderson.

A. Yes.

Q. Sonar Two was SN Rhodes.

A. Yes.

Q. Shows SN Rhodes. We've heard, under testimony, that he's a UI watch, typically that's designated as UI on the watchbill, does it show that?

A. On--on--on my--in my past watchbills I've written, and I've looked back at all of them, even before I got there, sonar watches were never written in as UIs. Normally it was the number four guy, was a guy that was in sonar when towed arrays were employed, so it was basically always an extra guy, and that's--Rhodes, why he wasn't qualified, I don't know. I don't know why that is other than when I put him in there, I thought he was just the extra guy who would be over instruction by the Sonar Supervisor.

Q. Okay, but what we've come to learn, in testimony, that you're suppose to have two qualified and one Supe----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so what I show is a unqualified watch but no designation on the watchbill as being unqualified, so because of that there's no--there's no hands on or designated oversight on the watchbill.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, and then we come to understand, under testimony, that Petty Officer Reyes was in--in sonar at the time of the collision assisting Rhodes.

A. I know he was in there before, I don't know at the time of the collision if he was there or not.

Q. Well under testimony we've come to understand that he went back to get his jacket, so in an ad hoc way he sort of becomes another watch inside of sonar. We haven't looked at the sonar--at the Torpedoman of the Watch, etcetera, but my understanding is having talked with the Engineer, that he said that the watchbill for Engineering was stable and hadn't changed. What do all the circles on that watchbill mean?

A. All the circles were on the watchbill when we pulled in, Squadron SEVEN told us they wanted a specific list of people by watchstations for interviews as soon as we pulled inport. And this watchbill was taken down and marked up, so these people could be interviewed as soon as Squadron SEVEN boarded the ship after pulling into port.

Q. After--this was on the 10th?

A. No, sir. It was the day of the 9th--well it was either the--very late at night or the morning of the 10th that they told us that they wanted this list of people.

Q. Okay. So the circles are just to mark up people that you were--it was just a useful document to send people over?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now we've come to hear under testimony that the sonar watch is kind of the safety of the boat kind of watch. Would you agree or disagree with that?

A. Most certainly, sir.

Q. Alright. You said that you are the--the XO's the planner, and that you are the executor. Does--did you have that much instability in your watchbill, does that look like a pretty good plan?

A. I don't understand your question, sir.

Q. Well, let's go back through it again. We have a number of men that were written in to stand the watch. But it turns out--and this is from 12-18--so my expectations are that I would find these men on watch during the collision, and what I find is that they're not on watch. That there's a fairly significant number of changes in these watches that start in the Control and the Sonar watches for the ship at that particular time.

A. In a normal underway those guys would be there, and under the circumstances, with having VIPs onboard, they needed different times--guys get head calls, a number of things can change, plus on--on--for the Planesman in particular, we put the--the best guys we had when we do large rudder angles. Not that they all can't do it, these guys are just the ones that we have that are the best at it.

Q. Okay, but you told me earlier that--you said that you knew for DV watches we're going to do angles and dangles. But Petty Office Feddeler specifically said under testimony that he was put in the Helmsman spot because he was so good at. But on the watchbill he's at the Lee Helm. Now does that--does that--I--I know it's hard to look at this stuff in the future, but it's an example to me of kind of the instability. You've got your best guy--you have to pull him back to make him your Helmsman so he

can conduct angles and dangles, but he--he appears on the watchbill in a--in a different place, he appears as a Helmsman.

A. Those three guys can sit any two spots on the station anytime, their--when they--when they--on a normal underway watch, Feddeler could be on the outboard station, and Ramirez, who's on watch, could be on the inboard station, because that's how they rotate through a 6 hour rotation, so they could have been in either of those spots.

Q. Okay, but Petty Officer Feddeler testified--you see Petty Officer Feddeler down there as a Lee Helm?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. From 12-18, when would you normally expect him to take the watch?

A. After he had chow.

Q. Can you give me a time?

A. On a normal underway he would have relieved around 1130.

Q. 1130. When I asked him that question he said that typically for a 1200 watch he'd be relieving--someone testified you'd be relieving about 1130, you--do you understand that Petty Officer Feddeler never came on watch until 1300?

A. Did I know that? No, sir, I did not.

Q. Okay. Well he came on watch at 1300. So I go back to my question, that sounds like a lot of instability in a watchbill. I mean, we've only--we're talking about 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11--11 names that I count, basically 10 changes.

A. I don't know what time he had chow, sir, I don't know what he testified for chow, I don't know why he was late getting up there, if he had an alternative reason for being late, I don't know.

Q. Lets go back to the larger question. How efficient can a ship be if there was that many watchbill changes over a short period of time.

A. As long as they're qualified at that watch--on this day--this day is not a normal day, sir, it's like VIPs. People are doing a lot of things. Different people take different watches during that day.

Q. You told me that it was a normal day just a minute ago. You told me that whether it was going to war or going DV cruise, "we did it just the same."

A. I said the guys reacted the same way. The watchbill doesn't--the watchbill did not work that way on that day and it hasn't in the past.

Q. There's this much instability on the watchbill on GREENEVILLE, on a daily basis?

A. No, sir.

Q. Then why is there so much instability? How efficient can this be if the crew doesn't know what watchstation they're going to be on. Is it just a completely ad hoc manner? How much backup can Sonar give if one of the key watches in there is a UI?

A. Well, I would expect if that guy was a UI somebody to raise the flag on this and say hey this guy really can't be here and I didn't know that. If I would've known that, he would not have been there.

Q. But in the process of sending it up to you, it should have been designated--isn't it common practice to designate on a watchbill that the watches are UI?

A. It's common practice with every watchstation except Sonar, because there are usually four men in there and out of those--there's five men in there--out of five of those, four of them are qualified and one of them is a UI guy, on UI under somebody else.

Q. Okay, but that's not the case on the 9th of February?

A. That's true.

Q. So, how safe can it be if the Watch and Sonar is completely at ad hoc? Look at the watches in sonar, Master Chief. Holmes is Supe and he's not there. Anderson is on watch and Rhodes is UI, he's standing watch as a UI without the oversight and Petty Officer Reyes walks in on an ad hoc basis becomes a watch. Does that sound like a safe Sonar to you?

A. It wasn't safe that day, sir. It's obvious.

PRES: Counsel?

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. Bailiff. Master Chief I'd like to show Exhibit 3, which is the Plan of the Day for the 9th of February. Part of your duties as the Chief of the Boat, you review the Plan of the Day?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact you have input into don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. You complete paragraph 4, COB's Korner?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you look at the paragraph right above COB's Korner, says SN Rhodes is listed as a delinquent on the 9th of February?

A. Yes.

Q. What is a delinquent onboard GREENEVILLE?

A. Means they are behind in qualification in some watch.

Q. Behind in qualifications, correct? They've exceeded the amount of time they were given to complete it?

A. Complete it. Or be at a certain stage of it.

Q. Now, I'd like you look at Exhibit 41 and you have Rhodes listed on that watchbill, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And that's a watchbill you reviewed?

A. Yes.

Q. And Rhodes was delinquent on that day wasn't he?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You testified earlier that you checked some other source when you prepared this watchbill when you checked on their qualification status. Is that right?

A. Yes, the watch qual binder.

Q. Okay. Have you had a chance to go back look at the watch qual binder and what the--how--Rhodes was listed on the 9th?

A. He's not in there. Not in the qual binder as whatever this--his delinquent AUX Operator. There's different phases as being qualified as a Sonarman Passive Broadband AUX Operator. AUX Operator entails a lot of things. A lot of different pieces of equipment.

Q. Would he be listed in that qual binder?

A. To stand the watch that he was on?

Q. Right.

A. If he was qualified he would have.

Q. But, we know he wasn't qualified, correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. So, he couldn't have been in the binder, right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Obviously you either missed him or didn't check the qual binder when you put the watchbill together?

A. I didn't check him and usually depend on my Chief Petty Officers to back me up on this and give me their input of who they want to be on those watchstations.

Q. So, your Chief Petty Officers failed to provide you forceful backup in this case, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And who would that Chief Petty Officer be?

A. Chief Grose.

Q. I don't have anything more.

MBR (RADM STONE): Good Afternoon, Master Chief.

WIT: Sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Stone):

Q. Tell me do you think you have a great crew onboard the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Personnel opinion? Do you think they are well trained. How about the equipment the sensors on the GREENEVILLE. Do you think they are being well maintained?

A. Yes, sir, we just had the sonar system repaired last dry docking. Bunch of the transducers replaced.

Q. And properly operated by the watchstanders?

A. Properly tested on during sea trial, sir.

Q. Overall so you think you have great sensors on there are properly maintained and operators, is that true?

A. To the best of my knowledge, sir, I'm a Torpedoman, sir. They work according to my----

Q. According to the Chief of the Boat----

A. They work according to the Chiefs and they say they work, so.

Q. As Chief of the Boat do you have an opinion on that?

A. My opinion is they work because they tell me they work.

Q. Okay. From what you know about the mission on the 9th of February, pretty low risk and pretty easy mission would you say?

A. It's never easy going to sea on the submarine, sir. There are a lot of things that have to happen just to get it to sea.

Q. Low traffic area, 10 miles south of Diamond Head? Not very many vessels out there?

A. I don't know, sir.

Q. How about your opinion on the weather that day. Not too bad?

A. I didn't know what it was--I know what it was when we pulled out, because I was topside once we got where we at right then. I didn't know until we surfaced that it was as bad as it was.

Q. Did it look like it was pretty reasonable weather or how would you have evaluated that overall?

A. After we surfaced, it was a terrible day.

Q. Would you say as the Chief of the Boat that the crew values your opinions because you are the Chief of the Boat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I value you your opinion too, since you're the Chief of the Boat. I'm very interested in hearing your opinion on the following issue:

On the 9th of February, GREENEVILLE got underway with what you described a great crew, well trained, high tech sensors that you think are well maintained and went out on a mission is relatively low risk in an operating area that has low density traffic. So with this highly trained crew and great sensors, I'm very interested in your opinion. Why do you think

GREENEVILLE in that mission they were on was unable detect a reasonably sized fishing boat that was steady on course and speed over a lengthy period of time? And not only failed to detect that fishing boat with its well trained crew and high tech sensors, not only failed to detect it, but also actually surfaced underneath it? What's your opinion on why that happened with a great crew with a great equipment?

A. Well, to be honest, sir, I have no idea. I hope whatever comes out of this tells us what that was because I couldn't answer that question in a million years to myself. I wish I could, but I can't.

Q. When crew members asked you as the Chief of the Boat, "Hey why do you think that happened." What do you offer to them? As your opinion?

A. I just tell them that it was terrible tragic accident and there's--I--I can't explain to them why it happened, an act of god. I don't know.

Q. Any personal lessons learned that you offer them as far as this particular event? Are there any lessons learned that you gathered from--on your own?

A. I would--that I would have told the crew before hand or now?

Q. No, certainly afterwards. The lessons learned from the incident.

A. Do exactly what we did. We went back to work on Tuesday morning and we had to get the ship ready to go to sea again and that's--we first had to get it to dry dock, put back together and go back to sea. I didn't tell them to stand around. I told them to do their own personal grieving and we were moving on. Basically that is what I told them the day we pulled--on Monday after we came in the morning.

Q. I know from your training and having been in since, what 1979, that when we have an event in the Navy, the people immediately gather and discuss on actions that were taken and what can we do better. That's the essence of our safety debrief after we had an event after there was a casualty or people injured. Those at that command gather up and say what did we learn from that. What can we do better next time. So, I'm interested on what did you do on GREENEVILLE as Chief of the Boat. I'm sure you played a major role in those discussions and people are eager to learn those lessons to prevent the incident from happening again. I'm just asking you what are some of the things you discussed to learn from that that you shared with the

crew members. Is there anything at all that you have taken away and shared from a safety point of view?

A. Well we've been under the microscope since the day we came back in. And we have everybody and his brother down there telling us what we should have done and what we need to do. And have we sat the crew down and--with--and since Captain Cortese got there and gave him a lesson learned? No, sir. We're waiting for it to come out of here so we can give them a perspective that is--that they'll understand.

MBR (RADM STONE): Thank you, Master Chief.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Afternoon, COB.

WIT: Sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. Maybe I missed it. What is your background? Are you a Torpedoman?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You had a lot of testimony about the lead up to getting underway for this DV cruise. Your schedule was changed, correct? The way I understood it originally you were going to stay up over the weekend?

A. Yes, we working up for an ORSE and we were originally going to be out. That's true.

Q. You as a COB were obviously involved with--when the change came down to make adjustments?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How much--how many days did you have to do that or can you give me a sense of how quickly that was put on you as a task?

A. Well we knew--we knew when we left Alameda that we were going to do a VIP cruise when we got back. So, it was no big surprise that we were going to do it. We started adjusting the schedule and the plan was to do the VIP cruise, take the weekend off and come back on Monday morning and get underway and complete the work up for the ORSE. The decision was made by Department Heads, myself, the XO, the Master Chief in charge of the nukes, that we were at a stage and we could afford to let the guys have a weekend off and come back to work on Monday and still be ready to do our ORSE. That was how we came to that

conclusion. Now, Squadron SEVEN did not agree--did not agree--they suggested--CAPT Cortese, who's onboard now, wanted to see some drills and stuff being done Saturday and Sunday. So, it was pull in and get underway on Sunday was what they asked. The Captain asked us to get together and make that decision. And that is when made we were one, Saturday would be a day of just getting back to sea. Sunday is the day that the crew relaxes and it would be a wasted day, so why not give the guys Saturday and Sunday off. That was the plan.

Q. You said Squadron SEVEN?

A. Squadron ONE, excuse me sir.

Q. Make sure I understand that because I'm trying to put this together in my head and what you had to do to adjust. Before you left California you knew you were just going to do this on Friday the 9th. Come in, shut down and then get underway on Monday.

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was a large contingent who went to shore, 51 mostly I think and 6 or so Officers. Majority of those--what I know so far were involved a shore trainer over at NSTCP?

A. I don't remember the numbers that went to the shore trainer, but by the SOPA Pearl Instruction that they have, we have to provide our own line handlers when you're doing an inter-harbor movement which is basically a VIP cruise. And in that book you have provide your own line handlers. A lot of those guys were left behind as line handlers for when we got back, casting the boat, getting the boat back into port.

Q. My real question that I was trying to get to. Did you have an input who stayed in, who had special liberty, trainers, line handler, or whatever--is it the fact that you started up this plan up and you wanted to leave them behind. Were you inputted into that?

A. I got input from the Department Heads who they needed to leave in for certain trainers and that was implemented into the plan.

Q. I never personally had to do a one day DV cruise where you had the option of leaving a bunch of people behind like this. My sense, my feel is 51 people plus 6 officers, that's a

significant part of your crew. Not huge, but a 1/3 or so, wouldn't you say?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you feel comfortable getting underway with that many people left in?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, feeling comfortable you must have thought through this, leaving that many people and what went through your head as far as leaving that many people in versus what you give up. What do you give up when you leave that many people in as far as capability or flexibility?

A. Well, what I mainly look at is the watchstanders that I have on watch. Are they capable guys. Like the Seaman there, to do that, and then in Rhodes case that was an oversight or a mistake, whatever you want to call it. But I felt comfortable with the watchstations I have. I had the senior watchstations that monitor what was going on on the ship that they were all highly capable trained guys that would be no problem or we wouldn't have left those other people behind. Chief Grose, the Sonar Chief, was brand new and McGiboney was a lot more qualified guy. Seacrest, Chief Thomas his Chief, usually stands Dive or Chief of the Watch so that guy standing that watch underway, has been standing it for the last two EASTPACs runs that we've done. I was confident that he was a good watchstander.

Q. You thought through this and it made sense to you.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. We have talked to a number in your crew over the last few days and they're very professional young men, but I get a sense that they're somewhat in denial that this terrible incident happened. Have you thought through what you're going to do, what you're going to change, how you're going to focus onto the future to get them back onto their feet? To get over this sense of denial? I think as you think through that, everything you hear everything that was done correctly, with some minor exceptions but the facts are that it still happened. Have you thought through as the senior enlisted onboard the GREENEVILLE, how you're going to handle that problem?

A. Well, I've thought it through. There's not a lot to change. The crew being in denial, I don't think they're in denial. I think they--there are some guys that are very remorseful still, I think there's probably ten percent that could care one way or another because they just don't--they're junior guys. They

weren't--you know there wasn't--they weren't impacted by losing the CO now the XO is gone so it's a need there that they can come to.

So I mean it's a--if they're coming to anybody they're coming to me and I don't have any sense that there's anybody there that's a ready to quit, ready to turn in their rating badge and say I can't do this anymore, it's too hard. I think we'll continue to do what we do and we will--everybody knows that this was nothing intentional. Nobody on GREENEVILLE got up, nobody got up from Pearl Harbor on February ninth saying well we're going to go out and have this accident and these guys know that. There're some of them that take it harder than others, you know they all put on the same dungarees in the morning but everybody that gets in them is a different guy. Everybody's different. There's not one of them that you can talk to the same everyday. And I think they'll do fine.

Q. Okay, thank you.

A. Sir.

PRES: Thanks, Master Chief. Counsel for CDR Waddle?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins):

Q. Master Chief, there's been some discussion about the watchbill, what's the impact of setting the modified piloting watch underway, on the watchbill? Would that have impact on the possible--how you man a watch section?

A. The modified piloting party just takes more people and puts more people on watch and Control when they station that.

Q. For example you need a qualified fathometer person, right?

A. Fathometer, NAVSUP----

Q. And on the watchbill that you wrote up the sonar operator one is listed as Petty Officer Anderson? He's a qualified Fathometer Operator?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and is Petty Officer Reyes a qualified Fathometer Operator? If you know.

A. I would have to look but I don't believe Reyes is qualified fathometer, yet.

Q. So, if Petty Officer Anderson is a qualified Fathometer Operator, is that what it's called, an operator?

A. Yes.

Q. Operator, then--and there's only one other possibility on the boat, for example Petty Officer Bowie, one of those guys is going to have to stand Fathometer, correct? You just have to say yes or no here.

A. Yes, I wasn't clear to the Admiral's question about--I mean there's people that get moved around on different watches when--what--when you need a different guy on a different watch or you station a different light maneuvering watch--the watch--the one you just spoke of the modified piloting party, people go to different watchstations via a different watchbill.

Q. Sure. With the exception of Petty Officer Rhodes, who we know is not qualified, but who had Petty Officer Reyes standing over him at the relevant portions of this sail, is there anyone else on that watchbill or who was standing watch to your knowledge who was unqualified?

A. No, sir.

Q. Based on your knowledge as Chief of the Boat for the past several years, Petty Officer McGiboney, a qualified Sonar Supervisor?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Having observed him as a petty officer on your boat, is he well regarded and competent?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Petty Officer Bowie, is a Passive Broadband Sonar Operator, is he somebody you would believe is a competent sonar operator?

A. For his age I'd say he was a little more adult than some of the others of his age, very professional, more professional than guys--most guys his age, conscientious guy.

Q. Do you feel comfortable having him--I assume you would since he operates Passive Broadband sonar. Would you have--feel comfortable having him as Passive Broadband Sonar Operator, responsible for safety of the ship during ships maneuvers?

A. Oh, yes, sir, and I would expect--that the Sonar Supe to--also have that in mind when he put whoever he put on there, knowing that guy would be qualified, knowing that guy knew what he was doing.

Q. You indicated in response to VADM Nathman's questions that--that on this day there was some instability in the--in the watchbill, correct? Answer yes or no. Would you agree that this event, this DV, underway with some training and the line handlers left behind, was a different circumstance than you normally experience underway with full complement of crew onboard?

A. Yes, sir. No different than having midshipmen onboard. It's same thing we do. We have to swap people around, move people around to accommodate taking those guys to sea--letting them drive the ship--it's just the way it works.

Q. You know there's been several changes to the watchbill that you had signed out, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you agree that the changes that were made, having now--having the benefit of hindsight to look back on were--were appropriate changes in personnel?

A. As long as Reyes was over instruction on Rhodes, yes, I feel that was good. I didn't know that he had left Rhodes there for that short amount of time for whatever reason it was, but with the rest of the guys that have been moved around--I was definitely comfortable with who was on watch.

Q. On the Plan of the Day, there was indication that Petty Officer Rhodes was delinquent in his watch qualification. To get undelinquent--to get off that delinquent list, you have to stand some watches, don't you?

A. You have to study, you have to stand watches, depends on if it's a practical factor that has to be completed, yes.

Q. But standing a watch would--would assist--Seaman Rhodes--I may have called him Petty Officer Rhodes--Seaman Rhodes in moving himself off the delinquent list, correct?

A. That would help, yes.

Q. Seaman Rhodes testified here, seemed like the guy who was pretty--excited about being in the Navy and being a sonar operator. Would you agree with that?

A. He--performs well. He's--the reason--and I'm going to back up for a second. The reason you got a lot of Sonarmen that are on this dink list is because they got a new Chief. The Chief before was not as aggressive as of--a guy as we got now and he didn't look ahead. Chief Grose has looked ahead and said, "hey I'm losing different guys these, AUX operator guys, and I need to start amping up these guys and getting them up to speed."

That's why you have these Sonarmen on this dink list, because his plan is to get from point A to point B, which was deployment and have these guys ready to go. That's why they are on the dink list because the last guy that was there--wasn't looking far enough ahead and didn't have a real good training plan compared to Chief Grose's and it's a little more aggressive.

Q. You were asked some questions about GREENEVILLE's inability--inability to detect the EHIME MARU. Since the accident are you aware that the GREENEVILLE tracked Sierra 13 which ultimately became the EHIME MARU for--for more than a hour before the accident? Did you know that?

A. No, sir.

Q. You haven't had a opportunity to review any of the reports about this accident or anything like that?

A. Not the specifics on the tracking of the--no.

Q. Have you talked to Petty Officer Bowie about what he saw on his Passive Broadband sonar, before the accident?

A. I've talked to him at length about how he is doing and that kind of stuff. I haven't approached that subject to him because it's kind of--still tough for him to--him and McGiboney especially to talk about any of that.

Q. RADM Konetzni has made a number of visits to the ship and visit with the crew. Isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. He has some concern about the crews grieving process, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You indicated in response to a question from--I think it was RADM Sullivan that--you felt comfortable getting underway with the number of people you had?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you feel you had enough qualified watchstanders to man the ship for 6 hours, at sea?

A. Yes, sir, I thought I had more than enough to be honest with you.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins): That's all I have sir.

PRES: Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Yes, sir. Just a quick second, please.

Questions by counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone):

Q. If you look at Exhibit 41 that you have right in front of you. I just want to direct your attention first to Ramirez and Feddeler. Now you made the decision to put them on the 12 o'clock watch, correct? And you made the decision to swap those two individuals out with--the people that were originally assigned, right?

A. Yes.

Q. It perfectly acceptable for you to make that decision?

A. I put the most qualified guys up there. That's the reason they were picked.

Q. And at the time that you made that decision was it--that was because you had learned since you originally did this watchbill on February that angles and dangles would be done at a little later period of time, correct?

A. I wasn't sure exactly when we were going to be done.

Q. But when you made the change to put your best people, you did in fact know, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And when--so when you made that change--it wasn't necessary in your opinion to let anyone else in the upper chain of command know because it was just a small administrative change done right at the time, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And with regards to sending the individuals to the training--the attack facility for training. Was one of the things going through your mind--that since you no longer going to be out all weekend that by sending a certain number of crew to the training facility, that would maximize training that would be necessary for the crew?

A. That was the reason for sending those specific people there because of the aggressive schedule that every submarine has to get in as much training as they can--sending people to the

trainer when you can to get them there, so obviously it's not open Saturday and Sunday. So the decision was made--Department Head, XO, myself--was to get those guys up there and get this training completed, so we can be moving on--we don't train just for the next inspection which was ORSE. We have to go on WESTPAC in June, so we were also training for our POM--getting our POM training in that's required by SUBPAC to complete prior to departure for WESTPAC.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Thanks, Master Chief. I don't have anything else.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No questions, sir.

PRES: Counsel, no redirect?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No, sir.

CC: Master Chief, I have to give you a witness warning. You are directed not to discuss the testimony that you have provided this afternoon, with anyone--if anyone approaches you and tries to discuss their testimony with you. You are not to discuss anything with them. Do you understand?

WIT: Yes, sir.

CC: Okay, thank you for your testimony. You are excused.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

CC: Bailiff, would you call LT Pritchett to the stand.

William C. Pritchett, Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. LT Pritchett, would you please state your full name and would you spell your last name for the record?

A. William Christopher Pritchett. P-R-I-T-C-H-E-T-T.

Q. Are you currently assigned to the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how long have you been with GREENEVILLE?

A. I've been on the GREENEVILLE since October '99.

Q. Okay. What do you do on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I currently serve as the Chemistry and Radiological Controls Assistant, as well as the Ship's Diving Officer.

Q. Can you--is GREENEVILLE your first boat?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

Q. Where were you before the GREENEVILLE?

A. Before the GREENEVILLE I was at Naval--Submarine Officer Basic School in Groton, Connecticut. Prior to that I was at Naval--Nuclear Power Training Unit in Charleston, South Carolina, Naval Nuclear Power Training Command in Orlando. And then I was assigned to the NROTC University of Texas where I got a Masters Degree.

Q. All right.

A. And prior to that I graduated from the Naval Academy in '96.

Q. Thank you. What did you get your Masters Degree in?

A. Electrical Engineering, sir.

Q. Great. I'd like to talk to you a little bit about the 9th of February.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What were your duties that day, beginning in the morning?

A. In the morning I was assigned the maneuvering watch Contact Coordinator for leaving Pearl Harbor. I rigged forward Compartmental Lower Level for dive, and then I was assigned after that--I was not on the watchbill until--I was scheduled to be on the maneuvering watch again coming back in. I was assigned as an escort for the civilians that were onboard.

Q. Okay, so after--the maneuvering watch concluded about what time?

A. I'm not sure exactly, sir, it was----

Q. Mid-morning time frame?

A. Yes, sir, mid morning.

Q. Okay, and then you had some duties with the DVs?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. What were your duties with regard to the civilians?

A. I was given approximately a half of group of them to take them on a tour of the Forward Compartment, answer any questions they had, just see what they needed and respond to their needs.

Q. Okay, so you spent the morning, or remainder of the morning with them?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. What sort of things did you do with them?

A. I took them on a tour of the Machinery Room, the Torpedo Room, up into Sonar, I got them drinks a lot, answered a lot of their questions, took them to the restroom. One lady was sick so I took her to the XO's rack to lay down, just--that was my primary responsibility.

Q. Did you--did you have some lunch with them?

A. I did not. I escorted them to crews--to the wardroom, the ones that were eating in the first sitting, and then I ate in Crew's Mess actually, without--not with any of them.

Q. And which sitting did your group sit in for lunch?

A. At the time of lunch, the groups kind of got divided some what, and there weren't two distinct groups anymore, but I was the one that showed the people in the first sitting to the wardroom.

Q. Okay. Now did you--did you get back with your group at some point after they finished lunch?

A. Yes, sir. I got back with another group of people, I can't say it was the exact same group, but some people were the same.

Q. And what did you do with them after that?

A. After that I took them on--the ones that hadn't been on a tour already, I showed around a little bit, I was in Control most of the time then, and at some point after that, then I took a number of them to Control because we were about--we were doing angles and dangles, to see that, and then be in Control for the emergency blow.

Q. Okay, so you took--let me talk to you a little bit about that. You took the group to Control for the angles and dangles, through the emergency blow phase?

A. Yes, sir. I wasn't in Control the entire time, but I was--I told them that was a good place for them to be to see these maneuvers.

Q. Terrific. What period of time were you in Control for?

A. During the--I think the start of the angles and dangles I was there, but I remember being down in middle level for most of that, because I remember watching another officer sliding along the deck during one of the angles. Not--there weren't any other civilians down there. At some point, or during the set to periscope depth was probably the next time I came back into Control.

Q. Okay, so you were in Control for the beginning of the angles and dangles, and then you departed for a period and came back right about the ascent to periscope depth?

A. Yes, sir. The first thing I remember after coming back was the initial periscope search.

Q. Okay. Let me talk to you a little bit about those time frames when you were in Control, both during the angles and dangles phase, and then when you returned back at periscope depth. Did--well initially when you were in Control during the angles and dangles, was the CO in Control?

A. I--I can not remember that exactly, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you remember if you saw the XO?

A. I don't remember, sir.

Q. While you were there, do you recall any reports of contacts?

A. No, sir, I don't.

Q. When you--you say when you came back, was that at periscope depth, or just as the ship was ascending to periscope depth?

A. The first thing I remember, sir, after coming back, I came up the aft ladder of Control, near the fathometer, and I remember seeing Mr. Coen start his periscope depth sweeps. At that time I was getting coffee and water for some of the guests, and I thought to myself that was--I got here at the perfect time, so--that's the first thing I remember on that trip up to Control.

Q. And when you arrived back at that time, where were you in Control?

A. I was--I was standing between [pointing laser at exhibit] on the top left of your chart, between--just underneath the fathometer in that picture. Between the fathometer and the navigation plotting table.

Q. Okay. And that's on Exhibit 6 up there on the wall?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Great. Were you--were you interacting with the civilians when you came back up or just kind of hanging out?

A. Yes, sir. There were civilians in front of me at the Radar all the way forward towards the Ballast Control Panel. Those are the ones I was--I had gotten two glasses of water and a glass of coffee I think. And I was talking to them. And also--I think the COB gave me a GREENEVILLE mug to bring to CAPT Brandhuber. I was going to bring it to him and ask--I didn't know if he wanted a drink or he just wanted a mug. And I remember it was too crowded for me to get to him and the conversations going on and I didn't give it to him I brought it back down.

Q. Okay. Where--where was he that you couldn't get to him?

A. At the time near this he was on the portside of Control also. He was forward of some civilians at that time and---

Q. You've got one of these laser pointers up there. If you'd take that and point to where you saw CAPT Brandhuber when you came back.

A. The first time I saw him he was somewhere up in this area [pointing laser at exhibit] and there's--these are the civilians that I was getting the drinks for--were in this area right here [pointing at Exhibit Number 6].

Q. You say the first time you saw him, that was when you came back just prior to periscope depth?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And what was he doing up there?

A. At the time, I remember he was just--he looked like he was looking at the--in this area [pointing at Exhibit Number 6].

Q. Okay.

A. That--that's all I can remember.

CR: Sir, can I ask where is up there?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): I'm sorry, Petty Officer Leather. We're looking now on the port side of Exhibit Number 6--port side forward.

Q. Would you say up here by the bench locker?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that the area where you saw him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Did you--when you came back in just before periscope depth did you hear any reports of contacts?

A. No, sir, I didn't. The first thing I heard was Mr. Coen calling "no close contacts".

Q. Okay. Did you see--you said you saw Mr. Coen just as he was beginning or completing those sweeps?

A. Yes, sir, just as he was being the--the sweeps.

Q. Can you describe the--the sweeps that you saw him do?

A. Yes, sir. They appeared to be three 8 second sweeps like I would expect to see after coming to periscope depth.

Q. Okay. And then he called out "no close contacts" after that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Did--was the Commanding Officer on the Conn as well?

A. Yes, sir, he was.

Q. Do you recall where he was?

A. I can't recall exactly. I think he was more forward than starboard but I'm not sure exactly. More in--somewhere in this area [pointing laser at exhibit].

Q. Did you know what the Commanding Officer was doing?

A. Not exactly. I think I remember seeing him watching Mr. Coen, but that's all I can remember.

Q. Okay. Was he--could you tell if he was interacting with Mr. Coen at all?

A. I couldn't tell that, sir.

Q. All right. Could--did--did you remain there throughout the time of the collision?

A. No, sir. I remained there until about 30 seconds after emergency deep was called and then I left to--I think get

another drink--I can't remember exactly why. But I came back and I was back in Control before the collision.

Q. Okay. I'm sorry if I asked you this, but did you see the Executive Officer at this time when you came back?

A. No, sir, I didn't see the Executive Officer at any time.

Q. Okay. Were you in a--in a position ever at this time when you were in the Control Room to see if the Executive Officer may have been up near the Sonar Shack?

A. No, sir, I wasn't. If I could use the pointer again. I pretty much was in this area [pointing laser at exhibit] the whole time I was ever in Control. The first time and the second time. And it was--there was people here [pointing laser at exhibit] and some people--it was--it was--I could not see the entrance to Sonar. Maybe if I was trying to or concentrating I might have. But I didn't--I didn't try.

Q. Okay. Were--how many of the DVs were up there during this time when you came in?

A. It's hard for to say exactly. A lot of them. 80 percent is--is my guess. But it's--it's--there were at least 10 of them.

Q. Where do you recall seeing them?

A. There were several up in the area of the Ballast Control. I'm not sure if there were any--anywhere else. I'm sure they were just by the numbers. But----

Q. Okay. Did you happen to see if--if the OOD or the Commanding Officer was--was interacting with the FTOW at all?

A. No, sir, I didn't.

Q. Did you make any observations with regard to the Commanding Officer's use of the periscope?

A. Yes, sir. I saw him take the scope from Mr. Coen after Mr. Coen completed the three low-power sweeps. And he searched for I think about 45 seconds to a minute. And then called--and he was facing--at the end of that he was facing 0 degrees relative and then he called emergency deep and lowered the scope.

Q. Do you know if before that time frame if the ship had come up for a little higher--higher look?

A. Yes, sir, he did. He--I ordered him--he ordered a depth change to five-eight feet. And I wasn't sure if he was giving the order to Mr. Coen or to the Dive. I think they responded simultaneously. But he did have the Dive make his depth five-eight feet.

Q. Okay.

A. About 5 seconds to 10 seconds within starting his search.

Q. And I think you--you testified that you--you came up basically just as Mr. Coen was beginning his--his periscope search?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And between that time and the time that you just discussed, where the CO called emergency deep, how long was that period of time?

A. Between when Mr. Coen completed his search?

Q. Well, the time that you--you arrived up in Control and the time that the CO called--or whoever called Emergency Deep.

A. It was about 90 seconds, sir, I think.

Q. Okay. About 90 seconds?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did it seem like a short period of time at periscope depth for you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. You've been--how long have you been qualified as an OOD?

A. I've been qualified since August of 2000, sir.

Q. Okay. Have you ever, under these sorts of circumstances, have you ever come up to periscope depth and remained there for that short of period of time before?

A. I never have. I haven't stood as many watches as Mr. Coen has as Officer of the Deck, but I never have.

Q. Okay. What--what occurred after the Emergency Deep was called?

A. After the Emergency Deep was called it looked like people were taking their actions. I don't think it was ever--I never heard anyone in Control say that it was for training or it was a drill but I assumed it was because I--and I think the watchstanders could have told if it was. There would have been

a more urgency in it. At some point during the descent I left Control and I went down to middle level again.

Q. Okay. And did you return at any point?

A. Yes, sir. I returned at some point prior to the Emergency Blow maneuver because I remember being in Control near the same place where I was the first time for the operation of the auxiliary diving alarm by one of the civilians.

Q. I think you had mentioned earlier that when you--when you had first come back to Control that Chief of Staff--Staff was up on port sort of forward and you may have indicated that he had moved at some point?

A. I don't remember seeing him specifically after--when I came up for the Emergency Blow.

Q. Okay. After the--now when you got back describe what happened.

A. When I got back--I can't remember how long I was back before the Emergency Blow was ordered--or how it was ordered. But I remember that there was a female civilian who sounded the auxiliary diving alarm for the Emergency Blow maneuver. And then another--a different civilian--a male civilian was the one who actually pulled the actuating valves. And I remember counting out loud for 10 seconds while the Emergency Blow--and it was noisy of course as it always is. And the ship started to ascend. And then I remember at some point the Captain announcing on the LMC that this is the part where the ship's coming out of the water or something to that effect. And you could feel it. And then several seconds after that he said, "Well, I was--I called it a little too early. Here's where we're actually coming out of the water." It was real--shortly after that is when the collision occurred.

Q. Do you recall if anybody--if any of the civilians were seated at the Helm's or the--the other Planes?

A. I cannot recall that, sir, from where I was.

Q. Okay. After the collision did you take on any responsibilities?

A. Yes, sir. I--when they announced--someone asked what that--what was that and they sent people immediately to look in the Fan Room for flooding evidence. I went down at that time to the Forward Compartment Lower Level to the Torpedo Room to look for flooding there and in the Machinery Room. After about 5 minutes I went to Crew's Mess to help the DC parties who were getting out the diver's gear and the other emergency gear just

to make they were organized there. And then about 15 minutes later I think, I went to Control and relieved Mr. Coen as Contact Coordinator. Because at that time the Officer of the Deck watch was shifted to the Bridge and I relieved him there.

Q. Okay.

A. I also did some geo-plotting before that.

Q. Okay. So you were--as cor--Contact Coordinator were you using the periscope at all?

A. Yes, sir. I was using primarily--I was primarily on Number 2 scope the entire time, looking mostly for personnel that weren't in life rafts.

Q. How long did you do that?

A. I did that--I did that through dinner time when I was relieved at--at around 1800, and then I was the evening watch Contact Coordinator as well. So I stayed that until midnight. And at some point in there we stopped looking for civilians. It was more the standard contact coordination job.

Q. Okay. Were you aware while you were--while you up in Control that the AVSDU was OOC?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

Q. When did you determine that?

A. I--as soon as I stationed the Maneuvering Watch the Navigator went up to the AVSDU in Control and he--he was trying to turn it up because he assumed I think that maybe the intensity was turned down to much and he couldn't get it to work. So he called the--Petty Officer Holmes in Sonar Division, into Control to look at it. I was there at the same time. And he couldn't get to work. He said he thought it was broken. And then he told us that maybe he could--he thinks he could--he could maybe fix it if--he'd have to remove cards from other AVSDUs in Sonar. So the Sonar Officer was at this time the Control Room Supervisor for the Maneuvering Watch and the Weapon's Officer wasn't onboard so we told him what the problem was. I remember making an entry in the Trouble Log, the green book. And about--within 5 minutes the Navigator went into the Captain's stateroom. He said he was going to tell him and I assume that's what he did.

Q. So this was during the Maneuvering Watch----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When it was noted?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Still inport? Commencing the Maneuvering Watch----

A. Yes, sir, we were still inport.

Q. Okay. You say you've been qualified as OOD since last July?

A. Last August, I think, sir.

Q. Last August.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What does the loss of the AVSDU mean to you as a--as an OOD?

A. It--it removes one more means that the Officer of the Deck has directly to look at--his choice of screens in Sonar. He can still see all the same screens by going to Sonar. It's just--it will take a little more time.

Q. Would you--would you do anything to compensate for that?

A. I think I would make more frequent trips to Sonar if I was interested in seeing contacts, sir. Or if they gave me knowledge of new contacts.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you.

WIT: Yes.

Questions by a court member (RADM Stone):

Q. LT Pritchett, it sounds like you're doing great on GREENEVILLE. Congratulations.

A. Thank you, sir.

Q. Did you have a chance to have any small talk or chit-chat with the distinguished visitors while you were walking them around the boat?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. Did any of the DVs tell you what they were going to do when the boat pulled into Pearl Harbor?

A. I can't recall any of them telling me that, sir.

Q. Okay. Was--when was the--what was the cause of the illness for the sick DV that you mentioned?

A. I think it was motion sickness, sir, it was a female. She just said she wasn't feeling very well.

Q. Okay. And was she in the XO's stateroom during the PD, Emergency Deep, and Emergency Surface evolutions or was it earlier in the day?

A. Sir, it was earlier than that when I took her there. I can't recall if she was still there or not.

Q. Okay. With the DV's illness was that passed on to anyone?

A. I know I told the XO, sir, because I asked him if it was okay if she laid down in his stateroom.

Q. Was there any concern about getting back into port quicker because of the illness that you are aware of?

A. No, sir. But it was a very serious--it wasn't determined to be a very serious illness. I know the Corpsman was informed as well.

Q. Okay. Did any of the DVs seem to be in a hurry to get back to Pearl Harbor, from their conversations with you?

A. Do you mean prior to the collision, sir?

Q. Yes.

A. No, sir, they didn't.

Q. Okay. How about onboard the boat, did you sense any urgency in any of the officers onboard in returning to Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir.

Q. My last question is what momentos or souvenirs were in the works to be presented to the DVs for this particular underway cruise? What type of items were going to be presented to them?

A. I'm not exactly sure, sir, I didn't see--I wasn't the one who was going to hand them out. Typically we give them plaques or posters or something, pictures of the Captain or the ship, but I'm not sure what they were gonna be this time.

Q. Great. Thank you very much.

A. Yes, sir.

MBR (RADM STONE): That's all I have.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Good afternoon, Lieutenant.

WIT: Afternoon, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. Just a couple of quick questions for you. During your escort duty when you were taking this group around the ship, how did they interact with the Sailors in the sense that if a Sailor needed to get through them--around them to get to his equipment did he--did he have any bones, if you will, about asking them to move or ya know, to get through to do his job?

A. I didn't see any evidence that any Sailor had trouble getting through if he needed to do a job to where the civilian would not move out of the way.

Q. So the crew wasn't shy about push--moving people out of the way or asking them to move to do their jobs?

A. Yes, sir. They would ask nicely for them to move out of the way and then they would move.

Q. You mentioned during the angles that you were on the second level, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did I hear you say that there was some--there was an officer or somebody sliding on the deck?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you consider that a safe evolution?

A. It was--it was in the Wardroom passageway and I don't--it was proba--maybe not the wisest thing but I don't think it was unsafe.

Q. Obviously the ship got extended overnight and wasn't planning on staying overnight and I think what I heard you say, and you correct me if I'm wrong, you--you were basically on watch from about 1400 until around midnight or eleven o'clock at night?

A. Yes, sir. I had a break for dinner.

Q. And why were you on watch such a long time? Is that typical for GREENEVILLE?

A. It's not typical to stand more than a 6 hour watch. This was just the case that they needed to write a watchbill as such that we didn't have a standard crew or officer contingent to where we were scheduling a watch overnight. So they were doing what they can--seeing who had the most rest--who could--I was asked if I was okay to stand another 6 hours of watch and I said, "I was."

Q. So you--I guess you would say you were running--running short in the Wardroom for officers--qualified officers?

A. I would say that we weren't--for an extended period of time--if we had to stay underway for say 30 days we probably wouldn't have had enough officers. But we had enough for everyone to safely stand watch over a 2 day period.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Okay, great. Thanks.

PRES: Counsel for CDR Waddle?

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Thank you, sir.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young):

Q. LT Pritchett, when you were standing in the aft port corner during the sweeps by the CO, you actually heard the CO change magnification while on the scope?

A. I think I recall hearing him change the clicks--the magnification because it makes a clicking sound. Yes, ma'am.

Q. Would that be the same as change--the doubler?

A. No, ma'am. The doubler does not make the same sound. It would--that would--it would change the magnification in a similar way but it doesn't make the same sound.

Q. All right. You also were the Contact Coordinator at some point?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And I think you stated that you thought the sea state was 3 to 5 feet, is that about right?

A. That's--that's what I said. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And you also stated that the visibility was not very good?

A. The visibility I wouldn't--I don't know how to call it as far as good or not good. It was--when I was Contact Coordinator immediately after the collision I know I was not using the PERIVIS, but that was because I was primarily looking for a head in the water. It was--it took too much light away and the conditions that the visibility was to where I think I would have had more difficulty looking for a person who wasn't in one of the life boats.

Q. All right. Going back for a second to when the CO was on the scope. Do you recall hearing the CO say that I hold no visual contacts in high-power?

A. I don't recall hearing him say that, ma'am.

Q. All right. RADM Stone commented that you had been doing a great job on GREENEVILLE. In fact, so great that you were the GREENEVILLE, Junior Officer of the Year for 2000, is that true?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And you were the GREENEVILLE nominee for Squadron ONE's, Junior Officer of the Year as well?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. How'd--how well did you do at the Naval Academy?

A. I graduated first in my class, ma'am.

Q. All right. Thank you.

A. Yes, ma'am.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Nothing else.

EXAMINATION BY THE COURT

Questions by the President:

Q. What was your major?

A. It was Systems Engineering, sir.

PRES: Alright. Super.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Aren't you going to ask him why he didn't go Naval Aviator [laughing]?

PRES: You've got bad eyes, don't you?

WIT: One of my eyes, actually, is not correctable to 20-20, sir.

[Laughter in the courtroom.]

PRES: Counsel?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): Sir, we have no questions.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Thank you, sir.

Questions by counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert):

Q. LT Pritchett, we've heard quite a bit of testimony already about how LTJG Coen stands Officer of the Deck. Is anything notable in your mind that you would like to briefly share with this court about how he stands that watch?

A. Yes. He's a very meticulous watchstander, methodical. He doesn't like stuff moving too fast. If he can make sure that he's in control of most situations I think he will--it sometimes slows something down if he doesn't feel that it's safe. And that's the way I'd describe it. I think he's a good--he certainly has more experience standing the watch than I do. So if anything, he could probably comment better on how I stand the watch than the other way around.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Thank you.

WIT: Yes, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No further questions.

PRES: Counsel?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Nothing further, sir. LT Pritchett, thank you for your testimony. You are advised not to discuss your testimony with anyone. If anyone attempts to discuss your testimony with you please report that to the counsel who originally called you and that would be myself.

WIT: Yes, sir.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

PRES: We'll recess until 1505.

The court recessed at 1445 hours, 15 March 2001.

The court opened at 1505 hours, 15 March 2001.

PRES: This court is now in session. Counsel.

ASST CC (LCDR Harrison): Let the record reflect that all members, parties, and counsel are again present. No procedural matters for the court, sir.

PRES: Mr. Gittins, do you have any matters?

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins): I do. Sir, with the court's permission I substituted a complete copy of Exhibit Adam that we submitted this morning. There was a page omitted, so we corrected that and provided it to the court reporter and request that the full and complete be submitted for the incomplete that we provided this morning.

PRES: Alright. Counsel, anything?

Counsel for LCDR Pfiefer, party (LCDR STONE): No, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR FILBERT): No, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, the court calls YN2 Quinn.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Good afternoon, Petty Officer Quinn.

WIT: Good afternoon, sir.

Sean Quinn, Yeoman Second Class, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Petty Officer Quinn, would you please state your full name for us and will you spell your last name for the record?

A. Sean Patrick Quinn. Q-U-I-N-N.

Q. Thank you. Are you currently attached to the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you been with the GREENEVILLE?

A. Approximately 1 month, sir.

Q. What do you do onboard the GREENEVILLE?

A. I'm a Yeoman, sir.

Q. Are you the Leading Yeoman, or is there someone senior to you?

A. There's someone senior to me, YN1 Jones.

Q. Can you generally describe your responsibilities and duties as a Yeoman onboard the GREENEVILLE?

A. I'm the Assistant Leading Yeoman. I have two junior Yeoman that work for me. I'm in charge of basic admin duties for the day, and just general correspondence. You know, routing the mail, just general admin.

Q. Are you qualified on any underway watches yet?

A. No, sir. I haven't been onboard long enough.

Q. Is GREENEVILLE your first boat?

A. No, sir. GREENEVILLE's my third boat.

Q. Alright, what was your previous history in boats?

A. My first Command was the USS PARGO, SSN 667, decommissioned in '96; I then went to the USS OKLAHOMA CITY, and was there until February of '98; I went to the shipyard for 3 years; and now I'm on the GREENEVILLE.

Q. Terrific, thank you. How long have you been in the Navy?

A. Six and 1/2 years, sir.

Q. Did you have an opportunity to get underway with the GREENEVILLE on the 9th of February?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I'm going to talk to you a little bit about that day.

A. Alright, sir.

Q. What were your responsibilities that morning before the--at the maneuvering watch, just before the maneuvering watch?

A. During the maneuvering watch--I'm not qualified any underway watchstations, so I really didn't have a particular job. The only things that were tasked to me that day were things left by YN1, just regular admin things that had to get done. I really didn't have a purpose of being there. I was--I wanted to go.

Q. Did you have any duties or responsibilities with regard to the civilians that were going to be embarking?

A. No, sir.

Q. Putting together Welcome Aboard packages or anything like that?

A. Yes, things like that is all I did. I wasn't tasked to be with them the entire day.

Q. Why did you get underway?

A. It was first opportunity. It's been quite awhile. I was anxious to get to the GREENEVILLE. So I just wanted to go get back into the groove of things.

Q. Did you happen to get involved with the civilians that morning after you got underway?

A. Just weaving in and out, you know, if they needed help with things, you know, just--just, yes, just weaving in and out, if they needed help with anything.

Q. Okay. Did you stay involved with them, as needed, throughout the morning?

A. I came and went. I wasn't with them the entire day.

Q. Did--were you involved with them in the afternoon at all, the civilians?

A. Just--I was just with them, like kind of walk them around sometimes when they were going from place to place, like the bathrooms, the heads, things like that.

Q. After--in the afternoon, after the lunch period, did you-- did you go to Control for any reason?

A. Yes, sir. I went up there so I could watch how the crew did the angles, dangles, how they operated, things like that.

Q. Do you remember approximately what time you arrived in Control?

A. No, sir, I don't remember.

Q. After lunch?

A. After lunch, yes, sir.

Q. Do you know if it was before the angles and dangles events?

A. Yes, sir. It was, I'd say, about 30-45 minutes before the angles and dangles.

Q. And where were you at in Control? Where did you station yourself?

A. I was standing right besides the Helmsman, where underneath the bridge accesses hatch.

Q. Okay. Is that where you remained----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. While you were in Control?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did you remain once you got there?

A. Once I got there through all the evolutions and when we had the collision.

Q. All right, and you pretty much remained in that location while you----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were in Control?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. All right. Do you recall seeing any of the civilians in Control during that time frame?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Approximately how many do you recall seeing? I'm not looking for an exact number.

A. Most of--I'd say most of them were there.

Q. Do you recall where they were?

A. Mostly on the outside of the Conn, mostly from where the fathometer is, all the way around, just not in the--there's a couple in the front of the Conn, and there was a couple in the side where the FTOW is.

Q. You've got a--you've got a laser pointer there on your table, so as I understand it, you put a couple of them on the port side, inboard of the fathometer, [pointing laser at exhibit] in this area?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. A couple more up forward in the Control Room?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then some others on the starboard side?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Thank you. Do you recall, when you were there, if the Commanding Officer was in Control?

A. Yes, sir, he was.

Q. Okay, where was he?

A. [Pointing laser at exhibit.] About--in between the two periscopes and mostly up in this area, if I recall correctly.

Q. Did he remain in Control throughout the time period you were there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you ever remember seeing the Commanding Officer leave for any reason?

A. No, sir, I don't remember him leaving.

Q. Do you know if--if he may have went over in to sonar or in the sonar area?

A. I don't recall, because I mostly--I was standing here [pointing laser at exhibit] and I had my back to this area most of the time, so he could have come in behind me and I just not seen it.

Q. Do you remember if you saw the--well let me ask you this, when you saw the Commanding Officer up by the periscope stand, what did you observe him doing?

A. At what point?

Q. At--well let me ask you this, during the angles and dangles phase?

A. He was--he mostly stood, if I remember right, he mostly stood right in here [pointing to Exhibit 6], you know, and when we was doing the angles and dangles, he kind of explained before we did them, what the ship would do, that way civilians would know. And once we got to particular points in angles and dangles, he would say over the LMC, this is where we're at, you know, the ship's at this much of a tilt, port or starboard, things like that.

Q. Okay----

PRES: Counsel, where are we going with this? Are we--are we going to talk about what he observed in terms of what the Commanding Officer did, or anything like that?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Yes, sir.

PRES: Okay, I don't want to do that. Petty Officer Quinn is a fine Petty Officer, but he's not qualified at any watchstation, and I don't want to correct you here, but I don't think it's going to be--I don't think it's going to be helpful here to talk about what he observed or not observed, because I don't--it's not going to carry any weight with the members.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Yes, sir.

PRES: Okay. So we ought to go to a different type of line of questioning on some other issues, but not about what he observed the Commanding Officer do or not do.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Yes, sir, that was the line of questioning, was just his observations.

PRES: I--I just don't think it's going to carry any weight.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Yes, sir.

PRES: Alright. Petty Officer Quinn, that's not a reflection upon you, it's just that you've already acknowledged, as a Yeoman, you're not qualified in any of these watchstations, correct?

WIT: Yes, sir.

PRES: Okay.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sorry about that, sir.

PRES: Okay. Admiral's, any questions?

[Negative response by all members.]

PRES: Counsel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (CDR Herold):

Q. Petty Officer Quinn, just one question. Why were you anxious to get to the GREENEVILLE?

A. It's been quite sometime since I've been underway. While I was stationed in the shipyard, I came down to the GREENEVILLE a couple times, had a chance to talk with CDR Waddle before I actually reported, I met some of the other crew--it's been about 4 years since I've been underway. Shipyard really wasn't the greatest duty station I've been to, and talking with CDR Waddle, I was really anxious to get underway and see how he operated as a Commanding Officer.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (CDR Herold): Thank you.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): No questions, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No questions, sir.

PRES: Petty Officer Quinn, you did a nice job.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

ASST CC LCDR HARRISON): You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, a party, or counsel. You will not allow any witness in this case to talk to you about the testimony that you have just given or testimony that you may give in the future. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempt to talk to you about your testimony you should make those circumstances known to me. Thank you.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

Ryan D. Mahoney, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. LT Mahoney, would you please state your full name and spell your last name for the record?

A. Ryan David Mahoney. M-A-H-O-N-E-Y.

Q. Welcome. Are you stationed aboard the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. What do you do on the GREENEVILLE?

A. I'm the Sonar Officer and the Quality Assurance Officer.

Q. How long have you been onboard the GREENEVILLE?

A. For about 1 year.

Q. And what is your previous experience in submarines prior to the GREENEVILLE?

A. I was assigned to the USS WILLIAM H. BATES for about 2 years, I was on the DECOM crew and then I transferred to the GREENEVILLE after completing Engineer School after decommissioning the USS WILLIAM H. BATES.

Q. Where did you get your Dolphins, was that on the GREENEVILLE?

A. On the BATES.

Q. On the BATES. I want to talk to you just briefly about your duties and responsibilities as the Sonar Division Officer. How many people do you supervise as the Sonar Division Officer?

A. About 13 to 14 people.

Q. What--generally what's the distribution of their paygrades in your division? How junior to the most senior?

A. Normally--well Seaman to Chief, and normally about two to three Seaman and majority are Third and Second Class.

Q. Do you have any role in their qualification processes, on their watchstations within sonar?

A. In their signature block in their qualifications. I give interviews for each watchstation they qualify for and I also see

the qualification track each week for, you know, where they are in their qualifications.

Q. As the Division Officer, do you generally monitor the qual status of your subordinates at any given time?

A. I couldn't tell you at any given time exactly their qual status is, but I see the book on a weekly basis, so I have a general idea of where they are in qualifications.

Q. Do you generally know if one of your guys is unfortunately delinquent in his qualifications?

A. Yes.

Q. On any given day, would you know, as the Sonar Division Officer, which of your men is standing any particular watch in sonar?

A. Not particularly, unless I actually go up to Sonar and take a look. The watchbill isn't routed through me, so I really don't specifically take a look at it, but I go up and look who's--who's on watch, or I go up and take a look what's going on from time to time.

Q. Okay, so you're not on the chop chain on the watchbill?

A. No, I'm not.

Q. If someone's not yet qualified in your division, is that information promulgated anywhere, publicly, at the ship? Do you know if that shows up on the Plan of the Day?

A. Not qualified?

Q. Yes.

A. Not in the Plan of the Day, no.

Q. On the 9th of February, it appears as though one of the men in your division was standing watch in Sonar and may not have been qualified. Were you aware of those circumstances?

A. I wasn't aware until after the fact.

Q. Okay. Is it--in the Sonar Division, is it normal operations to have watchstanders that are not qualified on watchstations?

A. It's normal operations, in order to get--in order to learn about the watchstation they have to sit there and observe what's going on.

Q. As a UI watch?

A. As a UI watch, correct.

Q. Would you expect them to have a dedicated over instruction watch with them, or not?

A. Yes, I would expect qualified people to be assigned to the watchsection, and they be assigned as extras, and sit the stacks and have a qualified operator still there in the Sonar Room, assigned as over instruction.

Q. Okay, so if Seaman Rhodes was assigned as the Workload Share on that day, do I understand your testimony that he would have had somebody as his over instruction watch assigned to that console with him?

A. Yes, he should have.

Q. Would it be enough for him to be supervised by the Sonar Supervisor?

A. As a Passive Broadband I would say, probably yes, but if there's more than two or three contacts I'd want him to have direct supervision from someone else.

Q. Do you stand watch back in--back aft as well?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Okay. I would imagine back aft there are no people standing under instruction watches without over instruction supervision. Is there some distinction between Sonar and the rest of the boat in terms of the requirements for an over instruction watch, that you are aware of?

A. Not that I'm aware of. I just know that in the Engine Room it's much more strict.

Q. If--if that information had come to the attention of your Sonar Supervisor, would you have expected that person to have taken action?

A. Can you clarify that again?

Q. The unqualified watchstander sitting without an over instruction watch, what would you expect from your Sonar Supervisor?

A. I would expect the watchbill--if I had known the watchbill had said that there was an unqualified operator on the watchbill and there wasn't the required number of qualified operators, that they would at least ensure the watchbill gets changed, or ensure that there's someone as his over instruction there when he's on watch.

Q. Does it surprise you, as a Sonar Division Officer, that the enlisted men that work for you in sonar have the impression that one can stand an under instruction watch as Passive Broadband, Work Load Share, without a dedicated over instruction watchstander, other than the Sonar Supervisor, or other personnel who may be at sonar. Does that surprise you at all?

A. Surprises me a little bit. But Work Load Share, being that it's a backup watchstation, I can see that if you used your judgement, that I have one qualified operator whose looking at the contacts, and if the contact picture isn't that cluttered, I can see them putting someone on Workload Share and not--may not have a dedicated over instruction to him.

Q. Okay. Do you think it might be all right then as long as--as long as there isn't high density contacts, there's not as many contacts there'd be some distinction?

A. I mean effectively I wouldn't want--I don't know.

Q. But----

A. Yes, there should be--there really shouldn't be a distinction, but there is one.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Okay. Thank you. Sir, that's all I have.

Questions by the President:

Q. Would it surprise you that we had testimony yesterday that--you have two consoles there of the four. You're aft two are the ones that are your BSY-1, one is the Work Load Share, the most aft one in sonar; and the third one is your primary panel for the BSY-1, is that--that's our understanding, is that your understanding?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would it surprise you, we took testimony yesterday, that said that it was not uncommon to have an underway watch under instruction also on the primary BSY-1 panel?

A. Sir, you're saying two under instruction watches?

Q. No. I'm saying independent you're going to have an under instruction watch on either panel, and as long as you have a Sonar Supe, that it was okay?

A. I guess I was surprised at that. I would expect that their would be an over instruction watch, at least to--at least assigned to the watchbill itself. And in--or in that room itself, so when there is somebody on watch there, there's at

least somebody whose qualified for his position, so if he has questions he can ask him.

Q. Okay, it wasn't exactly the question. What I--what I meant was we've heard testimony that GREENEVILLE had, on the day of the accident, had an under instruction watch on the work--the work share console, right, the work share console?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But testimony yesterday indicated that under other occasions, we also had watches under instruction on the primary BSY-1 console. Now does that surprise you?

A. Yes, that would surprise me.

PRES: RADM Stone, do you have questions?

MBR (RADM STONE): Yes, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, if I could have my nickel back for just a moment?

PRES: Certainly. A couple more questions.

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. On the 9th, did you get permission to take samples of primary coolant while you were on watch as EOOW?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And from whom did you get permission?

A. I got permission from the Officer of the Deck to take samples of the primary coolant.

Q. Did this occur shortly before the angles and the dangles?

A. This is about 1230 when I called up for permission.

Q. Approximately when did you begin the samples?

A. Getting the sample, I think, about 1245.

Q. Did the Commanding Officer ever speak with you concerning how much longer it would to complete the samples?

A. There was one time when I talked to the Officer of the Deck in regards to the fact that we had about--we were still doing samples and the Commanding Officer picked up the line that we were talking on and asked me directly how much time we had left.

Q. What did you tell him?

A. I told him 12 minutes.

Q. Did you--did you actually complete your samples?

A. No, we had to secure one of the samples.

Q. Who told you to stop taking the sample, or to secure it?

A. The Officer of the Deck did.

Q. How much longer would you have had to complete that sample had you been able to keep going?

A. We would have had 12 minutes, like I told him. Because I called down to the person taking the sample and asked him specifically how much time he had, and he knows how long it takes to finish up the sample.

Q. When it was secured, how much time of that 12 minutes remained?

A. No, that was the time.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, that was the elapsed time it would have taken to finish it up.

Q. So to complete it, you would have needed to spend 12 more minutes on the primary sample. Based on your experience, is it abnormal to secure samples prematurely?

A. Yes, it's abnormal, I've never done it before.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you, sir. That's all I have.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Good afternoon, LT Mahoney.

WIT: Good afternoon, sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. How important is team work in a submarine, do you think?

A. Team work is very important in a submarine, because we all have our different watchstations and different areas of expertise, and everyone's got to back each other up and make sure that everything's done right, to make everything work safely and correctly.

Q. How important is it in sonar control?

A. In sonar control it's--I don't understand your question, sir.

Q. Do you think it's--when you think of your sonar control team, why do you think team work is important for that group there in sonar control?

A. It's important because we have many operators who are looking at different screens, have different information that needs to be correlated through the supervisor. So each one has to be--has to, you know, give his information to the supervisor, in a very concise manner so he can put that together and then give the Officer of the Deck his backup on what's going on, the big picture in sonar. So each person should be, you know, should know their watchstation quite well and should be ready to give information. And the Supe, who's more experienced is going to interpret that information as to what stuff should be passed out the Control Room, what's pertinent, you know, and what's more important, it should be prioritized.

Q. Okay. So that's a complex operation in the requiring people to be coordinating very well with one another?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If you keep changing out the players in that team, do you think there's a risk of no continuity or consistency in the team where players are changed out fairly rapidly during a watch? In other words, I'd give you an analogy. If you're--if you're going to build a house and every time you go back to check on the work, it's a different team building there and you ask them what's the status of this, and the building team tells you, "I didn't know that was an issue, that was the last team that was there." Same when you building an acoustic picture in Sonar, if you're changing out the players in there, don't you run the risk of losing that continuity and consistency in the acoustic picture?

A. I think you may run that risk, but I think you also run the risk of people losing focus, because you're staring at a screen for long periods of time. You're listening to sounds that may not change, you know. For long transits you may have one or two contacts the entire watch. So the refreshing of watchstanders is extremely important in Sonar. So, you know, something that someone else might not have heard should be picked up by another operator, so I think it's important that you continually change out watchstanders in Sonar. And as long as the turnover is sufficient, they should tell you which contacts they have, what they've done, approximately, and that can be done fairly efficiently in Sonar.

Q. So a sufficient turnover is important?

A. Right. And you have a consistency with the supervisor, you know. He's getting all that information, interpreting all that data, such that, you know, and he doesn't change out throughout the watch, and the watchstanders move around so the--I know the give and take as you have fresh watchstanders giving data to the person who is always keeping the picture.

Q. How long would you suggest then that you have these turnovers? What's a long period of time, in your mind, for a watchstander to stand watch before he necessitates a turnover? An hour, 30 minutes, 4 hours, what's about right?

A. I think about an hour. An hour to 2 hours.

Q. So when we look at a watchbill that's a 4 hour period, there's no intent to have those people to stand that watch for 4 hours?

A. Oh no, this is within the sonar watchsection itself. But the watchstanders that actually stand in Sonar will stand a 6 hour watch. It's just that changing from--if you change from panel to panel, or if you have one--sometimes you have a signed watchstander that's an extra and you can give those guys breaks.

Q. Okay. So you think there just needs to be a balance then between making sure that you have people stand the watch long enough to know what's--what's going on and have good situational awareness, and not turn it over so quickly that you never develop that continuity. So that's the balance?

A. Yes, sir.

MBR (RADM STONE): Okay, thank you. That's all I had.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. Lieutenant, I just have a couple quick questions for you. In some previous testimony we heard that you have a new Sonar Chief----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Working for you. And what's his name?

A. Chief Gross.

Q. And the report that I'm reading from which was put together--was given to us by counsel here from Master Chief Anderson, I guess he's over at the training facility, is that right?

A. I'm not sure if it's Master Chief Anderson.

Q. Okay. But he states that your Chief, since reporting, has noted numerous deficiencies with sonar training, that needs the process corrected. Can you--can you elaborate on that any way that could help me understand what that means?

A. I think the deficiencies--he talked to me specifically about a couple, and most of them have to do with target motion analysis. Having sonar create an independent picture, in Sonar itself. So he's found that a lot of them are not creating that picture that is kind of feeding the data and not taking it and analyzing themselves, as operators, so they can give the supervisor the backup in the Sonar Room.

Q. How long have you been the Sonar Officer?

A. For about 1 year.

Q. Okay. So let me make sure I understand. You're--we talked quite a bit in the last few days about what's expected in Sonar. And what you're telling me is what you're trying to improve, particularly getting ready for deployment, is to have the operators not just detect the data, but actually try to process it, as a backup?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what would be your evaluation to say your training of your--of your sonar gang right now, in this area?

A. I think as of Saturday--we'll--we've been in the ship yard for, now for almost 6 months, since we first went into dry dock, so they haven't used that data, so they've gotten a little bit rusty on it. I know the senior guys know how to use the--know how to do the target motion analysis, but may not be doing it all of the time. And some of the newer guys that have been here, you know, just 6 months or 8 months, probably have had little or no experience with it.

Q. During this day, the 9th of February, about a third of your guys were off the ship training?

A. Yes, sir, I think it was--it may have been more than that.

Q. Okay, but a significant number?

A. A significant number were off training, yes, sir.

Q. Can you--can you tell me what the objectives of the training were that day?

A. The objectives of training were precisely what I just talked about before, was the target motion analysis. They went up to the trainers and ran a problem so they could practice those techniques.

Q. You were the Engineering Officer of the Watch during the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could you describe for me what you heard and felt, since you're pretty far aft compared to anybody else we've talked to?

A. Yes, sir. As we came to the surface, I heard the Commanding Officer make a LMC telling us that we were about to break through, and then as we--as we broke to the surface, I felt--we initially thought it was a big wave that hit. Kind of, as we come up and settled down, it felt like we kind of slammed against a big wave and there was a large vibration, reverberated throughout that lasted about 2 1/2 seconds. It was loud, deafening, and it lasted a lot longer than if you had just hit a wave, so we were just wondering, "what was that, what was that," we had no idea. And then about 10 seconds later the Commanding Officer had got on the LMC and told us that we had--or maybe it was 10, I can't remember exactly how long, and told us that we had hit the--I think he mispronounced the name when we first hit it----

Q. Right.

A. But we had hit a vessel and it was sinking. We were going to render assistance.

Q. Did you take any casualty actions or damage control measures in the propulsion plant?

A. The damage control we took was just to inspect all spaces and make sure there is no problems. I got reports almost immediately from the Engineering Watch Supervisor about--that we had had no damage. The only things that were wrong is that we had found that the shaft--this is--well, this is post-analysis it took a long time but the shaft was wobbling a little bit and the first shaft seal had failed, but the second shaft seal picked up and was holding. I also got reports from all the watchstations saying they had no damage or saw no flooding. They all went around with flashlights and checked for something that went wrong.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Okay, thank you.

Questions by the President:

Q. Let's go back. You said you're watchstation at the collision was?

A. Engineer Officer of the Watch.

Q. Engineer Officer of the Watch. And you said after the collision you independently--or the watchstanders went around and checked for integrity and leaks. Is that what they did?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it called away as a collision?

A. It was called--the Captain--it was called by the Commanding Officer as a collision. I did not make any announcements.

Q. Okay. Are there any requirements in any of the ship's bills for doing anything special in collision, in terms of integrity checks or watertight integrity of the boat?

A. Yes, there is a collision bill.

Q. Okay.

A. That requires these checks.

Q. Does the collision bill include doing a drive train check?

A. I'm not sure, sir.

Q. Okay. Do you think it would?

A. I would think it would, sir.

Q. Okay, you discovered you had--you had shafting problems on the emergency backing bell as I understand.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. All right. Is the--is it a standard--an expected standard in the submarine community for Sonar to develop its own independent picture?

A. It's an expected standard, but not a required standard, sir.

Q. Can you talk--take me through the difference between expected and required?

A. I think in the--in the--in the duties and responsibilities it's not specifically stated for a submariner, but generally that's what we expect from Sonarmen. Because they're taking the visual raw data and they should be interpreting that for us and getting backup because that's a tenant that, you know, we all live by in the submarine force.

Q. Okay. Are--are there--using your own words, are there expected standards for TMA legs?

A. In Sonar?

Q. Yes.

A. I think they expect it would be--we'd determine a bearing rate and determine what the--yeah, I think there are expected standards. Yes, sir.

Q. I'm going to put words in your mouth and you tell me, describe to me if this is wrong or not. But an expected standard would be if you're not able--if you think you're on a leg for TMA and it isn't long enough do you expect Sonar to make noise about it--to tell the Officer of the Deck that wasn't long enough or something?

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. You do? Okay. So if Sonar doesn't complain or indicate that the legs were short enough or long enough than they're accepting it as a standard?

A. If they don't complain, yes, they're starting to accept the fact that they may not be doing an accurate enough search and not telling anyone. Or they may have identified that it was--it's not a good search but just didn't make that recommendation which they should have done.

Q. Okay. Are you aware that you have 4 of your Sonarmen--make it 5, Petty Officer McGiboney, Petty Officer Reyes, Petty Officer Bowie, Seaman Rhodes, and I believe that's--it must be Chief Gross, go do interviews with Master Chief Sonarman Anderson at the Navy Sub--I guess Submarine Training Center Pacific, ACINT Division?

A. No, sir.

Q. You were not aware of that? They didn't inform you that they had gone over there and done kind of a wash up of their ability to look at what had happened in terms of their sonar contacts on the 9th of February?

A. No, sir, they didn't tell me about that.

PRES: Thank you.

PRES: Counsel for CDR Waddle.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Thank you, sir.

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young):

Q. Good afternoon, Lieutenant. A point of clarity regarding a question you answered from LCDR Harrison earlier. He asked you if you knew that there was a not qualified person on watch in Sonar, that person being SN Rhodes. Is it that you didn't know he was on watch or that you didn't know he was unqualified?

A. Umm, both. I did not know he was on watch and I didn't know--I did know he was unqualified, didn't know he was on watch.

Q. Alright, thank you. Do you know the primary reason--or do you know the reason why the primary sample was ordered secured?

A. Umm, I do not know why it was ordered secured.

Q. And, with the ship conducting it's 30 degree angles, would the Engineering Lab Technician need to stow equipment?

A. In order--yes. In order to do those, normally the lab is set up for a sample, so in order to do those angles, he should have the lab stowed--yeah, the equipment needs to analyze.

Q. And, about how long would it take for him to stow the equipment?

A. I really don't know. I guess about 5 minutes--5 to 10 minutes.

Q. You talked about the fact that you all are trying stress independent solutions from the folks in sonar, right?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And, you mentioned that some of your crew was out in the trainer that day. Were they practicing Ekelund ranging?

A. I don't know if they were exactly practicing Ekelund ranging, but, those are the types of TMA that we would hope they would be practicing if they're in those trainers.

Counsel for CDR Waddle (LCDR Young): Alright, nothing further.

PRES: Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer?

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer (LCDR Stone): No sir, no questions.

PRES: Counsel for Mr. Coen?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Thank you, sir.

Questions by counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert):

Q. LT Mahoney, I wanted to ask you some questions about the sample that was secured. Can you tell me if you remember in relation to, if the samples were secured and then how long after that did the angles commence, do you have an idea about that?

A. I don't really remember, I think--I really can't tell you.

Q. Okay, well, when the samples were secured, LTJG Coen was the Officer of the Deck, is that right?

A. Yes, that's right sir.

Q. And, he had called--or you had called him and requested permission to do samples, is that how it worked?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, then at some later point, he called and asked you how much longer the sample would take, is that right?

A. Yes, sir. That's correct.

Q. Would this-- this would have been after lunch sometime if he had taken watch for the afternoon watch, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When he called you back and asked you about how much longer it would take, did you pick up anything in his voice, any way he sounded that struck you?

A. Umm, I could just tell he was a little bit hurried--because I knew that--well it was 12--let me see what time was it, I knew it was about the time that the guests would be getting out of lunch time, that when he called me and he may have been--I'm sure he was asked by the Commanding Officer--that would be my guess by the way he was talking--if they had secured or not. So, I'll say he was a little bit hurried.

PRES: Commander could I ask questions, just to follow-up?

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Yes, sir.

PRES: Go ahead. I'm sorry, we'll wait.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Okay.

Questions by counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert);

Q. You said that he sounded hurried when he called you and asked you how much longer it would take, and then I believed you said earlier, that the Commanding Officer then got on the line at the same time that you two were talking, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, the CO told you to secure the samples?

A. No, that's the time when he asked me how much longer it was.

Q. Oh, I'm sorry. In the CO's voice, the Commanding Officer's voice, did you pick up anything in his voice, did he sound hurried or perturbed or anything along those lines?

A. He was just kind of--there wasn't much hurry in his voice, but I think I could tell, he wanted to move things along. He wanted to know exactly how much time he had and to figure out what was going on, so that he could figure out what he had to do before we came into port.

Q. And, that was the time that you told him it would be about 12 more minutes.

A. Yes, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): Thank you, I don't have any further questions.

PRES: Redirect?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison)

Q. Lieutenant, I just had one question, when it comes to the sampling of the primary underway, whose permission do you need to sample the primary?

A. Ah, normally, it's just the Engineering Officer of the Watch permission, but for this particular sample we had to do something that required the Commanding Officer's permission to do this specific samples.

Q. Okay so,----

A. What we had to, I can't remember----

Q. The ultimate chain of authority was from the Commanding Officer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, thank you.

PRES: Re-cross?

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (LCDR Young): Nothing, sir.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): No, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you for your testimony, LT Mahoney, you're directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, parties thereto, or counsel. Do not allow any witness in this case to talk to you about the testimony that he has given or which he intends to give. If anyone other than counsel or parties attempts to talk to you about your testimony in this case, you should make those circumstances known to the counsel which called you, that would be myself as Counsel for the Court. Thank you, you're excused.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Sir, the court calls STS3 Anderson.

Brian S. Anderson, Sonar Technician (Submarines) Third Class, U.S. Navy, was called as a witness for the court, was sworn, and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Assistant Counsel for the Court (LCDR Harrison):

Q. Thank you, would you please take a seat. Petty Officer Anderson would you state your full name and would you spell your last name for the record.

A. Full name, Brian Scott Anderson, A-N-D-E-R-S-O-N

Q. And, you're currently assigned to the GREENEVILLE?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you been with the GREENEVILLE?

A. Since April of 1997.

Q. What department and division do you work in?

A. Weapons Department, Sonar Division.

Q. Can you describe your qualifications, your underway qualifications in terms of watches for us?

A. Fully qualified Sonar Operator, Towed Array Handling Supervisor and Weapons Handling Team Member.

Q. You also qualified on the fathometer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many people in Sonar are qualified on the fathometer?

A. I'll say all but maybe two member's of the division right now.

Q. Okay, did you stand the Fathometer Watch on the night, the 9th of February?

A. Yes, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you. Sir.

Questions by a court member (RADM Sullivan):

Q. Petty Officer Anderson, I just have a few questions to ask you. How did you know you were assigned the Fathometer Watch on the 9th?

A. Well, that day as lunch came around, you're trying to figure out how to rotate everybody through so, I was standing watch in Sonar in the morning and I was relieved so I could eat and then relieve the current Fathometer Watch and then take until we pull back in until dinner.

Q. Was there a posted modified piloting party or piloting party watchbill that you are aware of?

A. There is a piloting party watchbill, but it's normally--or Fathometer Watch isn't part of the piloting party.

Q. And, during the afternoon events when you're on watch, could you show with the laser pointer there, show where you stand your watch?

A. Standing right there [pointing laser at exhibit], sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): For the record, he's pointed out the spot that says fathometer on the port side of the diagram, it's Exhibit 6.

Q. Can you briefly describe what you were doing with the fathometer?

A. As Fathometer Watch, you're in charge of monitoring where the bottom of the ocean is. So on depth changes and normal running, the ship doesn't run aground while submerged.

Q. So, you're really working for the Navigator and the Navigation Supervisor correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have any interaction at all with the Sonar Supe and his team?

A. While on Fathometer Watch, not really sir.

Q. Okay. In fact I think it would be fair to say, it's purposely done that way, correct?

A. Fathometer is more of a navigational tool, but the equipment is part of the BSY-1 of the sonar systems, so that's why the Sonar Technicians are the ones who usually man it.

Q. Can you briefly tell me as--after say high-speed maneuver's, what were you doing with the fathometer? Was it continuous, were you taking single soundings?

A. We were running continuous soundings and doing logs every 15 minutes on them.

Q. You were in a position to at least observe the preparations to periscope depth, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you hear any reports--or any interactions between Sonar and Fire Control, Officer of the Deck?

A. I heard some of the reports, contacts that they held, the bearings. I wasn't really paying too much attention to the interaction because, really, I'm part of the watchstation. I'm supposed to maintain the fathometer and kind of ignore the rest except for depth changes.

Q. Okay, so you're doing your job?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there distinguished visitor's around you at the time?

A. There weren't many around the fathometer itself. They were more forward Control closer to Helms and Planes and periscopes.

Q. As you at least observed as a disinterested party of the baffle clear and the periscope depth, did you have any opinions as to how it was done?

A. From what I saw, it seemed like it was going like every other periscope evolution that we do. I didn't notice anything that was out of the ordinary.

MBR (RADM SULLIVAN): Okay, thank you.

Questions by a court member (RADM Stone):

Q. During the time at periscope depth and prior to going to emergency deep, did you have any conversations with CAPT Brandhuber, the Chief of Staff of SUBPAC?

A. No, sir.

MBR (RADM STONE): Thank you.

PRES: Counsel for CDR Waddle?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins):

Q. Do you have any recollection where CAPT Brandhuber may have been located?

A. I do not remember, sir.

Q. You were standing near the fathometer on Exhibit 6?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How close would you be to that station?

A. Within arms reach sir.

Q. You don't have a sense of a guy standing there in maybe whites or khaki's?

A. People were going back and forth constantly, I didn't really--after awhile you lose track of who's going where sir.

Counsel for CDR Waddle, party (Mr. Gittins): That's all I have, sir.

Counsel for LCDR Pfeifer, party (LCDR Stone): No questions, sir.

Counsel for LTJG Coen, party (LCDR Filbert): No questions, sir.

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Petty Officer Anderson, thank you for your testimony. You are directed not to discuss your testimony in this case with anyone other than a member of the court, parties thereto or counsel. You will not allow any witness in this case to talk to you about the testimony that he has given or which he intends to give. If anyone other than counsel or the parties attempts to talk to you about your testimony in this case, you should make those circumstances to the counsel originally calling you as a witness, that would be myself as Counsel for the Court. Do you understand?

WIT: Yes, sir.

[The witness withdrew from the courtroom.]

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): Thank you very much for your testimony. You're excused.

PRES: Petty Officer Anderson, you did a fine job.

WIT: Thank you, sir.

PRES: Any procedural matters?

ASST CC (LCDR HARRISON): No, sir.

PRES: We're going to recess until tomorrow morning. We're going to recess until 0800 tomorrow morning.

The court recessed at 1552 hours, 15 March 2001.